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Abstract
At the most general level, this thesis examines the ways in which face and object 
processing change with experience, and the ways in which they do not. Two theoretical 
topics are of particular interest. The first is the origin of holistic/configural processing: 
under normal circumstances, this is limited to faces, seen upright; here I explore 
whether it can develop with experience for inverted faces or for objects-of-expertise 
(thus testing the expertise hypothesis). The second is related to understanding face- 
space, and the norm-based coding of individual face identity. Timescales of experience 
considered range from 2 mins of adaptation to a distorted face, to 20 years at judging 
show-dogs.
Empirical chapters are organised as four more-or-less independent papers, each 
addressing somewhat distinct theoretical questions. The first empirical chapter tests 
whether extensive training with inverted faces is sufficient to change processing style to 
that used for upright faces (i.e. holistic). The second empirical chapter examines which 
tests are best for showing differences between faces and objects, in subjects with no 
particular expertise with the target object class (i.e., dog novices). The third empirical 
chapter tests whether dog-show judges (i.e., dog experts) process dogs in the same way 
as they do faces. The fourth empirical chapter tests whether adaptation to a distorted 
face changes perception in relation to a norm, whether any such changes are based on 
previous experience with faces, and whether adaptation transfers between upright and 
inverted faces when a relational (spacing) distortion is used.
Taken together, results suggest that upright-face-like processing does not occur 
for inverted faces or dogs after hours to years of practice; that previous experience has a 
strong effect on adaptation; that adaptation for both upright and inverted faces occurs 
with respect to a norm, but that the adaptation for upright and inverted faces occurs in 
different populations of neurons. In terms of methodology, results suggest that some 
tasks are better than others for asking questions about the domain-specificity of faces, 
and that adaptation to simple face-shape distortions is a good way to investigate the 
structure of “face-space”. Overall, the thesis concludes that there is little or no evidence 
to support the idea that practice changes processing of non-face objects or inverted faces 
in such a way that it becomes like that for upright faces. Possible origins of domain 
specificity (based on previous literature) are also discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: HOW ARE FACES “SPECIAL”?
1.1 Overview of the thesis
The general intent of this thesis is to examine the role and effects of experience 
on visual face and object processing. In particular I am interested in how different 
amounts of experience may be related to holistic or configural processing, namely the 
style of cognitive processing often argued to be “special” to faces, and considered to be 
an important part of what supports humans impressive ability to distinguish between 
many individual faces. The different amounts of experience to be examined range from 
minutes to many years. As an example of the former, I investigate changes in what 
appears normal after a two minute adaptation to distorted faces and how this relates to 
face-representations derived from long-term experience. As an example of the latter, I 
investigate how dog experts with 20 years experience process pictures of dogs.
One aim of this thesis is to contribute to the debate on whether 
holistic/configural processing is domain specific, that is, limited to faces, and indeed, to 
upright faces. As a review of previous empirical studies will show, upright faces are 
special at least compared to many other stimuli. The question is whether 
holistic/configural algorithms can be applied to non-face objects, or inverted (upside- 
down) faces under certain circumstances. I am primarily interested in the theory that 
within-class discrimination plus experience produces holistic processing; here, the 
amount of practice required might be anything from hours to years. This expertise 
hypothesis is contrasted with the theory that holistic/configural processing is genuinely 
domain-specific, and thus only upright faces are holistically processed. (Were such 
domain-specific processing supported, it might have some innate basis; however, this 
possibility is not empirically tested in this thesis.) These theories will be fully explored 
in the literature review and experimental chapters.
Most of the empirical work in the thesis addresses this first aim of evaluating 
domain specificity. The first experimental chapter addresses the question of whether 
training in an experimental setting is sufficient to develop upright-face-like processing 
for inverted faces. Inverted faces are an obvious comparison stimulus to upright faces in 
that they have the same low-level properties (e.g., spatial frequency, brightness, etc.) 
but, without practice, are not processed holistically. The chapter explores the 
development, or otherwise, of holistic processing with 10 hours of exposure to inverted
faces, an amount of practice which has been suggested to induce holistic processing for 
the artificial objects “greebles”, and which is well in excess of the number of trials 
required to remove inversion effects for visual recognition of objects.
Subsequent work then explores the emergence, or otherwise, of holistic 
processing with much greater levels of experience. In this case, the stimulus class 
considered is a type of object -  labrador dogs -  rather than inverted faces, and the 
subjects of interest are real-world experts with many years of experience in individual 
identity level judgements for this class (e.g., labrador dog-show judges). I argue that 
labradors provide a good comparison for face stimuli in several ways, the most 
important being that they are living things with genetic diversity and thus, as for faces, 
individuals differ from one another on a great many dimensions; this is not the case for 
man-made objects such as greebles. The chapter reports tests for face-like processing of 
labradors on several tasks, some relevant to holistic processing (inversion effects, 
composite task) and one that tests for a non-holistic phenomenon (sensitivity to reversed 
contrast), in labrador experts. Dogs have not previously been compared to faces on two 
of these tests even in novices. Thus, the chapter before the one on dog experts presents 
results on the tasks for subjects who have no particular expertise with dogs beyond 
general familiarity and knowledge of a canonical upright. The results for these “dog 
novices” confirm that within-class discrimination alone is not sufficient to induce face­
like processing on any of the measures. The primary aim of this study with novices is to 
consider which tests of face recognition are best for testing the expertise hypothesis, by 
establishing which show effects for faces and not objects (a qualitative difference) 
rather than having only a disproportionately large effect for faces compared to objects (a 
quantitative difference).
The last study relevant to the domain specificity hypothesis returns to a 
comparison of upright and inverted faces, using a method that explores the effect of 
very short-term experience -  a two minute adaptation period -  on the perception of 
facial distortion. The result of interest concerns the transfer of adaptation across 
orientations. There is substantial behavioural evidence that upright and inverted faces 
are processed differently at a cognitive level. However, the area of the brain most 
strongly activated by faces (compared to other objects) is also activated by inverted 
faces. A single study has used adaptation to show that upright and inverted faces are 
processed by different neural populations. Lack of transfer of adaptation between
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upright and inverted faces would provide another test of this, and show that different 
neural populations are used for the particular distortion I have tested.
The second aim of this thesis is to use the effects of experience to understand the 
representations of upright faces as individuals. This can be done using temporary face- 
adaptation in the theoretical context of a “face-space”. As noted above, holistic 
processing assists us in recognising individuals. Each individual face may also be 
thought of as belonging to some kind of multi-dimensional face-space, presumed to be 
built up of faces seen over the life of an individual. Of particular interest is the form that 
adaptation takes, whether it is related to a norm in face-space, and how it can be 
modelled in neural terms. I also examine whether some dimensions in face-space are 
more adaptable than others and whether this is related to differences in the natural 
population of faces experienced in everyday life. Thus, this part of the thesis deals with 
how short-term exposure may change face representations built up over longer-term 
experience.
Several aspects of the literature on face processing form the background to the 
experimental studies. These are reviewed, along with the basic theories relevant to the 
experiments, in Chapters 1 and 2 of the thesis. Chapter 3 then contains the experiments 
on processing of inverted faces after extensive training (Experiments 1-3). Chapter 4 
contains experiments comparing results for faces versus labradors on several tests in 
non-dog-experts (Experiments 4-6), and Chapter 5 contains the corresponding 
experiments in dog experts (Experiments 7-9). Chapter 6 presents the experiments on 
adaptation for different dimensions in face-space (Experiments 10 & 11), that on 
transfer of adaptation between upright and inverted stimuli (Experiment 12) and some 
preliminary neural models of the results. Chapter 7 is the General Discussion, which 
draws together the results of all experiments, and considers how these relate to each 
other and to the previous literature.
1.2 Review of empirical evidence on whether faces are special.
This section will review literature relevant to the question of whether upright 
and inverted faces are processed differently, and whether faces are processed differently 
from other objects. Literature from behavioural tasks as well as relevant work from
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neuroscience will be reviewed; note that all experiments reported in the present thesis 
are behavioural experiments on adult human subjects. Also note that in this thesis “face 
processing” means individual identity not, for example, emotion or attractiveness; 
previous research has shown that identity is separable from these other aspects of face 
processing (e.g., Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Schweich & Bruyer, 1993).
In this chapter only object processing in non-experts will be discussed. That is, 
the subjects of the reviewed experiments will be ordinary people with a general 
familiarity for the class of objects tested, rather than extensive practice at discriminating 
similar individuals of that class. Note that all people are generally agreed to be expert at 
face recognition, unless they have some kind of disorder which prevents them from 
recognising people normally (e.g., prosopagnosia, or possibly autism).
1.2.1 The disproportionate inversion effect on memory for faces.
In behavioural experiments, early studies on memory for upright and inverted 
stimuli suggested that faces were processed differently from other objects. On a task of 
recognition memory, faces were more adversely affected by inversion than other stimuli 
which also have a canonical upright (e.g., aeroplanes, houses, or stick figures displaying 
different actions; Yin, 1969). This disproportionate inversion effect for faces occurred 
even when the non-face stimuli (pictures of period costumes) were easier to recognise 
than faces in the upright orientation (Yin, 1969). The effect has also been replicated for 
other stimuli including pictures of buildings (Scapinello & Yarmey, 1970) and 
landscapes (Diamond & Carey, 1986), dogs (in non-experts; Diamond & Carey, 1986) 
and dog faces (Scapinello & Yarmey, 1970).
Yin interpreted his results as indicating that upright faces are processed in a 
holistic or configural manner whereas inverted faces and objects are processed in a part- 
based manner. However, Valentine (1988) noted that a disproportionate inversion effect 
does not provide any direct evidence of holistic processing, and moreover, that the 
disproportionate inversion is only a quantitative not qualitative difference and does not 
mean that faces are special per se. Before I describe more recent evidence arguing 
directly that upright faces are holistically processed, I use the next section to describe 
what is and is not meant by holistic processing in the present thesis.
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1.2.2 Exactly what is holistic processing for faces?
In the face recognition literature, the terms “holistic” and “configural” 
processing are taken to mean some kind of extraction or integration of information 
across the entire face region (excluding hair). The exact definition of these terms 
remains a matter of debate (e.g., see Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002, for a 
discussion). They vary from meaning processing information from the whole face with 
no decomposition into local parts (e.g., Farah, 1996; Moscovitch, Winocur, & 
Behrmann, 1997; Tanaka & Farah, 1993) to initial part-decomposition followed by 
encoding relationships and/or spacing between multiple features (e.g., Rhodes, 1988). 
Note that faces are generally agreed to share a first-order configuration; that is, the same 
parts in the same basic order (for faces, two eyes above a nose above a mouth). 
Differences in spacing between features are then sometimes referred to as differences in 
the second-order relationships (Diamond & Carey, 1986). It is not clear exactly how the 
spacing between multiple sets of features is related to “holistic” processing (in the sense 
of processing an undifferentiated whole) except that changes in spacing between 
features will change the whole. Most authors agree that tests of these kinds of changes 
all access aspects of the same underlying process. In the present thesis, I use the term 
holistic to cover all versions of holistic or configural processing proposed (e.g., see 
Maurer et al., 2002) and will not distinguish between them. Holistic/configural 
processes are contrasted with local part or feature information (e.g., exact shape of eyes 
or lips).
It is also important to briefly note what is not meant by holistic processing in the 
context of this thesis. Many stimuli show some advantage for parts being processed in 
context. For example, letters are recognised more easily in the context of words than in 
isolation, or in jumbled letter strings (the word superiority effect, Reicher, 1969; 
Wheeler, 1970). Although this may be one kind of holistic processing it is not the kind 
used for recognising faces. In support of this, there exist patients who, although unable 
to recognise faces, can read normally (Humphreys & Rumiati, 1998; Moscovitch et al., 
1997). Similarly, the ability to use closure to recognise Mooney faces or objects (very 
high contrast pictures with no grey tones) is not the same as holistic processing of faces, 
although Mooney faces/objects are easier to see when you have been told what to look 
for. This claim is supported by the finding that a patient with impaired object 
recognition but intact face recognition can accurately describe Mooney faces (e.g., a 
young girl looking right) but not Mooney objects (Moscovitch, et al., 1997). Further, a
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double-dissociation exists with a patient unable to recognise faces, but able to recognise 
objects with missing segments or presented in visual noise (Duchaine, 2000). These 
findings suggest that closure is an earlier stage of visual processing to the holistic 
processing involved in face recognition. One final example of what is not meant by 
holistic processing in this thesis must be given. Gauthier, Curran, Curby, & Collins 
(2003) define holistic processing as “obligatory processing of all features of an object, 
even when subjects are instructed to attend selectively to one feature while ignoring 
others” (p.428). This definition as the inability to ignore notionally irrelevant stimuli 
would mean that anything with high automaticity of processing would be holistically 
processed with whatever else was presented at the same time. As a concrete example, 
this definition would suggest that words plus colours are holistically processed in the 
Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935). Such an attention-based definition is not what is usually 
meant by holistic processing in the literature on faces. This thesis will examine holistic 
processing only in the strict sense used in the face literature.
1.2.3 Evidence of holistic processing for upright but not inverted faces.
Subsequent to Valentine’s (1988) review, several paradigms have directly shown 
the special nature of upright face processing. In Young, Hellawell, and Hay’s (1987) 
composite effect, the top half of one famous person’s face was combined with the 
bottom half of a different famous person’s face (e.g., Tony Blair’s forehead with 
George Bush’s chin). An example is given in Figure 1.1. For upright faces, when these 
two halves were physically aligned, subjects were slower to name either half (e.g., the 
top half) than when the two halves were offset. Given that simple response competition 
from the two halves is the same in both aligned and unaligned conditions, this indicates 
that perceptual fusing of the two halves (i.e. holistic processing) occurred when the 
halves were aligned. For inverted faces, in contrast, there was no difference in naming 
times for aligned and unaligned stimuli, indicating no holistic processing. This result 
has been replicated with both familiar and unfamiliar faces (Carey & Diamond, 1994; 
Hole, 1994; Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2004). For unfamiliar faces, a 
matching version of the task is used (the variations of the task will be discussed in 
Chapter 5).
6
Figure 1.1. An example of stimuli used in the composite task, made up of the top- 
half of George Bush's face and the bottom half of Tony Blair's face. In Young et 
al. (1987) reaction times to name the top half were significantly slower in the 
aligned than the unaligncd condition for upright stimuli, but there was no 
difference between conditions for inverted stimuli.
In Tanaka and Farah’s (1993) part-whole paradigm, subjects first learned whole 
faces (e.g., Bill). In a subsequent memory test stimulus pairs were presented, either as 
isolated parts (e.g., Bill’s mouth vs. Jim’s mouth) with subjects asked to choose a 
specified part (e.g., Bill’s mouth), or in the context of the whole face (e.g., Bill’s mouth 
in Bill’s face vs. Bill’s mouth in Jim’s face) with subjects asked to choose a specified 
face (e.g., Bill’s face). An example is shown in Figure 1.2. In the upright orientation, 
memory for the face part was better in the whole face condition than in the isolated part 
condition, indicating strong integration of parts into wholes. This did not occur, 
however, for inverted faces or scrambled faces. Scrambled faces contain all the same 
face parts as normal faces but the first-order configuration has been changed (e.g., the 
mouth at the top, one eye and the nose in the middle, and the other eye at the bottom). 
Results for scrambled faces thus show that it is not only the presence of the parts in the 
correct upright orientation, but also the arrangement of those parts which is important. 
Variations on this paradigm include: an immediate memory version, where subjects are 
presented with a face and then presented with either two parts alone or two parts in the 
face (Davidoff & Donnelly, 1990; Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999)1; and a version where
1 Note that the effect is referred to by Davidoff and Donnelly as a Complete Probe Advantage or CPA.
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subjects are asked whether it is Bill’s mouth in both part and whole conditions (rather 
than Bill’s face in the whole condition; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997).
Study:
Test: whole 
condition
lest: part 
condition
Bill's face
Bill's lips in Bill's face Jim's lips in Bill's face
Bill's lips Jim's lips
Figure 1.2. An example of stimuli used in the part versus whole task. Subjects are 
more accurate at remembering Bill's lips in the context of Bill's studied face 
(whole condition) than when presented alone (part condition). This difference 
occurs when all stimuli are upright, but not when they are inverted.
A range of techniques have been reported which fall under the heading of 
relational (or spacing) versus local feature alterations. The first of these was the 
Thatcher illusion reported by Thompson (1980), in which the eyes and mouth of a face 
(in the original case, Margaret Thatcher) are inverted while the rest of the face is 
unaltered. The resulting stimulus appears extremely grotesque when upright, but 
becomes only slightly odd when inverted. Murray, Yong, & Rhodes (2000) compared 
Thatcherised faces, and faces with altered spacing/relationship between features (e.g.,
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the mouth moved abnormally far down the face), to faces where an individual local 
feature had been altered (in this case blacking out teeth or whiting out eyes). Ratings of 
“bizarreness” were taken at various orientations between upright and inverted and it was 
found that while ratings for normal and featurally altered faces decreased linearly with 
inversion, the change in ratings with rotation was more bell-shaped for spacing-altered 
and Thatcherised faces. Murray et al. conclude that spacing type changes (ones that alter 
the holistic nature of the face) are noticed well in the upright orientation, but poorly 
when the face is inverted. Changes to local features, conversely, are obvious in upright 
and inverted orientations (as well as intermediate ones). Other experiments have come 
to similar conclusions (e.g., Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Gilchrist & McKone, 2003; Le 
Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2001; Leder & Bruce, 1998; Rhodes, Brake, & 
Atkinson, 1993). An example of a spacing change, a featural change (of the kind used 
by Leder & Bruce, 1998) and a Thatcherised face are shown in Figure 1.3.
Thatcherised Bill Bill with featural change Bill with spacing change
Figure 1.3. An example of a Thatcherised face (the fact that it looks less odd 
when inverted can be seen by turning the page upside-down), a featural change to 
the colour of mouth and eyes (of the kind used by Leder and Bruce, 1998), and a 
spacing/relational change in the distance between eyes. Original Bill is shown in 
Figure 1.2.
Two further techniques have been shown to isolate the configural/holistic 
component of face processing, and to show that it occurs only for upright faces. In the 
first, McKone, Martini & Nakayama’s (2001) categorical perception in noise technique, 
subjects were trained to classify two faces and a continuum of morphs between them as
9
either “Face 1” or “Face 2”. These were presented in heavy visual noise (e.g., random 
dots) to make recognition via local features unreliable. After up to 10 sessions of this 
classification practice, subjects were asked to make similarity judgements between pairs 
of faces, or to say which of two sequentially presented faces was “most like Face 1”. 
Categorical perception is defined as better discrimination around a perceived boundary 
between the two faces (e.g., for 40% and 60% Face 1 morphs if the boundary was 50%) 
than for morphs an equal distance apart but on the same side of the perceived boundary 
(e.g, 20% and 40% Face 1 morphs). McKone et al. found categorical perception for 
upright faces, but not for inverted faces or for isolated parts (noses).
In the second technique isolating configural processing, McKone's (2004) 
peripheral identification technique, faces were flashed at various distances from 
fixation. For both upright and inverted faces, identification accuracy reduced as 
horizontal distance from fixation increased, consistent with the degradation of low level 
visual processing that occurs in the periphery. The important finding was that the falloff 
with distance from fixation was faster for inverted faces than for upright faces. This 
produced a peripheral inversion effect, namely a reemergence of an inversion decrement 
in the periphery when subjects had previously been trained to identify upright and 
inverted faces to ceiling accuracy with central presentation. McKone (2004) argued that 
these results arose because (a) upright faces are processed in a holistic plus part-based 
manner while inverted faces are processed as parts only, (b) holistic processing 
integrates information from across larger regions of the face than does part-based 
processing, and (c) peripheral presentation degrades the information available from any 
single local region of the face (e.g., the nose alone, or a patch of skin on the left cheek). 
Together, these factors allow identification of upright faces to survive further into the 
periphery than identification of inverted faces. In direct support of this interpretation, no 
peripheral inversion effect was found for an isolated face part, namely the nose alone.
From the studies reviewed above, it is apparent that upright and inverted faces 
are processed qualitatively differently. Moreover the results for upright faces indicate 
that they are holistically/configurally processed, whereas inverted faces and scrambled 
faces are processed as a mostly unrelated collection of parts.
1.2.4 Results for objects using the above holistic processing paradigms.
I now review findings for the paradigms described above with objects as stimuli 
(note again that this is only in non-experts). For many of these paradigms there have
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been few (or, in the case of McKone et al.’s, 2001, categorical perception in noise task, 
no) objects tested, so for these cases the claim that the paradigms show that faces are 
special relies only on the distinctions between upright and inverted faces.
The composite effect has only been tested with one class of non-face objects, the 
novel objects known as “greebles”. Greebles are vaguely animal-like rendered shapes 
(i.e., they look three-dimensional) with cylindrical “bodies”, “heads” and four 
protrusions (three from the “head”, one from the “body”; see Figure 1.4). Like faces, all 
greebles share a first-order configuration. In assessing the composite effect, Gauthier & 
Tarr (2002) required subjects to match the target half of aligned and unaligned greebles 
in a sequential same/different task. Aligned trials were matched approximately 42 ms 
faster than unaligned trials. Holistic processing would be indicated by aligned trials 
being matched slower than unaligned trails; thus greebles were not holistically 
processed.
Figure 1.4. Example greebles courtesy of Michael J. Tarr (Brown University).
The part-whole paradigm has been tested on more object classes than any other 
test of holistic processing. This includes the long-term and short-term memory versions 
of the task, as well as a “transformed” version in which the part is tested in the whole 
but with a spacing change also made (e.g., for faces this might be Bill’s mouth in Jim’s 
face with Jim’s eyes moved apart; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997). In the latter case the result 
for faces is that performance for the part in a transformed whole face is intermediate to 
performance for an isolated part or the part in the original whole face (in fact it is 
significantly better than performance for parts but significantly worse than performance 
for original whole faces). Using Tanaka and Farah’s (1993) long-term memory version 
of the part-whole paradigm, no part-whole effect or transformed part-whole effect was
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obtained for houses (Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999; Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & 
Sengco, 1997), and no part-whole effect was obtained for dog faces (Tanaka et al.,
1996, cited in Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997). A small part-whole effect was found for car 
fronts and biological cells (approximately 8-16%; Tanaka et al., 1996, cited in Tanaka 
& Gauthier, 1997), but this was much smaller than for faces (approximately 25% in this 
study). For the artificial stimuli “greebles”, small effects have also sometimes been 
found. There was no reliable effect in Gauthier, Williams, Tarr, and Tanaka (1998), the 
only difference being because one isolated part was below chance. There was a 6% part- 
whole effect in Gauthier and Tan' (1997); and a part-whole effect in d’ (a measure of 
sensitivity) of 1.4, and a transformed part-whole effect in d’ of approximately 0.5. Note 
that neither of the greeble studies included faces as a comparison group.
Using the immediate memory version of the paradigm (CPA), a small part- 
whole effect was found for houses (approximately 5-10%, Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999). 
and chairs (5% compared to 11% for faces, Davidoff & Donnelly, 1990). Thus, the part- 
whole effect may be like the inversion effect in that the effect is much larger for faces 
than for other objects, although a small effect does occur for objects.
Only one study has examined the Thatcher illusion with an object class, and then 
only on children. Rouse, Donnelly, Hadwin, and Brown (2004) asked children to 
identify which of two houses was “odd”. To make Thatcherised houses the bay window 
and door were turned upside-down. This gave the impression of an inward curving, 
rather than an outward curving bay window. Rouse et al. compared the differences in 
accuracy to pick the odd stimulus between upright and inverted orientation for faces and 
houses. The inversion effect was 34% for faces, and 14% for houses (although note that 
the upright performance for houses was worse, making comparison of the size of the 
inversion effects difficult).
Sensitivity to spacing-based changes has not been tested with any natural object 
class. Many studies have changed the distance between parts of made-up objects, and 
some have even compared these to changes to shape of parts (e.g., Keane, Hayward. & 
Burke, 2003, Experiment 4). However, these were stimuli with no canonical upright, 
making comparison with tests using faces difficult (because for faces the finding is that 
both spacing and feature changes are noticed well upright, but that feature changes are 
noticed much better than spacing changes inverted). Obviously much more work needs 
to be done before conclusions can be drawn about whether there are differences 
between faces and objects on this paradigm.
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Turning to the paradigms which isolate holistic processing for faces, the 
categorical perception in noise paradigm has not been used. The peripheral 
identification task has been tested for dachshund dogs. MacPherson (2001) showed that 
within-class discrimination of dachshunds did not produce the inversion effect in the 
periphery which is characteristic of holistic processing for faces. If anything, processing 
of inverted dogs was slightly better than processing of upright dogs, and both declined 
at the same rate as eccentricity increased.
In summary, while testing of more object classes would be valuable, it is clear 
that (in non-experts) objects do not receive the same type of holistic processing as faces. 
Objects show small inversion effects and small part-whole effects, but these are not 
nearly as big as for faces. Further, the composite and peripheral identification 
paradigms show no effect, at least for the limited classes of objects tested so far 
(interestingly this suggests that these paradigms may provide purer measures of face­
like holistic processing that the other tasks).
1.2.5 Non-holistic behavioural paradigms on which faces and objects differ.
Contrast reversal. Effects of contrast reversal (reversing the luminance values of 
pixels so that the picture looks like a photographic negative) have been evaluated as 
potentially “special” to faces (e.g., Gauthier, et al., 1998). Many studies have shown 
that contrast reversal substantially impairs face recognition (e.g, Bruce & Langton,
1994; Johnston, Hill, & Carman, 1992; Kemp, Pike, White, & Musselman, 1996) and 
even impairs discrimination of spacing changes in faces (Kemp, McManus, & Pigott, 
1990). This does not necessarily imply that contrast reversal only or primarily affects 
holistic processing for faces. Instead, it seems that contrast reversal disrupts information 
about shape-from-shading at an independent stage in the visual processing stream. 
Kemp, et al. (1990) showed that, in a match-to-sample task, inversion (turning the face 
upside-down) and contrast reversal each reduced accuracy in an additive fashion (i.e., 
there was no interaction between the two), indicating that inversion and contrast 
reversal affect face-recognition in different ways (also see Bruce & Langton, 1994). 
Confirming this result, Hole, George, and Dunsmore (1999) found that there was a 
composite effect (i.e., holistic processing) that was as large for contrast reversed faces 
as for original faces.
For objects, three studies have investigated contrast reversal effects. In the one 
published study, Gauthier et al. (1998) found no effect of contrast reversal for
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identifying previously learned greebles. In a conference presentation, Subramaniam & 
Biederman (1997) reported the same null result with a sequential same-different task for 
chairs. However, in both these studies the objects had strong part boundaries that are 
relatively insensitive to contrast reversal and thus processing may have been less reliant 
on shape-from-shading cues than is the case for faces. Reporting in a second conference 
presentation, Nederhouser, Mangini, Biederman, & Kazunori (2002) addressed this to 
some extent by using “blobs” (pictures of smooth three-dimensional objects with a 
number of random looking protrusions), and again found no effect of contrast reversal. 
Thus, results to date suggest that objects do not produce face-like contrast reversal 
effects.
Attention. Although attention is not the focus of this thesis, it is worth noting 
that upright faces may also be special with regard to attentional resources. For example, 
even though faces do not “pop-out” in visual search (e.g., Brown, Huey, & Findlay, 
1997), patients with unilateral neglect can attend to the neglected side if something 
“makes a face” across the mid-line (e.g., Vuilleumier, 2000; Vuilleumier & Sagiv,
2001). That is, when two crosses or two digits were presented with a curved line below, 
all inside a circle (i.e., representing two eyes and a mouth in a face), patients could 
correctly report the items on both sides of the screen. Without the “mouth” and “face- 
outline”, patients ignored the item on the left. Further, work by Palermo and Rhodes 
(2002) suggests that upright and inverted faces may have different attentional resources. 
Subjects performed a sequential match-to-sample version of the part-whole task, but 
while viewing the upright test face were either asked to ignore two flanking faces or to 
say whether the flanking faces where pictures of the same person in different views. The 
flanking faces task interfered with holistic processing of the main task when the 
flanking faces were upright but not when they were inverted.
Practice and inversion effects. Both objects and faces show inversion effects on 
recognition memory. Objects also show large inversion effects in time (or accuracy) to 
name rotated objects (e.g., Jolicoeur, 1985; Lawson & Jolicoeur, 1998), but these 
effects disappear rapidly with practice (3-30 trials, McKone & Grenfell, 1999). Further, 
this is true even for objects which require discrimination of similar individuals rather 
than the more common basic level naming (approximately 95 trials, Tarr & Pinker, 
1989). Training with inverted objects may even induce reversed inversion effects (i.e., 
better performance for inverted than upright). In a conference presentation, Husk, 
Sekuler, & Bennett (2004; Husk personal communication, August, 2004) report training
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subjects to discriminate upright or inverted houses using up to 4,000 trials in total. 
Before training there were no consistent inversion effects. After training there was an 
inversion effect for the subjects who had learnt houses upright and a reversed inversion 
effect for those that had learnt the houses inverted (about 13% in both cases). Note that 
this was still substantially smaller than the inversion effect for untrained faces (about 
30% in this study).
There has been little research on training with inverted faces, particularly 
regarding whether training affects processing style. Haggbloom and Wamick (2003) 
showed, for example, that after training subjects can improve old/new recognition 
memory for inverted faces so that it is similar to the performance of another group on 
upright faces. However, this study did not test whether the processing of upright and 
inverted faces was the same. The only previously published study which tested 
processing style of inverted faces after training is the categorical perception study of 
McKone et al. (2001). They gave subjects up to 30,000 exposures to inverted faces but 
still failed to find holistic processing. It may be that the constancy or not of inversion 
effects over practice differentiates faces and objects (a full review on the subject of 
training with inverted faces is provided in Chapter 3).
1.2.6 Summary of behavioural studies.
The above sections have reviewed literature on behavioural findings for faces. 
Faces show disproportionate inversion effect in recognition memory compared to other 
objects. Further, as revealed by the composite, part-whole and spacing versus local 
change paradigms, upright faces seem to be processed in a holistic/configural manner 
including strong sensitivity to second-order relational information, whereas inverted 
faces are processed in a part-based or local feature manner. Not all the paradigms 
comparing upright and inverted faces have been used to compare faces and non-face 
objects. For the composite effect, the one object class tested to date (greebles) suggests 
no holistic processing for non-face objects. The part-whole effect is small but present 
for several object classes (i.e., the part-whole effect, like the inversion effect, is merely 
disproportionately large for faces rather than being present for faces and absent in 
objects). Spacing versus local changes have not been tested for objects in the same way 
that faces have, but note that this may be partly due to difficulty in defining what makes 
a spacing rather than a part change in, for example, a dog. It is also worth noting that in 
all the studies reviewed above, the objects, like faces, were compared at a within-class
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or individual level (i.e., comparing dog 1 vs. dog 2, in the same way that w;e would 
usually make judgments about Bill vs. Jim). This point will be returned to later.
Overall, behavioural findings show that upright faces are different from inverted 
faces and objects in terms of style of cognitive processing. The following sections will 
review differences (and similarities) in the way that objects and faces are processed in 
the brain. Sections will include brief reviews of studies looking at clinical patients, brain 
scans, hemispheric differences, and evoked response potentials (ERP) or 
magnetoencephalography (MEG).
1.2.7 Differences between faces and objects in neuropsychology.
Prosopagnosia is the disorder of being unable to recognise faces2. It was first 
reported by Quaglino & Borelli in 1867 (cited in Benton, 1990), and is often taken as 
evidence that faces are processed separately from other objects in the brain (e.g., Farah, 
1996; McNeil & Warrington, 1993). However, it has been questioned whether 
prosopagnosia is truly a face-specific deficit, or whether the deficit applies generally to 
within-class discrimination (Faust, 1955, cited in Benton, 1990). Particularly in early 
studies, it was common to compare between class discrimination of objects (e.g., chair, 
vs. table) to within-class discrimination of faces (e.g., Bill vs. Jim), but it has been noted 
(e.g., Damasio, Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982) that this is not a fair comparison as 
individual faces are more similar to each other than objects such as a table and a chair 
are to each other. A single system for recognising both faces and objects, with partial 
brain damage distributed throughout this system, might show deficits for the harder 
(within-class) task of face discrimination, but not for the easier (between-class) task of 
object discrimination.
On the other hand, if the brain areas important for object processing are distinct 
from, but spatially close to, those for important for face processing, then a brain injury 
might often damage both areas together. Arguing against the within-class discrimination 
interpretation of prosopagnosia, apparently “pure” cases have been reported. For 
example, prosopagnosic WJ showed normal performance for identifying individual 
sheep faces, despite very poor performance for identifying individual humans faces 
(McNeil & Warrington, 1993; see also De Renzi, 1986). This result has recently been 
extended from patients with acquired prosopagnosia (e.g., as the result of a stroke or
2
Note that prosopagnosics can sometimes recognise people by other features such as voice or hairstyle.
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head-injury) to patients who were apparently bom prosopagnosic (they have no history 
or sign of trauma). Duchaine, Dingle, Butterworth & Nakayama (2004) showed that the 
developmentally prosopagnosic subject Edward could be trained to recognise greebles 
at the same rate as normal controls, showing that his ability to discriminate similar 
individual objects was good. Moreover, a double dissociation between object and face 
recognition has been demonstrated. The “pure” object agnosic patient CK identified 
individual faces perfectly but was unable to recognise objects even at the basic level 
(Moscovitch et al., 1997; also see Humphreys & Rumiati, 1998). This rejects the idea 
that face processing is always more sensitive to brain damage than object processing.
The double dissociation between “pure” prosopagnosia and “pure’ object 
agnosia would seem convincing evidence for a genuine separation between faces and 
objects. Despite this, some authors have quite recently argued for the within-class 
interpretation of prosopagnosia. Gauthier, Behrmann and Tarr (1999) varied level of 
categorisation for objects, including a between-class condition (e.g., comparing faces to 
other objects), a subordinate level condition (e.g., comparing a pigeon to an eagle) and 
an individual level condition (e.g., comparing eagle 1 to eagle 2). Noting that the tests 
of patients WJ and LH (suggested to be normal at making within-class discriminations 
of chairs and eyeglasses frames; Farah, Levinson, & Klein, 1995) were based only on 
accuracy measures with unlimited presentation duration, Gauthier et al. measured 
reaction time (RT) and also accuracy with limited presentation time. In simultaneous 
matching and match-to-sample tasks, two prosopagnosics (SM and CR) were affected 
by level of categorisation; age-matched controls were also affected, but the effect was 
disproportionately large for the prosopagnosics. Gauthier et al. interpret this finding as 
showing that prosopagnosics have a deficit at within-class processing for objects. Note, 
however, that the prosopagnosics were slower than controls even at between-class 
discrimination, making it difficult to compare the size of the categorisation level effects 
between subject groups as these were in relation to different baselines. In contrast to 
Gauthier et al.’s results, the developmental prosopagnosic Edward was within the 
normal range of RTs on two levels of a greeble verification task (identity and family), 
as well as a naming task (Duchaine et al., 2004). Second, using simultaneous matching 
and match-to-sample tasks de Gelder, Bachoud-Levi, and Degos (1998) found 
prosopagnosic patient AD showed a reversed inversion effect (i.e., inverted better than 
upright) for within-class discrimination of shoes. This pattern matched that found for 
faces in this patient (and patient LH, Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1995). The
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reversed inversion effect for shoes also occurred for LH (de Gelder & Rouw, 2000), but 
was not found for a third prosopagnosic (RP in Rouw & de Gelder, 2002).
In summary, there is quite good evidence from the neuropsychology literature 
that faces and objects are processed separately in the brain. This is not without 
controversy, with some prosopagnosic patients also having deficits at making within- 
class discriminations with objects. However, note that drawing conclusions from this 
literature without reference to other areas of research may be misleading, as different 
patients have different levels and extent of damage (or in the case of developmental 
prosopagnosics, areas which have not been properly formed). This makes it hard to 
know which kinds of processing are linked from examining a single patient (see 
Duchaine, Nieminen-von Wendt, New, & Kulomaki, 2003, for a good discussion of this 
problem).
1.2.8 Face specific brain regions and neuroimaging.
As well as research on people unable to recognise faces (or objects) studies of 
brain processes have focussed on cortical activity in normal subjects. Using 
neuroimaging techniques, a “fusiform face area” (FFA; Kanwisher, McDermott, & 
Chun, 1997) has been located that is activated more by looking at faces than by looking 
at a range of other objects differing in basic category (activation is measured as an 
increase in Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent -  BOLD -  response)3. In arguing that 
this activation is genuinely face specific, rather than being attributable to within-class 
discrimination for faces, McCarthy, Puce, Gore, and Allison (1997) found strong FFA 
activation for different individual faces shown in a field of other objects, but not for 
individual flowers shown in a field of other objects. A possible criticism is that this 
difference could have been due to the passive viewing task leading subjects to 
spontaneously employ within-class processing for faces, but only basic level 
categorisation for flowers. However, using a one-back-matching task to ensure attention 
to individual identity for all stimuli, FFA activation has been confirmed to be stronger 
for faces than for hands (Kanwisher et al., 1997), and houses (Tong, Nakayama, 
Moscovitch, Weinrib, & Kanwisher, 2000). Similarly, higher activation for faces than 
houses, cars, flowers, or guitars has also been found on a within-class task where 
subjects have to make judgements about whether a stimulus is the same sub-type as a
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pre-specified target (e.g., pigeon rather than another bird; Grill-Spector, Knouf, & 
Kanwisher, 2004); and for individual Lepidoptera (butterflies and moths) on an old/new 
recognition task (Rhodes. Byatt, Michie, & Puce, 2004).
In contrast to this evidence, two studies by Gauthier and colleagues have argued 
that the FFA is a general within-class object processing area. In the first Gauthier, 
Anderson, Tarr, Skudlarski, and Gore (1997) found increased activation with 
subordinate level verification (e.g. Is this a penguin? for penguin vs. ostrich) compared 
to basic-level verification (e.g., Is this a bird? for penguin vs. goldfish). However, in 
this study the “FFA” was not individually localised; instead a large area of cortex was 
defined based on coordinates determined from previous studies. This means that the 
area being examined was not necessarily the same as the area that processes faces 
(McKone & Kanwisher, in press). In the second study, Gauthier, Tarr et al. (2000) 
individually localised the FFA, and replicated the result of increased activation with 
subordinate level verification. However, the amount of activation for within-class 
discrimination of objects is difficult to interpret given that no comparable task for faces 
was included; the only comparison made was between the difference between faces and 
objects (localiser task) and the difference between basic-level and subordinate-level 
discriminations.
Overall, there seems to be good evidence that the FFA is more activated by faces 
than other objects. Even when processing is at an individual level the activation for 
faces is still stronger than that for objects (Rhodes, Byatt, et al., 2004). The only object 
class for which there seems to be much more activation than baseline is birds (Grill- 
Spector et al., 2004). As Grill-Spector et al. themselves point out, this may be because 
birds, like faces, have heads.
A second question about the FFA is then in what way is it involved in face 
processing? The fact that the FFA is quite strongly activated by cat faces and by human 
eyes without the rest of the face (Tong et al., 2000) may suggest that any “faceness” is 
enough to activate the area to some extent. This suggestion is further supported by the 
fact the area is still strongly activated by inverted faces, although less than for upright 
faces (Kanwisher, Tong, & Nakayama, 1998). Importantly, however, recent evidence 
from Grill-Spector et al. (2004) in which they correlated activation with behavioural
Other areas such as an Ocipital Face area (OFA) are sometimes reported, but as the focus in the 
literature has been on the FFA. focus in this thesis will also be on the FFA.
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responses on a trial-by-trial basis, showed that the FFA is involved in individual face 
identification as well as just face detection.
The question of what activation actually means in these studies is also an 
important one. Generally results are discussed as though more activation in an area 
indicates better tuning for processing a particular stimulus class. However, less 
activation can be found for familiar than unfamiliar faces in the FFA (e.g., Rossion, 
Schütz, & Crommelinck, 2003), and for high-frequency than low-frequency words in 
word areas (e.g., Kronbichler et al., 2004), suggesting that the predicted response may 
not always be clear. Although not a problem in most of these studies, it is also worth 
noting that attention modulates the FFA response (Wojciulik, Kanwisher, & Driver, 
1998).
1.2.9 Hemispheric differences in processing style.
For faces, standard behavioural findings are that (a) upright faces are recognised 
better with initial presentation to the right hemisphere (left visual field) than with initial 
presentation to the left hemisphere (e.g., Rhodes, 1993; Rhodes et al., 1993; Watanabe, 
Kakigi, & Puce, 2003), and (b) inversion effects are larger with right hemisphere 
presentation than with left hemisphere presentation (McKone, 2004; Rhodes, 1993; see 
also Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2003). Further, Parkin and Williamson 
(1986) showed that subjects were faster to make a face/non-face decision (Mooney 
faces vs. random blobs) when initial presentation was to the left visual field/right 
hemisphere, but were faster to say that features were incorrect (e.g., nose replaced with 
a picture of a telephone) when initial presentation was to the right visual field/left 
hemisphere. They interpret this result as showing that the right hemisphere is better at 
holistic processing, but that the left hemisphere is better at part-based processing. In 
terms of imaging, Rossion, Dricot et al., (2000) supported this conclusion using a part- 
whole task. They found that the right FFA showed stronger activation when subjects 
made a judgement about whole faces than when they made a judgement about isolated 
face parts, while the homologous areas in the left hemisphere (left FFA) showed the 
reverse effect. This pattern was not replicated for houses; instead, there were no 
significant differences in activation between judgements about whole houses and parts 
of houses in either hemisphere.
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1.2.10 Temporal differences in brain response to faces and objects.
Studies of brain activation using neuroimaging, although allowing examination 
of spatial differences, fail to capture possible temporal differences in neural processing 
of faces and objects. For this, event-related potentials (ERP) or 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) are needed. Using ERPs, it has been reported that 
there is a negative component at approximately 170 milliseconds which is face-specific 
over some electrodes (T5 and T6 which are usually located over the middle temporal 
gyrus in the left and right hemispheres respectively). The N170 is larger in response to 
faces than to individual items from a range of stimulus classes including cars, furniture, 
human hands, animal faces (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996), shoes, 
houses and greebles (Rossion, Gauthier et al., 2000). Bentin et al. (1996) suggested that 
the N170 might best be described as sensitive to eves rather than whole faces, as it is 
also very strong for eyes presented alone, inverted faces and faces with the position of 
the features scrambled. The effects are actually slightly different with the amplitude for 
inverted faces being enhanced and the effect slightly delayed (approximately 10 ms, 
replicated by Rossion, Gauthier et al., 2000). Eyes alone also produce increased 
amplitude (Bentin et al., 1996).
Using MEG, Liu, Harris and Kanwisher (2002) found an M l70 (M as in MEG) 
that was larger for faces than for houses on an identification task. They further found 
that this M l70 was larger to a face which had had the features blacked out than to a face 
where the features had been scrambled, suggesting that configuration was more 
important than local feature shape (including eyes). This was contrasted with an M l00 
which showed a preference for the scrambled real face (correct features) over the face 
with features blacked-out (correct configuration).
Thus, there is some kind of processing at 170 ms that differs for faces and 
objects, and even for inverted faces. It seems likely that this is involved in face 
identification, whereas an earlier process is involved in face detection.
1.2.11 Summary of brain studies
Studies of face-processing in the brain support the findings from the behavioural 
literature that there are differences between face and object processing. Studies with 
“pure” prosopagnosics and object agnosics show that objects and faces are processed by 
different areas of the brain. This is supported by neuroimaging studies which show that
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the FFA is activated more by faces than other objects, even when within-class 
discrimination is used. Studies with MEG and ERP also show that the time-course for 
processing of faces and objects differs.
1.3 Summary of the evidence for ‘special’ processing of (upright) faces
Overall, the review in Chapter 1 has presented substantial evidence that faces are 
processed differently from other objects. Behaviourally, there are both quantitative 
differences between faces and objects (inversion effects and part-whole effects) and 
qualitative evidence that only faces are holistically processed (composite effect, 
peripheral identification). There is also evidence that faces and objects are processed 
largely in different brain areas, and with different time courses. These distinctions are 
not uncontroversial, however, with slight effects such as the part-whole effect for 
objects, or some activation in the same brain areas taken by some researchers as 
evidence that faces and objects are not processed differently when within-class 
discrimination is required.
I note that the only real exception to the special status of faces might be human 
bodies. Reed, Strong, Bozova, and Tanaka (2003) found the same size inversion effect 
for faces and bodies for both accuracy and reaction time4. There is also a part-whole 
effect for bodies. Seitz (2002) found an advantage for whole bodies over parts (e.g., 
arms) that was the same size as that for faces when the “whole” condition for faces and 
bodies was matched. There was also a “whole” advantage for bodies in 8 and 10 year 
old children, which appears to be as large as or larger than the effect for faces (for 
children the whole condition for faces and bodies was not matched). Although the FFA 
is not activated by hands, there is an area of the brain which is more activated by body 
parts than other objects including whole faces (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 
2001). Thus, it may be that similar cognitive processing of bodies to faces is occurring, 
but in a different cortical area. This is an idea which needs more investigation, but not 
one which is covered by this thesis.
4 Note that the accuracy effect was less than half the size of that usually found for faces, 7% in this study 
compared to an effect for faces of usually 15-25%. This may be partly due to ceiling effects and partly 
due to the fact that distractor stimuli “differed on one or two features, such as facial hair” (p.305), 
lessening the need for holistic processing.
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The next chapter discusses theories of why the results reviewed above might 
occur. That is, how the pattern of similarities and differences in object and face 
processing might have arisen. Also discussed are possible origins of “special” 
processing for faces, and theories of how individual faces might be represented.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORIES OF FACE RECOGNITION
This chapter introduces theories of face recognition considered from three 
perspectives. In Section 2.1,1 first describe theories of why upright face processing 
appears to be different from inverted face processing and object processing; these 
theories include the within-class discrimination hypothesis, the expertise hypothesis and 
domain specificity. In Section 2.2,1 then review the possible origins of special face 
processing consistent with the domain-specific view. Finally, in Section 2.3,1 describe 
theories of how faces are represented as individuals, and coded with respect to an 
average face, with particular emphasis on the concept of face-space.
2.1. Theories of why (upright) faces appear special
In previous literature, three primary theories of why faces appear to be special 
have been proposed. These are referred to here as the within-class discrimination 
hypothesis, the expertise hypothesis, and the domain specificity view'. I now briefly 
describe each theory and summarise how and where this thesis addresses them (detailed 
reviews of the relevant empirical literature are given in other Chapters).
2.1.1 Within-class discrimination is sufficient for holistic processing.
One potentially important difference between faces and objects is the preferred 
level of identification. Humans naturally process faces at the level of individual identity 
(e.g., Sam vs. Bob); that is, in a within-class fashion. In contrast, objects are usually 
identified at merely the basic level (e.g., Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes- 
Braem, 1976), such as chair versus dog, or at a subordinate but not within-class identity 
level, such as poodle versus labrador (but not poodle 1 vs. poodle 2). An early idea was 
that this difference in processing level might be the source of apparently special 
processing for faces (e.g., Faust, 1955, cited in Benton, 1990; Damasio, Damasio, & 
Van Hoesen, 1982).
This theory would then predict that any object class should be processed in the 
same way as faces if the task requires identification at a subordinate level. Although
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some quite recent articles still seem to argue in favour of this hypothesis (e.g., de Gelder 
& Rouw, 200; Gauthier, Tarr et al., 2000; Tarr, 2003), it is generally agreed that it has 
been disproved. All the evidence reviewed in Chapter 1 supports the view that the 
within-class discrimination hypothesis is not viable. In terms of neuropsychology 
(Section 1.2.7) there are some prosopagnosics who have deficits at making within-class 
discriminations for both faces and objects, but there are also some patients who have 
“pure” face deficits or object deficits. Similarly in the area of neuroimaging (Section 
1.2.8), although within-class categorisation sometimes increases activation for non-face 
objects in the FFA (Rhodes, Byatt, Michie, & Puce, 2004), in general this is not the case 
(Grill-Spector, Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004) and the BOLD response in the FFA remains 
much less than for faces in all studies. Finally, the behavioural studies reviewed all used 
tasks which required within-class discrimination of objects (e.g., recognition memory 
for a series of houses). Despite this, inversion effects were smaller for objects than for 
faces (Section 1.2.1), the part-whole effect was smaller for objects than for faces, and 
the composite effect was absent for greebles (Section 1.2.4). All these findings argue 
that the special holistic processing which occurs for faces does not occur for individual 
discrimination of objects.
2.1.2 Expertise hypothesis: within-class discrimination of objects-of-cxpertise elicits 
holistic processing.
In addition to preferentially categorising faces at an individual level, humans are 
also much more experienced at making these fine discriminations for faces than for 
other objects. That is, we are expert at making individual face discriminations, but are 
usually not expert at making individual object discriminations. The expertise hypothesis 
(Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Meadows, 1974) argues that this 
difference can explain the empirical differences found between faces and objects. It then 
predicts that face-like processing for objects should occur when three conditions are met 
(Diamond & Carey, 1986). First, like faces, individual exemplars of the object class 
should share a first-order configuration and differ on second-order relationships (i.e., 
have the same basic parts and differ in spacing between those parts). Second, as for 
faces, the task should require that objects are recognised at an individual level. Third, as 
for faces, subjects should be expert enough with the stimuli to make use of subtle 
second-order differences between individuals.
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Studies testing the expertise hypothesis have used experts of two very different 
levels of experience. Experiment trained experts are given approximately ten hours of 
training with individual members of an object class (these studies have almost 
exclusively used greebles as stimuli). An obvious limitation of studies with experiment 
trained experts is that, while demonstrating the emergence of a face-like effect in this 
time-frame would be very interesting, a lack of effect does not mean that it could not be 
found with greater experience. Addressing this issue, real-world experts with many 
years of experience have also been tested. These real-world experts have included 
groups such as dog-show judges, car enthusiasts and bird-watchers.
The literature review of empirical studies testing the expertise hypothesis is 
provided in Chapter 5, and to some extent Chapter 3. As will be shown in these 
chapters, there is currently very active debate about the expertise hypothesis. While 
many authors seem persuaded that “special” aspects of face recognition are based on 
expertise (e.g., Elgar & Campbell, 2001; Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2004; 
Reed, Stone, Bozova, & Tanaka, 2003), others are less convinced (e.g., Duchaine, 
Dingle, Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2004; McKone & Kanwisher, in press; Tanaka, 
Kiefer & Bukach, 2004). My opinion of this literature, especially arising from the most 
recent studies (e.g., Grill-Spector et ah, 2004; Rhodes, Byatt, et al., 2004), is that 
convincing evidence in support of the expertise hypothesis has not been demonstrated. 
Indeed, 1 believe the published evidence is generally against it, and my own data 
(Chapters 3 and 5) will also fail to show any development of face-like processing with 
expertise.
2.1.3 Domain specificity: Faces per se are special.
Some authors (e.g., Kanwisher, 2000; McKone & Kanwisher, in press; Rhodes, 
Byatt, et al., 2004) have argued that faces per se are special. According to this domain 
specific view, faces are the only stimulus class to strongly activate the FFA, and may be 
the only stimulus class that can be holistically processed (a possible exception being 
bodies). This theory predicts that neither within-class discrimination nor expertise is 
sufficient to produce face-like processing of other objects. Note that, logically, the 
domain specificity view can only be supported by eliminating the other theoretical 
alternatives.
Also note that the domain-specificity idea itself says nothing about the origins of 
special processing for faces (beyond saying that it does not arise from generic
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expertise). Given my suggestion that current evidence for the expertise hypothesis is 
weak, I consider it valuable to examine the possible origins of holistic processing within 
the domain specific view, to assess whether it is a viable alternative. This is done in 
Section 2.2.
2.1.4 How the present thesis addresses theories of why faces appear special
In summary, three general theories of why faces might be special have been 
suggested. The two considered most viable in the current literature are the domain 
specificity hypothesis (e.g., Grill-Spector et al., 2004; Kanwisher, 2000; McKone & 
Kanwisher, in press; Rhodes, Byatt, et al., 2004) and the expertise hypothesis (e.g., 
Gauthier, Curran, Curby, & Collins, 2003; Gauthier & Nelson, 2001; Gauthier & Tarr, 
1997, 2002). Domain specificity is the idea that faces are somehow special per se. The 
contrasting expertise hypothesis suggests that faces are simply the class with which we 
have most experience at making within-class discriminations. That is, extensive 
experience is suggested to be sufficient for face-like processing to occur for any non­
face objects. The amount of experience required to produce face-like processing has 
been suggested to be approximately 8-10 hours of laboratory training in some studies, 
or many years of real world experience in others. In the present thesis, both the “8-10 
hours” and “many years” timescales for expertise are directly tested as part of the first 
aim of the thesis (to test whether face-like processing is really domain specific). In 
particular, Chapter 3 tests experimental training with inverted faces, while Chapter 5 
tests real-world expertise with labrador dogs using dog-experts of many years’ 
experience.
The third theory is that within-class processing alone, even without expertise, is 
sufficient to produce face-like processing for objects. This theory has little empirical 
support, but has still been taken seriously quite recently (e.g., Tarr, 2003). Results 
presented in Chapter 4 (comparing Labrador and face processing in novices) add to the 
literature relevant to this hypothesis.
28
2.2. Possible origins of special face processing.
Within the domain specificity view, many authors have suggested an origin of 
special processing for faces in terms of an innate representation of basic face structure. 
They further suggest that such a representation might have arisen from a system for 
recognising/imprinting on members of one’s own species (conspecifics) that is 
maintained across different species. For example, Morton and Johnson (1991) have 
suggested an innate representation of the basic structure of a face (three blobs in the 
positions of eyes and nose/mouth), which they propose might be coded at a subcortical 
level (see also Mondloch et ah, 1999). Another possibility is that there is no innate 
representation, but faces are the first thing that one regularly sees (or the first thing that 
is regularly placed at a distance at which infants can focus). Either of these alternatives 
allows that there may be a critical period for the development of normal face 
recognition. That is, there may be a period in development in which it is important to 
have specific face input, in the same way that kittens raised without any early exposure 
to vertical (or horizontal) lines are insensitive to horizontal (or vertical) edges later in 
life (Blakemore & Cooper, 1970; Hirsch & Spinelli, 1970).
Two types of empirical studies are relevant in assessing these possible origins of 
special face processing in adult humans. The first are studies including both normal and 
visually deprived infants and children. The second are studies on whether face 
recognition has special developmental status in other animals, especially those closely 
related to humans in evolutionary terms. Both will be briefly reviewed.
2.2.1 Developmental studies in humans.
Face preference in normal infancy. If there is an innate face representation, 
infants might prefer face-like stimuli compared to those that are less face-like. Morton 
and Johnson (1991) suggest that there is an innate mechanism that causes infants to 
track face-like stimuli in early infancy. This would ensure that infants are exposed to 
faces during a (postulated) critical period, so that they develop normal face processing 
(see also de Haan, Humphreys, & Johnson, 2002). There is empirical evidence to 
support this idea. Newborns less than one hour old tracked a schematic face stimulus 
further than a scrambled schematic face stimulus (Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, &
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Morton, 1991). Newborns less than two hours old preferred three blobs in the correct 
placement for eyes and nose to the same blob configuration upside-down (Johnson et 
al., 1991; Mondloch et al., 1999). This second preference seems to disappear by six 
weeks of age (Mondloch, et al., 1999) with the preference for schematic faces over 
scrambled schematic faces also disappearing by three months of age (Johnson et al., 
1991). Newborns less than 4 hours old also looked longer at their mother’s face than a 
stranger’s face (in this experiment, real heads rather than photographs were used), but 
this preference disappeared when the hair and face-outline were covered with a scarf 
tied under the chin (Pascalis, de Schonen, Morton, Deruelle, & Fabregrenet, 1995).
Some authors suggest that infants simply prefer aspects of stimuli which happen 
to be more frequent in face-like stimuli than other stimuli tested (see Simion, Cassia, 
Turati, & Valenza, 2001, for a review). However, this fails to explain why infants 
should prefer stimuli that happen to be more face-like. Unless an explanation can be 
given, the parsimonious suggestion would seem to be that infants prefer faces. Cassia, 
Turati, and Simion (2004) argue that it is information in the top-half of the visual field 
(i.e., more elements), rather than faceness per se which infants prefer. Cassia, et al. 
compared looking preference in infants less than 4-days-old for pairs of stimuli in 
several combinations. When an upright face was contrasted with the same head with the 
internal features inverted as a group, infants preferred the upright feature group to the 
inverted feature group. When a scrambled face with more visual information in the top- 
half (two eyes turned sideways and off-set to the right, above the nose turned sideways, 
above the mouth off-set to the left) was contrasted with a scrambled face with more 
information in the bottom-half (the mouth off-set to the left, above the nose turned 
sideways, above two eyes turned sideways and off-set to the right) infants preferred the 
scrambled face with more visual information in the top-half. When the scrambled face 
with more visual information in the top-half was contrasted to the normal upright face 
infants had no preference. However, there are some problems with the conclusion from 
this study that infants simply prefer information in the top-half of the visual field. The 
most obvious is that, at low spatial frequencies, the face stimuli which had more 
information in the top-half also look more face-like than those which have more 
information in the bottom-half. Another criticism is that although these stimuli have 
more information in the top-half, normal faces seen as part of whole heads do not (i.e., 
the eyes are usually situated approximately half-way up the head, meaning that there are 
more elements in the lower half). However, the problem of stimuli cropped such that
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more information is present in the top-half is also true of the original Johnson et al. 
(1991) schematic faces.
To establish that there is an innate preference for faces several things would be 
needed. A very positive aspect of the Cassia et al. (2004) study is that they based their 
stimuli on pictures of real faces, thus replicating a preference for upright feature groups 
over inverted feature groups with more naturalistic stimuli. As well as using real face 
stimuli, another important test of innate representation would be to test that infants are 
more interested in faces than other objects. It seems most likely that they would prefer 
the item for which there is an innate representation; however, it is also possible that the 
other item would be seen as more novel and hence attract more interest. An even 
stronger test would therefore be to compare infants’ ability to discriminate individual 
faces to their ability to discriminate individual non-face objects: an innate capacity for 
faces would predict better discrimination for faces than objects. To my knowledge 
neither of these have been done with infants less than several months old.
Studies in infants a few months to a year old have examined whether they can 
discriminate non-face objects. Quinn and Eimas (1996) familiarised three to four month 
old infants with pictures of cats, and then showed pairs of a novel cat and a novel dog 
either as whole animals, as bodies without heads, or as heads without bodies. Dogs (the 
unfamiliar stimulus class) were preferred in the whole body and head-only conditions, 
but there was no preference in the body-only condition. This suggests that dogs could 
be distinguished from cats on the basis of head shape, but not body shape. This only 
occurred for the upright orientation; in the inverted orientation, dogs were preferred in 
all conditions. Results from Bonatti, Frot, Zangl and Mehler (2002) suggest that 10- 
month-old infants can distinguish human-like objects (dolls) from other objects 
(including toy dogs faces), and distinguish dolls from one another (although this result 
was less strong) but not distinguish non-face-like objects (e.g., black motor car vs. red 
wax strawberry) from one another. In this experiment infants were shown two objects 
(or one object and one doll) one at a time, and then subsequently shown either both the 
objects together or only one of the objects. If infants looked longer in the single object 
condition, it was concluded that they were surprised that there was one not two objects, 
and hence that they had been able to tell the two objects apart. The finding that 10- 
month-old infants can discriminate between stimuli containing faces, but cannot 
perform even between-class discriminations for stimuli which do not contain faces is 
hard to reconcile with the idea that faces are not special, given that infants can
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discriminate two similar looking unknown males (a difficult within-class 
discrimination) presented in 3/4 view, at 5 months old (Fagan, 1979).
A preference for faces in infancy may of course be tuned by experience. Using a 
habituation paradigm, Pascalis, de Haan and Nelson (2002) showed that six month old 
infants can distinguish between individual monkey faces, as well as between individual 
human faces (they look longer at the novel face for both species). This was not true for 
9-month-old infants and adults, who could distinguish only human faces.
Overall, these studies suggest that before six months infants may be interested in 
faces generally, and are better able to discriminate faces than to discriminate other 
stimuli, but also that the system is tuned by experience to differentiate human faces. The 
results are consistent with the idea that infants have some innate representation of faces, 
or at least develop such as representation very early.
Holistic processing in normal development. The question of whether children 
holistically process faces, or at what age they do so, is important to the question of 
domain specificity for two reasons. First, it was in this context that the idea that holistic 
processing may require extended experience to develop (the expertise hypothesis) was 
first suggested. The second related reason is that tests of holistic processing in children 
can help to put an upper-limit on the amount of training needed to develop holistic 
processing if it is simply a matter of generic expertise.
Early studies by Carey and Diamond suggested that holistic processing was not 
mature until approximately ten years of age. This was on the basis that children six- or 
eight-years-old did not show adult like inversion effects (Carey & Diamond, 1977) and 
were more likely to judge faces as the same based on paraphernalia (e.g., hats, glasses) 
than on identity (Diamond & Carey, 1977). However, these studies were refuted by later 
evidence.
A number of more recent studies argue that holistic processing is functional at 
much earlier ages. Carey & Diamond (1994) showed that there was a composite effect 
(Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987) indicative of holistic processing at ages 6, 10 and 
adult. Similarly, Tanaka, Kay, Grinnell, Stansfield, & Szechter (1998) showed that parts 
were recognised better in the context of whole faces than when isolated (a part-whole 
effect; Davidoff & Donnelly, 1990; Tanaka & Farah, 1993) for children 6-, 8- and 10- 
years-old. This has also been extended to children only 4-years-old (Pellicano &
Rhodes, 2003). Further, Pellicano, Rhodes and Peters (submitted) included Tanaka and 
Sengco’s (1997) version of the task in which the part is presented in a version of the
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original face with a spacing change made to it (the transformed version) as well as in 
the context of the original face. Four-year-olds were better at the task when the original 
face was presented compared to the transformed face, suggesting that they did code 
spacing information. Findings of holistic processing at these ages also comes from work 
by Gilchrist and McKone (2003) for 6- and 7-year-olds, and McKone and Boyer 
(submitted) for 4-year-olds. These studies used differences in spacing or features and 
asked questions about distinctiveness in a paradigm based on Leder and Bruce (1998). 
Importantly, Gilchrist and McKone showed evidence of holistic processing in 6- and 7- 
year-olds (better ability to remember/discriminate spacing changes in upright faces than 
inverted faces) when baseline performance was matched to that of adults. This suggests 
that ability to code spacing changes was quantitatively as well as qualitatively mature at 
this age (although see Mondloch, Geldart, Maurer, & Le Grand, 2003; Mondloch, Le 
Grand, & Maurer, 2002).
The above paradigms have not been tested with children younger than 4-years- 
old (because of difficulties in explaining the task and so on). However, Cohen and 
Cashon (2001) have at least shown that 7-month-old infants can integrate information 
from the external (e.g., hair) and internal aspects of the face. In a habituation paradigm, 
infants looked longer at a face containing internal features from one previously seen 
face and external features from another previously seen face, than at a truly “old” face 
(this is also consistent with the finding of Pascalis et al., 1995). Geldart, Maurer and 
Henderson (1999) have also shown that 5-month-old infants can differentiate faces with 
the features moved (as a group) to a higher than average position from faces with 
features moved to a lower than average position (infants looked longer at faces with 
features higher than average), suggesting that the position of the features can be 
encoded to some extent at 5 months old (see also Thompson, Madrid, Westbrook, & 
Johnston, 2001).
Overall, evidence clearly supports holistic processing in children as young as 4- 
years-old on standard face tests. This is an important finding for tests of the expertise 
hypothesis as it sets an upper limit of 4 years of experience for developing holistic 
processing, if expertise alone is responsible for the usual finding of differences in face 
and object recognition.
Effects of early visual deprivation and brain damage. Logically, whether four 
years' experience (or any other amount) is sufficient to develop holistic processing for 
objects other than faces also depends on whether there is a critical period in infancy for
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developing holistic processing for faces. This question has been addressed by studies of 
patients with early visual deprivation, or early brain damage.
Studies by Le Grand and colleagues investigated the effect of early visual 
deprivation by testing the face recognition abilities of patients born with dense cataracts 
which were later removed. These patients had at least eight years of normal vision after 
the removal of the cataracts, but no detailed pattern vision to one or both eyes for the 
first 3- to 6-months of life. In a number of studies these patients were shown to have 
normal ability to match faces on direction of eye-gaze, lip-reading and expression 
(Geldart, Mondloch, Maurer, de Schonen, & Brent, 2002) as well changes to features 
(Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2001). They were, however, severely impaired 
at detecting changes in spacing (Le Grand et al., 2001) and matching identity over 
changes in head position (Geldart et al., 2002). Further, they did not show Young et 
al.’s (1987) composite effect (the difference between aligned and unaligned composite 
faces), and this was not due to worse overall performance than controls (Le Grand et al., 
2004). The hemisphere which is deprived is also important. Le Grand, Mondloch, 
Maurer, and Brent (2003) showed that only patients with bilateral or left-eye cataracts 
had deficits on the spacing task. This equates in infants to right hemisphere deprivation, 
that is, the hemisphere shown to be more important in face processing in adults (Section 
1.2.9). These studies strongly suggest that there is a critical period for developing 
normal holistic face processing. This idea is consistent with studies of developmental 
prosopagnosics and of patients who have the area of the brain usually used for face 
processing damaged at a very early age (e.g., one day old, Farah, Rabinowitz, Quinn, & 
Liu, 2000).
One theoretical possibility is that any stimulus class might be holistically 
processed if it is seen enough during the critical period, but that infants’ visual 
environment is set up in such a way that this usually only occurs for faces (most parents 
would prevent the family dog from spending much time with its face close to their 
baby’s face). Thus, the strongest evidence of a face-specific innate mechanism would be 
if newborns could distinguish individual faces (which there is some evidence that they 
can) but not distinguish individuals of another class (e.g., dogs).
2.2.2 Face-recognition in non-human animals
The question of whether faces are special per se, and whether this has an innate 
basis, may also be considered from the point of view of non-human animals. Morton & 
Johnson (1991) have argued in general for an innate mechanism which allows any
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species to more easily recognise its own kind (i.e., conspecifics). A study by Pascalis 
and Bachevalier (1998) showed that in a habituation paradigm rhesus monkeys spent 
more time looking at a novel face than a previously seen face of their own species, but 
did not discriminate between a novel and previously seen human face, even though 
these monkeys had been raised by humans. Humans in this study looked longer at a 
novel human face and did not differentiate between novel and previously seen monkey 
faces. With 8- to 9-year-old chimpanzees, also raised by humans, Parr, Dove and 
Hopkins (1998) found an inversion effect on a sequential matching task that was larger 
for chimpanzee faces than human faces, but absent for capuchin monkey faces or cars.
Monkeys also have a face-specific area in the brain in the same way as humans 
do. Tsao, Freiwald, Knutsen, Mandeville, and Tootell (2003) showed that there is an 
area in the macaque brain which appears to be homologous to the FFA. It is in a similar 
location in the macaque brain to that of the FFA in the human brain. The area is more 
active to faces (human and macaque) than to other objects or to Fourier phase 
scrambled textures (made from faces or objects). The area was also more active to 
macaque faces than to human faces. (The FFA of the human subjects was equally 
activated by the two kinds of faces.) Single-cell recordings in nonhuman primates also 
suggest that there are cells in the Superior Temporal Sulcus which are more strongly 
activated by faces and bodies than by other objects (e.g., Wachsmuth, Oram, & Perrett, 
1994) and that these are tuned to specific orientations (Ashbridge, Perrett, Oram, & 
Jellema, 2000).
Conspecific recognition also shows some similarities between humans and other 
non-human animals. Sheep are better at recognising sheep faces of their own breed than 
another breed, and better at recognising upright than inverted sheep faces (Kendrick, 
Atkins, Hinton, Heavens, & Kevem, 1996). Further, sheep discriminate upright sheep 
faces predominately using the right hemisphere (Broad, Mimmack, & Kendrick, 2000). 
Right hemisphere use in conspecific recognition also seems to occur for 3-day-old 
chicks (Deng & Rogers, 2002). These results are consistent with the idea that animals at 
many levels of the evolutionary tree may have special ways of recognising conspecifics.
Note that none of the studies mentioned in this section directly test “special” 
face processing in the sense of holistic processing. To my knowledge, no one has 
conducted direct tests of holistic processing of faces (e.g., the part-whole or composite 
tests) in non-human animals. This would obviously be important in understanding
35
whether the face recognition abilities shown by non-human animals are truly similar to 
those shown by humans.
2.2.3 The origins of special face processing: Summary.
Studies on infants and non-human primates reviewed above suggest that faces of 
one’s own species are given some special status. Whether this has an innate basis for 
faces per se, or is due to the fact that faces are the only objects seen extensively during 
an early critical period, is not known. It is also important to note that evidence of 
holistic processing for upright, but not inverted faces, in adults could be explained by 
either view. That is, within a domain-specificity theory, the large inversion effect in 
adults could be due to either an innate mechanism coding the basic structure of an 
upright face, and/or due to the fact that not enough inverted faces were seen during a 
critical period.
2.3. Individual representations of faces and face-space
This section discusses aspects of how individual faces might be coded within the 
system that represents faces, and how the idea of a “face-space” might be integrated 
with the largely independent literature on holistic processing for faces. By the “system 
that represents faces” I mean the stage of processing that deals with perceptual 
representations rather than, for example processing people’s names, semantic 
information (e.g., a person’s job), or expression. In the Bruce and Young (1986) model 
of face recognition (see Bruce, Burton, & Craw, 1992, for a later version), this would be 
the stage dealing with identifying the face based on appearance. In this model, other 
aspects of face recognition such as expression are separable from the stage which deals 
with facial appearance/identity.
2.3.1 Representing individual faces in “face-space”
A common idea is that appearance of individual faces is coded with respect to an 
average, norm, or prototype. Theoretically, this idea is usually instantiated in the idea of 
“face-space”, as proposed by Valentine (1991; also see Valentine & Bruce, 1986). This
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is a theoretical multidimensional space in which individual faces are coded on physical 
dimensions that usefully describe real-world variability between faces (e.g., face width, 
length of nose, etc.). A face lying at the centre of face-space is exactly average on all 
dimensions. Faces that are more atypical on one or more dimensions lie further from the 
centre on those dimensions. An example with only two dimensions is shown in Figure 
2 . 1.
A distance 
between eyes
length of nose
Figure 2.1. The heuristic of face-space, showing of exemplar faces (black dots) 
distributed on two possible dimensions. The average face is shown at the centre 
(grey dot).
The dimensions of face-space are usually thought of as not being defined a 
priori, but instead are presumed to be determined from the range of faces to which one 
has been exposed. Empirical evidence shows that prototypes of faces can be formed 
quickly and easily. Bruce, Doyle, Dench and Burton (1991) used a manipulation in 
which the internal features of a face were moved as a block with respect to the face 
outline. In a memory test, subjects were asked to choose which of a pair of faces they 
had previously rated for sex and approximate age. When the pair consisted of the 
unseen prototype face (or central feature version) and another unseen exemplar, subjects 
picked the prototype as seen on 82% of trials (Experiment 4). When the pair consisted 
of the unseen prototype and a previously seen exemplar, subjects chose each equally 
often (Experiment 5). This was after rating only four versions (exemplars) of each face. 
Infants less than 78 hours old are also able to quickly form prototypes from experienced 
faces. Walton and Bower (1993) showed that after seeing four faces (for less than a
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minute in total) infants preferred an average of these four previously seen individuals to 
an average of four previously unseen individuals.
Valentine (1991) deliberately left the exact nature of the underlying dimensions 
of face-space open. It is still unknown what the dimensions are, but two approaches 
have been used to determine what they might be. The first is to use a multidimensional 
scaling approach such as that used by Rhodes (1988). In this study, face pictures were 
rated on 31 scales ranging from things such as hairstyle and presence of freckles to 
forehead shape (e.g., receding) and eye-setting (e.g., protruding). Measurements of the 
face pictures were also taken and included things such as eye width, nose length, and lip 
thickness, as well as distances between features (39 measurements in total). The faces 
were then paired for similarity by a second group of subjects who paired the two most 
similar faces, then the next two most similar, and so on. (This method required far fewer 
possible pairings than would be required for rating similarity of all possible pairs.) 
Multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) was used on these similarity pairings and showed that 
three dimensions gave a good fit to the data. The ratings scales and measurements were 
then regressed against these three dimensions so that the dimensions could be 
interpreted. One dimension seemed to be linked to weight, with another linked to 
weight, hair-length and several measurements involving mouth-shape. The final 
dimension was linked to many measurements and ratings involving eye-shape, as well 
as nose-shape and a rating of the age of the face. Interestingly, eye-height in the face 
(measured to the chin), nose-length, and the relative positions of the eyes, nose and 
mouth in the face did not load on any of the three general dimensions.
An alternative approach to determining the kind of dimensions which might be 
coded in face-space is to use principle components analysis (PCA). In this kind of 
analysis the pixel-by-pixel intensity of a set of faces is scanned. From these values, 
eigen-vectors are calculated on the basis of which aspects of the face explain the most 
variance in the face pictures. Eigen-vectors themselves do not look like anything, but 
they can be added to or subtracted from an average face so that their effect may be seen. 
Early eigen-vectors (those that explain large amounts of variance) seem to code very 
general factors like masculinity/femininity. Individual identity is coded by eigen-vectors 
which each explain much less of the variance (e.g., O'Toole, Abdi, Deffenbacher, & 
Valentin, 1995). These two ways of exploring which aspects of faces might be coded in 
face-space differ in that PCA works from a set of physical faces used as input, whereas 
MDS is based subjects’ perception of faces.
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2.3.2 Empirical results commonly explained with reference to face-space.
The heuristic of face-space has been used to explain a number of important 
empirical findings. The distinctiveness effect refers to the fact that faces rated as 
“standing out more in a crowd” (distinctive faces) are recognised faster, but are 
classified more slowly as faces, compared to typical faces (e.g., Valentine & Bruce, 
1986). This is usually explained in terms of face-space as follows (although see Burton 
& Vokey, 1998). Faces which are more distinctive lie further away from the norm (or 
centre) on one or more dimensions. The more typical faces cluster around the centre. 
Faces which are more distinctive therefore have fewer near-neighbours in face-space, 
making them less confusable and easier to recognise in a memory task. Typical faces 
are, however, classified faster as faces than are distinctive faces, because the typical 
faces are closer to the norm (Valentine, 1991).
Another similar effect is that of averageness on attractiveness. Faces created by 
mathematically averaging many other faces are rated as more attractive than the 
component faces (e.g., Rhodes, Sumich, & Byatt, 1999). This has also be explained in 
terms of face-space, by suggesting that faces closer to the centre of face-space are seen 
as more attractive.
Caricature effects refer to that fact that faces can be made more recognisable by 
distorting them further away from the average along a trajectory drawn from the centre 
of face-space to the individual. This has the most effect on features which are not 
average to begin with; for example, a face with a larger than average nose would have 
its nose made even larger. It is also possible to make “anticaricatures”, that is, faces 
which are closer to the average than the original along the same trajectory. Empirical 
results show that making caricatures of faces causes them to be recognised faster than a 
veridical line drawing, whereas making anticaricatures of faces causes them to be 
recognised slower than veridical line drawings (Rhodes, Brennan, & Carey, 1987). 
Caricature effects can be explained in terms of face-space in a similar way to 
distinctiveness effects; that is, moving a face further from the average means that there 
are fewer faces to confuse it with. Rhodes et al. (1987) suggest that this advantage 
offsets the negative effect of the caricature not quite matching the veridical face.
The cross-race deficit refers to the finding that subjects are often better at 
recognising individuals of their own race than individuals of another race (e.g., Rhodes, 
Tan, Brake, & Taylor, 1989). There may even be more activation in the FFA for own
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than other race faces (Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & Eberhardt, 2001). The memory effect is 
explained in terms of face-space by suggesting that other race faces are coded using 
dimension values that are salient to that race but not necessarily to that individual 
(Valentine, 1991). Thus, other race faces will form a cluster some distance from the 
centre (i.e., some distance from the norm in a norm-based model). Other race-faces are 
then difficult to tell from one another although it is easy to tell that they are from 
another race.
Finally, adaptation aftereffects for faces may also be relevant to discussions of 
face-space. These will be discussed more fully in Chapter 6, but, briefly, adapting to a 
male face can make a sex-neutral face look female (Webster, Kaping, Mizokami, & 
Duhamel, 2004), and adapting to a radially expanded face makes subjects choose a 
slightly contracted face as both most normal and most attractive (Rhodes, Jeffery, 
Watson, Clifford, & Nakayama, 2003). Further, adapting to a face at one end of a 
trajectory through face-space (e.g., the trajectory might have a face with fat lips and thin 
nose at one end, and a face with thin lips and fat nose at the other) can make the average 
face look more like the individual at the other end of the trajectory (Leopold, O'Toole, 
Vetter, & Blanz, 2001). These findings have been interpreted as showing that adaptation 
to one kind of face can shift the norm of face-space, producing a percept in the opposite 
direction.
2.3.3 Integrating the notions of face-space and holistic processing.
Face-space is one of the two primary theoretical concepts referred to in 
explaining behavioural findings with faces; the other is holistic processing. An 
important question is how these two concepts might relate to each other. There is 
surprising little theoretical work in this area.
With respect to inversion effects and face-space, Valentine (1991) suggested that 
inverted faces are rotated to upright before being compared to the faces in face-space.
He argued that error is introduced during this process, thus explaining the usual finding 
of poorer performance for inverted than upright faces. The rotation idea predicts only 
quantitative not qualitative differences between upright and inverted face processing 
(Valentine & Bruce, 1988). As this has been shown not to be true (e.g., composite 
effect, Young et al., 1987), some other explanation must be found. It may be that there 
is a separate norm for inverted faces, as has been suggested for male faces and female 
faces (Rhodes et ah, 2003). Alternatively, a whole separate face-space might exist for
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inverted faces. If this were less tightly tuned than the face-space for upright faces, 
subjects might be worse at discriminating and recognising inverted faces than upright 
faces. Leder and Bruce (1998) have also suggested that dimensions describing second 
order relational information (e.g., distance between the eyes) are coded for upright faces 
but are not coded for inverted faces, while dimensions describing feature shape (e.g., 
eyebrow thickness) may be coded for both orientations.
Empirically, some studies have combined an inversion manipulation with effects 
usually explained in terms of face-space. Valentine (1991) found that inversion had a 
greater effect on typical faces than on distinctive faces. Similarly, inversion effects are 
larger for other race faces than own race faces (Rhodes, 1993; Rhodes et al., 1989).
With respect to the part-whole effect and face-space, Tanaka et al. (2004) have 
tested the size of the part-whole effect (Davidoff & Donnelly, 1990; Tanaka & Farah, 
1993) as a function of race. Results showed that for German Caucasian subjects (with 
little experience of Asian faces) there was a large part-whole effect for own-race faces, 
but no effect for other-race faces. For Asian subjects living in Canada, who had only 
slightly more experience with Asian than Caucasian faces, there were part-whole effects 
for both own and other race faces. These results were interpreted as showing that 
holistic processing is initially weak for unfamiliar face categories, but can develop with 
contact w ith the other race, as dimensions of face-space become tuned to better code 
individuals of that race.
The relationship between second-order relational processing and face-space has 
also been explored. Thompson et al. (2001) showed that 7-month old infants preferred 
to look at faces with average eye-mouth distance, than at faces with eye-mouth 
distances either larger or smaller than average. Conversely, Geldart et al. (1999) showed 
that 5-month olds preferred faces in which the height of internal features (moved as a 
group) was higher than average, even though adults found faces with features placed at 
average height most attractive.
In studies testing distinctiveness effects, Leder and Bruce (1998) increased facial 
distinctiveness by making either a local feature change (e.g., making the eyebrows 
thicker) or a spacing/relational change (e.g., moving the eyes closer together). They 
then showed that for upright faces both spacing and feature changes to distinctiveness 
increased recognition memory performance compared to memory for the original faces. 
For inverted faces only feature changes increased memory compared to original. These 
results were replicated by Gilchrist and McKone (2003) with both adult and 7-year-old
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subjects, and are consistent with previous findings on featural or spacing changes (e.g., 
Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Rhodes, Brake, & Atkinson, 1993).
Finally, the coding of second-order relational information in face-space has been 
explored by Mckone, Aitkin and Edwards (submitted). They used two relational 
distortions (changing the height of both eyes together, or changing the height of the two 
eyes independently) matched in terms of the amount of metric change in the face. In 
both cases, the eyes could be moved some distance before subjects’ perception of 
normality or identity was affected (e.g., before subjects said that the face no longer 
looked as normal as the original face). However, the threshold amount by which the 
eyes could be moved was less for the one-eye-up-one-eye-down manipulation, than for 
the both-eyes up/down manipulation. This difference in subjects’ perception 
corresponds to variability in the real world (i.e., the range of faces which need to be 
coded), with more variability found in the position of the two eyes together in the head 
than in the asymmetry between eyes (see Chapter 6 for details). McKone et al. suggest 
that their results can be interpreted as the variability in faces experienced affecting the 
variability of exemplar placement in face-space, which in turn affects subjects’ 
perception. In particular, faces would be clustered more closely together on a one-eye- 
up-one-eye-down dimension (less variability/smaller coding range), than on a both-eyes 
up/down dimension (more variability/larger coding range) in face-space.
2.3.4 Face-space and this thesis.
The concept of a face-space, in which individual faces are coded in terms of 
their position on a variety of underlying dimensions, has proved a useful concept in 
explaining important empirical phenomena such as distinctiveness, caricature, and 
cross-race effects. The theoretical relationship between the concepts of face-space and 
holistic processing, however, remains rather unclear. I suggest that this is partly because 
very little is known about the possible dimensions of face-space.
In Chapter 6 ,1 use the distortions introduced by McKone et al. (submitted), 
which correspond to different amounts of variability in face-space to ask whether some 
dimensions in face-space are more adaptable than others. I also compare adaptation to 
these distortions for upright faces to that for inverted faces, to see whether there are any 
differences, and finally I assess whether adaptation transfers between upright and 
inverted faces as a way of assessing whether different neural populations (and thus face- 
spaces) are being used for upright and inverted faces.
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CHAPTER 3: CAN HOLISTIC PROCESSING BE LEARNED FOR INVERTED FACES?
3.1 Overview.
The origin of "special" processing for upright faces has been a matter of ongoing 
debate. If it is due to generic expertise, as opposed to being domain specific, holistic 
processing should be learnable for stimuli other than upright faces. Here I assess this for 
inverted faces. I trained subjects to discriminate identical twins using up to 1100 
exposures to each twin in different poses and images. In the upright orientation, twin 
discrimination was supported by holistic processing. Removal of a single face feature 
had no effect on performance, and a composite effect (Young et al., 1987) was obtained. 
In the inverted orientation, however, above-chance identification ability relied on (a) 
image specific learning, or (b) tiny local feature differences not noticed in the upright 
faces. The failure to learn holistic processing for inverted faces indicates that, in 
contrast to the situation for objects (Tarr & Pinker, 1989), orientation specificity of face 
processing is highly stable against practice.
3.2 Introduction
For ordinary adults, faces form a special class of visual object. A specific 
cortical area in the right fusiform gyrus activates more strongly for faces than for other 
within-class object discrimination (FFA; Kanwisher, McDermott & Chun, 1997), and 
much evidence shows that a holistic or configural style of cognitive processing makes 
faces “special”. These include the disproportionate inversion effects (e.g., Yin, 1969), 
composite effect (Young, Hellawell & Hay, 1987), part-whole paradigm (e.g., Tanaka 
& Farah, 1993) as well as others reviewed in Section I.2.3.1
1 Examiners are reminded that Experiment 1 has already been examined as my Honours thesis under the 
title “Does practice induce configural processing of inverted faces?” (2000). It is therefore not eligible for 
examination, but is included here as Experiments 2 & 3 (which are eligible) follow directly from it. The 
Experiments in this chapter are published as Robbins & McKone (2003), Cognition, 88(1), 79-107.
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3.2.1 Why is holistic processing limited to upright faces?
This chapter compares two general theories of why, in adults, holistic processing 
is limited to faces, and moreover to upright faces. According to the expertise 
hypothesis, holistic processing is a domain-general property of expertise in making 
within-class discriminations. Diamond and Carey (1986) noted that, for most people, 
faces are the only class of visual stimulus for which they become genuine experts. 
However, these authors suggested that face-like holistic processing might be leamable 
for any object type, as long as three conditions were met: (a) all exemplars of the 
stimulus class share a similar basic configuration (i.e., the same parts in the same left- 
right, above-below relationships), (b) individual exemplars differ from this shared first- 
order configuration only in minor (second-order) ways (e.g., the exact distance between 
two parts; the exact shape of a part), and (c) the subject has sufficient expertise with the 
stimulus domain to make reliable discrimination between individual exemplars (e.g., 
dog-show judges who can remember one Scotch Terrier as distinct from another). 
According to the expertise view, holistic processing for faces is limited to the upright 
orientation because this is the orientation in which faces are usually experienced.
An alternative theory is that “special" processing for faces in adults is domain- 
specific, driven by some innate component or by exposure in early infancy (Farah et al., 
2000; de Gelder & Rouw, 2001; Morton & Johnson, 1991). This is supported by the 
finding that young babies orient preferentially towards face-like stimuli (Johnson, et al., 
1991), and that there appears to be a critical period in early infancy for the development 
of holistic processing (Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2001,2003, 2004). 
According to this view, the fact that holistic processing develops only for upright faces 
may be because (a) there is an innate representation of the basic structure of an upright 
face (eye-like-blobs above nose-like-blob above mouth-like blob), and/or (b) that a bias 
of subcortical origin in infants’ visual orienting causes upright faces to be a frequent 
input to developing cortical systems (de Hann et al., 2002), and/or (c) very early 
exposure to upright faces fixes the axes of face-space to suit this orientation. Critically, 
this view does not deny that experience has a role in face recognition, but proposes that 
generic perceptual learning in adults reflects different mechanisms from those involved 
in learning upright faces in infancy.
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3.2.2 Predictions of a generic expertise account.
If holistic processing is due to generic expertise then, as an adult, it should be 
possible to learn holistic processing for stimuli other than upright faces. In the literature 
to date several studies have explored this prediction via tests on experts with non-face 
objects (a more detailed review of this literature is given in Chapter 5).
For objects-of-expertise, disproportionate inversion effects have been obtained 
in long term memory with dog experts (Diamond & Carey, 1986), although these have 
not been replicated in a sequential matching task with car and bird experts (Gauthier, 
Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000). Relatively few studies have used paradigms 
which directly assess holistic processing. Using the part-whole paradigm. Tanaka et al. 
(cited in Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997) found some suggestion of an expertise effect -  that 
is, a larger whole-part advantage in experts than in novices -  for dog experts 
(interestingly, looking at dog faces), but not for car experts or biological cell experts. 
Other studies have investigated experiment-trained “greeble experts”. Greebles are an 
artificial object class that may be grouped into genders (by direction of protrusion) and 
families (by body shape); experts are trained using seven to ten 1 -hr sessions involving 
identification of greebles at the gender, family and individual-name levels. Three 
greeble studies have shown no reliable training effect in the basic part-whole paradigm 
(Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Gauthier et al., 1998), and no 
composite effect in trained subjects (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Gauthier et al., 1998). 
These studies have, however, shown some suggestion of a face-like effect in a 
modification of the part-whole paradigm: one of three greeble parts produced better 
memory for the part in the original configuration than in an altered configuration (cf. 
Tanaka & Sengco, 1997). Overall, studies with object experts have produced some 
suggestion of holistic processing, although the evidence is currently less than 
convincing.
3.2.3 Holistic processing for inverted faces?
In addition to non-face objects, another stimulus class of interest is inverted 
faces. If it were the case that, as an adult, holistic processing could be learned for 
inverted faces, then this would provide compelling evidence for the expertise 
hypothesis.
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An important question is then how much practice would be required. Two sets of 
literature are relevant to this issue. First, the authors of the greeble studies have 
suggested that expertise sufficient to support holistic processing can be learned in under 
10 hours of practice. Second, results from speeded object-naming tasks indicate that, for 
non-face objects, processing in the inverted orientation can come to share properties 
exhibited in the upright orientation with only a very small amount of training.
When objects are rotated in the picture plane they are initially named more 
slowly the further they are from upright (e.g., Jolicoeur, 1985), but this effect disappears 
with practice (for review, see McKone & Grenfell, 1999). For objects requiring within- 
class discrimination, Tarr and Pinker (1989) showed that, after practice at specified new 
orientations, naming times at intermediate positions then increased as a function of 
distance from the nearest-trained-orientation. They interpreted these results as evidence 
for “view-based” (i.e., template-like) representations of objects regardless of 
orientation: prior to the experiment, most stored views of a familiar object are in the 
upright (canonical) orientation and, within the experiment, new views are rapidly 
formed following exposure to novel orientations. Importantly in the present context, 
these upright-like representations in new orientations were created in less than 100 
trials.
No previous studies have adequately assessed whether it is possible to learn 
holistic processing of faces in the inverted orientation. Occasional claims that holistic 
processing can be learned for inverted faces are partly a result of miscitation. Both 
Valentine (1988) and Sergent (1984) cite Bradshaw and Wallace (1971) as finding no 
difference between upright and inverted faces following practice; however, with the 
particular task used in that study, Bradshaw and Wallace in fact reported that both 
orientations were processed in a part-based manner. Valentine (1988) also contrasted 
the findings of Sergent (1984), who found only part-based processing for inverted faces 
in unpracticed subjects, with those of Takane and Sergent (1983), who he claimed found 
holistic processing after practice; however, Takane and Sergent did not actually present 
or analyse any data for their inverted condition (although they did state that it was 
"similar to the upright condition", p. 405). Endo, Masame and Maruyama (1990) 
provide the only direct claim of holistic processing in inverted faces after practice. They 
used highly schematic faces (e.g., an unusual head outline; circles for eyes; triangle for 
nose etc.) in a vertical half-face version of the composite paradigm. The standard 
pattern -  a composite effect upright but not inverted -  was obtained when subjects were
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unpracticed. Following extensive training with inverted faces a composite effect did 
emerge in a condition with different headshapes in each half face. I suspect, however, 
that this could be attributed to the extreme violation of vertical symmetry that resulted 
in the aligned condition. When the two halves of the head were symmetric, there was no 
composite effect for inverted faces even after training.
In contrast to this suggested evidence for holistic processing of inverted faces, 
another series of studies (Martini, McKone, & Nakayama, 2002, cited in McKone, 
Martini, & Nakayama, 2003; McKone, 2004; McKone, Martini, & Nakayama, 2001) 
argue against any such learning. Each of these studies was designed to isolate the 
holistic component of face processing, by identifying some phenomenon which existed 
for upright whole faces, but was completely absent for inverted faces. In the present 
context, the relevant point is that subjects were given hundreds or thousands of trials 
with the face stimuli in the inverted orientation, and yet showed no signs of developing 
the signature phenomena for holistic processing. Only a limited style of practice was 
used, however, presenting the same image repeatedly, rather than different views, as in 
real life. Farah et al. (2000) note that recognising faces across different views is 
something prosopagnosics cannot do, suggesting that it requires holistic processing. 
Similarly, Tong and Nakayama (1999) state that a variety of views and contexts are 
needed to acquire a "robust representation" of a face. Thus, seeing an inverted face over 
a variety of views may be necessary to acquire a full holistic representation.
3.2.4 Present Study
The aim of the present study was to assess whether, with appropriate practice, 
inverted faces could come to be processed holistically. A major aspect of the design was 
the use of identical twins as stimuli to encourage maximum reliance on holistic rather 
than part-based processing. In real-world face recognition, single local features do not 
generally differentiate people reliably (e.g., many individuals have blue eyes). In an 
experimental setting, however, where stimuli include a limited number of different 
faces, local features can contribute substantially to performance. Even discrimination of 
approximately similar individuals (e.g., the same sex and age) could be based on local 
information alone (e.g., eye colour; presence of a particular freckle), especially when 
subjects see the same faces over many hours of practice.
Thus, to give the best chance for any holistic processing for inverted faces to
emerge, I wished to minimise local feature cues that might be used to identify the faces.
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The hope was that, with identical twins, no single feature would differ enough between 
siblings to support reliable discrimination, and instead that identification would rely on 
information integrated across the entire face region (i.e., holistic processing). Use of 
multiple images and viewing angles also made very local information (e.g., exact shape 
at the corner in the mouth in one particular photograph) unreliable as a cue to identity, 
and made learning more similar to real-life (see discussion on multiple views above).
During training, each twin (e.g., "Liz Smith") was individually named 
approximately 350 times (Experiment 1) or 280 times (Experiment 2). This level of 
practice exceeded the level of practice used in the greeble studies of trained expertise 
(120 training trials per individual greeble; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997), and also the number 
of trials in the "naming rotated objects studies" necessary to produce upright-like 
representations at other orientations (less than 100 trials per object; Tarr & Pinker, 
1989). Thus, although a training study can never hope to match the degree of real-world 
experience that people have with upright faces (or, for example, that which expert dog- 
show judges have with their breed of expertise), I argue that the present study will at 
least provide a strong answer to the question of whether holistic processing for inverted 
faces can, or cannot, emerge in experiment-trained "experts".
3.3 Experiment 1 -  Learning to recognise twins
In Experiment 1, subjects were trained to identify two sets of female identical 
twins, given pseudonyms Liz and Ruth Smith, and Ann and Clare Brown. Orientation 
was a between-subjects variable. Each subject completed 8 hrs of training sessions, in 
which feedback was given for decisions at three levels of categorisation (cf. Gauthier & 
Tarr, 1997), namely the individual level (e.g., Is this Liz?), the family level (e.g., Is this 
one of the Smiths?), and a gender level (e.g., Is this a female?). Individual level trials 
were of primary interest. The family level provided a check on subjects' ability to learn 
arbitrary face-name associations. Note that subjects should show good performance at 
both the gender and family levels, even in the inverted orientation, since local features 
(e.g., the lighter eyes of one set of twins) would be sufficient to support decisions at 
these levels.
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Experiment 1 included several tasks. Following the training phase (Experiment 
la), all subjects participated in tests designed to ascertain what, if anything, had been 
learned. First, subjects gave verbal strategy reports (Experiment lb). Subjects were then 
given a generalisation of identification test (Experiment lc), which examined ability to 
identify new photographs of the twins. This assessed whether learning was based on 
particular training images. The task was performed both with eyebrows and without 
eyebrows visible, since the strategy reports had indicated that this was the feature which 
differed most between the twins. Finally, a second test of generalisation was a same- 
different task (Experiment Id), again with new photographs, and again both with and 
without eyebrows.
I predicted that subjects in the upright face condition would: (a) learn to identify 
twins accurately at the individual level in the training phase (cf. 110 trials to reach 90% 
accuracy for naming twins in Stevenage, 1998); (b) generalise this knowledge to 
previously unseen photographs; (c) differentiate same-twin pairs (Liz-Liz) from 
different-twin pairs (Liz-Ruth) with relative ease; and (d) remain unaffected by the 
removal of the eyebrows. This last test provides a direct assessment of holistic 
processing. Previous evidence argues that holistic processing is not substantially 
impaired by removing a single face feature: for example, accuracy of naming famous 
faces is unaffected by removing only the eyes, or nose, or mouth (Experiment 17, 
Moscovitch et ah, 1997).
For subjects in the inverted face condition, several outcomes were considered 
possible. A pattern similar to that just described for upright faces would suggest that 
holistic processing had emerged with practice. Alternatively, failure to develop holistic 
processing could be reflected in several ways. First, given the difficulty of 
discriminating twins based on local information, subjects might fail to learn the twins at 
all during training. Second, learning might be good during training, but fail to generalise 
to new photographs. Third, learning might be good, but (despite my best efforts with the 
stimuli) be shown to rely solely on local features.
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3.3.1 Experiment 1: General Method
3.3.1.1 Subjects and Overall Design.
Subjects were aged 18-23 yrs, were of Caucasian background (i.e., the same race 
as the stimulus faces) and reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Trained 
subjects were friends of mine and were not paid. Each subject saw faces only in one 
orientation in all phases of the experiment, with N=9 in the inverted condition, and N=6 
in the upright condition.
Trained subjects participated in ten 1 -hr sessions, spread over approximately 5 
weeks. Sessions 1-8 comprised training with feedback, during which each of the twins 
was seen approximately 1100 times (in total). Session 9 tested generalisation of 
identification to new photographs, and the same-different task, using stimuli with the 
eyebrows shown as normal. Session 10 was identical to Session 9, but this time 
eyebrows were covered on all stimuli. Subjects were asked not to communicate with 
any other participant regarding the study until the completion of the experiment.
Total testing time for Experiment 1 was 181 hours. This includes 150 hrs for the 
15 trained subjects, plus 31 hours to test control subjects for the same-different task (see 
Experiment Id).
3.1.1.2 Face Photographs.
Sample stimuli for each twin are shown in Figure 3.1a. Two sets of Caucasian 
female identical twins (aged 22 years and 15 years) were photographed from seven 
different views: full-front (0°) and -20°, -15°, -5°, +5°, +15° and +20° from full-front 
(see Figure 3.1b). There were 138 neutral expression greyscale photographs of each 
twin (16 at each angle plus an extra 26 full-front). Photographs were cropped to remove 
external features and digitally retouched. For the Smith twins this included an attempt to 
thicken Liz's eyebrows, which were plucked differently to Ruth's. Each stimulus 
measured 55 by 37 mm at a screen resolution of 1024 by 768 pixels. All manipulations 
were performed using Photoshop 5.0.
Additionally, 36 cropped photographs of Caucasian male faces (13 males each 
pictured at -25°, +25° and full-face; see Figure 3.1c) were used in gender decisions.
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These came from the Harvard Vision Lab face database (F. Tong & K. Nakayama). 
Brightness and contrast were equated across the male and female sets, as well as for all 
four twins.
Sample male face Ann with an Experiment 1 
eyebrow cover
Ruth with an Experiment 2 
eyebrow cover
Figure 3.1. Sample stimulus photographs.
3.1.2 Experiment 1 a: Identification training.
Training involved categorisation of twins at three levels: gender, family and 
individual. It was predicted that sufficient local featural information would exist to 
distinguish gender and family even in the inverted condition. It was also predicted that, 
upright, subjects would be able to learn to identify the twins at the individual level; the 
first question of interest was whether subjects in the inverted condition could do so.
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3.1.2.1 Method.
Selection of training phase photographs. Each subject’s training set of 69 
photographs of each twin (276 total) was randomly selected from a general set of 91 
photographs of each twin2. Similarly 20 of the 36 male photographs were selected for 
each subject’s training set. The remaining 22 photos of each twin (and 16 of males) 
were held aside as the generalisation set (Experiment lc) for that subject.
Each training session contained a total of 296 trials (40 gender, 80 family and 
176 individual). Within each session, photographs from each subject’s training set were 
randomly assigned to questions (half of which had a “yes” answer and half “no”).
Procedure. Each trial comprised: a yes/no question based on either the gender, 
family or individual name (800 ms), a blank screen (100 ms), a fixation point (300 ms), 
a face until the observer responded (up to 3,000 ms), another blank screen (1,500 ms), 
and finally the same face with the correct answer shown below it (3,000 ms). The inter­
trial interval was 200 ms. Subjects were given a self-timed rest every 50 questions. Prior 
to testing, subjects were told there were two sets of identical twins but not given any 
names, forcing them to guess on early trials. Subjects were initially instructed to 
concentrate on accuracy, but were told to also aim for speed when they reached an 
accuracy of 90% at all levels.
Stimuli were displayed using PsyScope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 
1993) on a Macintosh Power PC 7200/75. Subjects sat approximately 50 cm from the 
screen, giving visual angles for the faces of 6.3° vertical by 4.2° horizontal.
3.1.1.2 Results and Discussion.
Table 3.1 shows mean identification accuracy during the training phase 
(Sessions 1-8). For gender decisions, subjects in both orientation conditions were, as 
expected, highly accurate even in Session 1.
: The other 47 photographs were used for other tasks.
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For family decisions, subjects quickly learned face-name associations, with 
performance approaching ceiling for both orientations in Session 2. Learning was 
slower at the individual level than at the gender or family levels, but average accuracy 
was reasonably good within the first two or three sessions, and reached over 75% in 
Sessions 7 and 8. Accuracy for the Smith twins was somewhat lower than for the Brown 
twins, and there was a small but consistent inversion effect \
Table 3.1. Experiment la: Average accuracy (% correct) over training sessions for the 
gender, family and individual categorisations (the Smiths and Browns are shown 
separately).
Sess 1 Sess 2 Sess 3 Sess 4 Sess 5 Sess 6 Sess 7 Sess 8
Gender
Upright 98 98 99 99 99 99 99 98
Inverted 95 99 98 99 98 98 99 98
Familv
Upright 85 98 98 95 95 97 98 97
Inverted 76 93 95 96 95 94 96 97
Individual (Browns) 
Upright 64 79 87 90 93 92 96 95
Inverted 63 77 83 86 86 87 90 91
Individual (Smiths) 
Upright 62 71 77 79 75 82 82 82
Inverted 52 64 70 71 70 72 77 78
Note: Chance = 50%
Further analysis focused on individual subject data shown in Figures 3.2, 3.3, 
and 3.4 for all tasks of Experiment 1. The first column shows identification accuracy (% 
correct) in the final two training sessions (Sessions 7 and 8, combined to give more 
power). To assess whether or not every subject learned to discriminate the twins, end of
3 Reaction times (RTs) were also measured. For upright faces, mean RTs (correct answers only) across 
the 8 sessions were: Gender = 921 (Session 1), 851, 717, 601,591,651,638, 551 ms (Session 8); Family 
= 1250, 1073, 884, 826, 716, 762, 690, 664; and Individual = 1401, 1334, 1150, 961, 837, 928, 814, 789. 
Interestingly, the RTs for the three levels do not appear to be approaching the same asymptote with 
practice. In sessions 7 and 8, an overall effect of level remained, F(2,10) = 9.18, M S E =7119.2 p<.01, with 
RTs to identify individuals 207 ms slower than gender decisions, Ff 1,10) = 18.1, p <.05, and 125 ms 
slower than family decisions, F(l,10) = 6.57, p<.05. This result for upright faces (for which subjects are 
by definition experts) contrasts with Gauthier and Tarr's (1997) use of equal RTs at the three levels as a 
criterion for expertise with greebles.
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training performance was compared with chance using the binomial distribution. With 
176 trials per family, a one-tailed comparison requires an identification accuracy of 
greater than 57% to be significantly better than chance (50%), at p< .05.
Smiths Upright (N=6)
Identification Same-diff 
task task
Identification Same-diff 
task task
Identification Same-diff 
task task
Figure 3.2. Experiment 1: Individual subject results in the upright condition, on 
the Smith twins. For the identification task, the leftmost column shows accuracy 
(% correct) in training sessions 7+8 (Experiment la), the next two columns show 
the generalisation tests both with and without eyebrows visible (Experiment lc), 
and the dotted lines show the accuracy needed to be significantly better than 
chance. For the same-different task diamonds indicate the trained subject's 
discriminability score with and without eyebrows (Experiment Id). Control 
subject scores are shown as box plots indicating mean, ± 1 SD and range.
For the Smith twins, in the upright orientation (left-most bar of Figure 3.2), all 
subjects learned to identify the twins accurately by the end of training. In the inverted 
condition (left-most bar of Figure 3.3), eight of nine subjects also identified the Smiths 
at well above chance levels; Subject 12, however, failed to learn the Smiths, the reason 
for which will become apparent when further tests are reported. For the Brown twins 
(left-most columns of Figure 3.4a, upright; and Figures 3.4b and 3.4c, inverted), all 
subjects were well above chance in sessions 7 and 8, for both orientations (note that
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subjects in the inverted condition are grouped on a critical difference which emerged in 
their behaviour on later tests).
Identification Same-diff 
task task
Identification Same-diff
task task
Identification Same-diff
task task
Figure 3.3. Experiment 1: Individual subject results in the inverted condition, on 
the Smith twins. Figure formatted as in Figure 3.2. Two subjects of particular 
interest are numbered (SI & S 12).
In summary, Experiment la showed that all subjects learned to identify the 
individual Brown twins reliably. The Smiths were more difficult to distinguish, but all 
subjects in the upright condition learned them well, and most of the subjects in the 
inverted condition also did so eventually. It was then necessary to ascertain exactly 
what had been learned: individual photographs, local features, or a true holistic 
representation.
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Browns(a) Upright (N=6)
Identification
task
Same-diff
task
100 -
(b) Inverted (using eyebrows, N=6)
Identification Same-diff
task task
(c) Inverted (not using eyebrows, N=3)
Identification Same-diff
task task
100 -
-  4.5
Figure 3.4. Experiment 1: Results for the Brown twins, for (a) the upright 
condition, (b) those in the inverted condition who reported using eyebrows to 
differentiate the twins and (c) those in the inverted condition who did not report 
using eyebrows. To save space each plot contains multiple subjects showing a 
common pattern (each diamond represents one trained subject), otherwise 
formatting is as in Figure 3.2.
3.1.3 Experiment lb: Self reported strategies.
Spontaneous comments from subjects in the inverted condition suggested that, 
during training, many were focussing on a single local feature -  eyebrow grooming -  
differentiate the twins. (Even after my touching up of the original photographs, there
remained small differences between the eyebrows of each sister; these are best seen in 
Figure 3.1a if the faces are turned upside-down). To investigate the role of the 
"eyebrow" strategy further, subjects were formally asked to list their strategies.
Two independent judges, blind to subjects' condition, rated strategy reports in 
terms of whether these mentioned eyebrows. Inter-rater reliability was high (Cohen's 
kappa = 96.6%). Example eyebrow strategies included "Ruth's eyebrows have little thin 
bits in the middle while Liz's don't" (Smiths) or "Right eyebrow: Ann has a diagonal 
slash missing" (Browns). I did not attempt to code holistic/configural strategies, since 
this type of information is not well described verbally (e.g., Fallshore & Schooler,
1995).
Table 3.2 shows the number of subjects using a local "eyebrow" strategy. In the 
upright condition, no subject used eyebrows for individual-level decisions, for either 
twin pair. In the inverted condition, however, most subjects used eyebrows for telling 
apart individual twins. This was most consistent for the Smiths, where the only subject 
who did not mention eyebrows was Subject 12; that is, the person who failed to leam to 
differentiate these twins during training. For the Browns, 6 subjects (of 9) used eyebrow 
differences, with other strategies reported also tending to be local in nature.
Table 3.2. Experiment lb: Number (and percentage) of subjects in the upright and 
inverted conditions rated as using eyebrow cues for gender, family, and individual 
categorisations.
N_gender_____ family_____ Browns Smiths_____
Upright 6~  2 (33%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Inverted 9 7 (78%) 1(11%) 6(67%) 8(89%)
Thus, for the Smith twins, strategy reports suggest that the sisters were so 
similar to each other that subjects in the inverted condition could leam to tell them apart 
only if they noticed the eyebrow difference. In addition to Subject 12, further support 
for this idea comes from Subject 1: during training this person failed to leam the Smiths 
for the first 5 sessions, but then said that he had finally "cracked it!" and it was "in the 
eyebrows" after which his performance dramatically improved. I presume that the 
broader range of local strategies reported for the Brown twins reflects the fact that these 
twins have more differences between them than the Smiths (see Figure 3.1a).
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3.1.4 Experiment lc: Generalisation in the identification task
This part of the experiment was partly designed to assess whether learning in the 
training phase reflected learning of particular training images of each twin, by testing 
generalisation of identification accuracy to previously unseen photographs. In addition, 
the task was run both with eyebrows visible (Session 9) and without eyebrows visible 
(Session 10; using a “headband” see Figure 3.Id), to assess whether successful 
identification performance relied on the presence of the local feature most commonly 
mentioned in the strategy reports.
3.1.4.1 Method.
The basic design and procedure were the same as in the training phase (i.e., 
confirm the identity of each twin presented one-at-a-time). A "name reminder" block 
(48 trials) used training photographs with feedback. A pre-generalisation block (48 
trials) then used training photographs but familiarised subjects with a no-feedback 
procedure. This merged seamlessly into the generalisation block using previously 
unseen photographs without feedback. The generalisation block included 104 trials; 
comprising 32 gender level, 32 family level, and 40 individual level trials (10 of each 
twin).
3.1.4.2 Results and Discussion.
Generalisation to new photographs at the gender and family levels was excellent 
(> 90%) as expected, so only results for the individual level will be discussed. In 
Figures 3.2 through 3.4, the second-from-left column indicates identification accuracy 
for new photographs with eyebrows included, and the third-from-left column indicates 
accuracy without eyebrows visible. For a significant difference from chance, with 20 
trials per family, a one-tailed comparison requires an identification accuracy of greater 
than 74%, at p < .05. Table 3.3 shows further statistical analyses contrasting, for each 
subject, the identification accuracy at the end-of-training (Sessions 7+8) with the 
accuracy (a) in the generalisation test with eyebrows, and (b) in the generalisation test
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without eyebrows. Results of chi-square tests for each subject indicate the number who 
showed a significant decrement between training and generalisation.
In the upright condition, all subjects generalised well to new photographs that 
included eyebrows (see Figure 3.2, Figure 3.4a, and Table 3.3), with identification 
accuracy remaining high, and no significant decrement compared to end-of-training for 
both sets of twins. When the eyebrows were covered, upright performance generally 
remained well above chance (Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.4a); moreover, no subject showed 
a significant decrement in comparison to the end of training for the Smiths, and only 
one did so for the Browns (Table 3.3). These results indicate that subjects in the upright 
condition had not merely learned particular photographs used in the training phase. In 
addition, removal of a single local feature from the image had essentially no effect on 
identification accuracy, consistent with the use of holistic processing (cf. Moscovitch et 
al., 1997).
In the inverted orientation for the Smiths (Figure 3.3), all except Subject 12 were 
above chance for new photographs that included eyebrows, and no subject showed a 
significant decrement in accuracy as compared to the end-of-training (Table 3.3). Thus, 
identification generalised well, arguing against learning of individual images. Critically, 
however, identification accuracy for the Smiths dropped substantially when the 
eyebrows were covered. Excluding Subject 12, performance in the without-eyebrows 
condition dropped to below-chance levels for 6 of the 8 subjects, with a seventh only 
just above chance; the drop was a significant change from end-of-training in all 7 of 
these cases. Thus, as suggested by the self-reported strategies, subjects trained on the 
inverted Smiths were relying substantially on eyebrow differences between Liz and 
Ruth, and had been able to learn very little distinguishing information about the rest of 
the Smiths’ faces.
For the inverted Browns, recall that local feature strategies other than the 
eyebrows were reported by some subjects; thus, I would not expect those subjects to be 
affected by only covering the eyebrows, and hence results are shown separately for 
those in the inverted condition who reported using eyebrows (N=6; Figure 3.4b), and 
those who did not (N=3; Figure 3.4c). When eyebrows were intact all but one subject 
generalised well to new photographs (Figure 3.4b and 3.4c, and Table 3.3). When 
eyebrows were covered, however, subjects who reported an eyebrow strategy showed a 
drop in performance (Figure 3.4b) which was significant in 3 of 6 cases (Table 3.3),
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while subjects who did not report using eyebrows were substantially less affected 
(Figure 3.4c; Table 3.3).
Table 3.3. Experiment lc: Summary of chi-square tests comparing identification 
accuracy for new photographs, both with and without eyebrows, to the end of training 
(X crit (1, Af=196) = 3.84,/? < .05). Data are number of subjects who showed a significant
drop in performance.
Smiths
Subject group With evebrows Without evebrows
Upright 0 (of 6) 0 (of 6)
Inverted 0 (of 8*) 7 (of 8*)
Browns
With evebrows Without evebrows
Upright 0 (of 6) 1 (of 6)
Inverted (using eyebrows) 1 (of 6) 3 (of 6)
Inverted (not using eyebrows) 0 (of 3) 0 (of 3)
Notes: * Excluding Subject 12, who could not identify the Smiths at the end of training.
In summary, the results of this first generalisation test indicate that subjects had 
not merely learned individual photographs in the training phase, in either orientation. 
This did not mean, however, that a holistic representation had been learned by subjects 
trained on the inverted faces. Instead, most of these subjects had merely learned a 
representation of eyebrow differences, particularly for the Smiths.
3.1.5 Experiment Id: Generalisation to a same-different task
The second test of generalisation used a new task to assess subjects' ability to
distinguish the twins. In this same-different task, a pair of photographs were shown 
together, and subjects indicated whether these were of the same person (e.g., Liz-Liz), 
or of a twin and her sister (e.g., Liz-Ruth). Another set of new photographs was
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employed, and the task was performed both with eyebrows (Session 9) and without 
eyebrows (Session 10).
The same-different task was included because I thought that it might be more 
sensitive than the simple identification test in showing any learning of inverted faces. In 
particular, it was possible that subjects might have learnt enough about the twins to be 
able to tell them apart when seen simultaneously, even though the representation in 
memory was not good enough to identify each twin reliably when seen one at a time.
3.1.5.1 Method.
Control subjects. To assess the "chance" range of performance control subjects, 
who had no identification training on the twins were tested. It was expected (cf. 
Stevenage, 1998) that controls would find it essentially impossible to tell the twins 
apart. There were 26 untrained subjects (13 upright and 13 inverted) who performed the 
same-different task with eyebrows visible, and 36 (17 upright and 19 inverted) who 
performed it without eyebrows visible. Control subjects were first year psychology 
students, reported normal or corrected to normal vision, were of Caucasian background, 
and received course credit for the half-hour experiment.
Design. Trained and untrained subjects were shown two types of photograph 
pairs: either two different photographs of the same person (a same-twin pair) or a 
photograph of the person and one of their twin (a different-twin pair). Only the five 
internal views were used (-15°, -5°, full-face, 5°, 15°), and pairs were always formed 
across different views (e.g., -15° and 5°) so that similarity would be judged on identity 
rather than pose. A measure of perceived similarity, on a ten point scale (after 
Stevenage, 1998), was derived from a forced choice decision of whether the pair was 
same or different identity, plus a confidence rating on a five-point scale (where 1 was 
totally guessing and 5 was completely sure). The conversion procedure is shown in 
Table 3.4. This combined accuracy-confidence score produced the same pattern of 
results as accuracy scores alone, but was used as the dependent variable because it 
provided a more sensitive measure. For trained subjects the task was performed with 
eyebrows visible in Session 9 and without eyebrows in Session 10.
Stimuli. Photographs for Experiment Id were selected by a pilot study (N= 12) in
which subjects rated 20 same-twin and 20 different-twin pairs for each set of twins (80
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pairs in total). From these 80 pairs, 10 same and 10 different pairs for each set of twins 
were chosen so that, as far as possible, pilot similarity scores were equated across same 
and different sets. To do so it was necessary to select those same pairs judged most 
dissimilar to each other, and those different pairs judged most similar to each other. The 
final stimulus set was therefore 10 same and 10 different Smith twin pairs, 10 same and 
10 different Brown twin pairs4. Pictures were of the same dimensions as in the training 
and generalisation tasks.
Table 3.4. Experiment Id: Conversion of same-different responses and confidence 
ratings to a ten-point similarity scale.
Response Confidence Similarity Score
different 5 1
different 1 5
same 1 6
same 5 10
Procedure. All subjects were told they would see two sets of identical twins, and 
that they were to decide whether pairs showed the same person or different people. 
Faces were displayed in pairs with approximately 50 mm between them on the screen. 
Each pair was displayed for 3,000 ms, allowing for approximately two fixations per 
face. This was followed by a prompt for the forced choice same-different decision, and 
then one for a confidence rating on the five-point scale.
3.1.5.2 Results and Discussion.
A discriminabilitv score for each pair of twins was calculated for each subject as 
their mean different-twin similarity rating minus their mean same-twin similarity rating. 
This gave a discriminability score of 0 if no difference was perceived between same- 
and different-twin pairs, and a discriminability score of 9 for maximum perceived 
difference (i.e., the subject got all decisions correct with the highest level of 
confidence). A sample calculation is shown in Table 3.5.
4 One of these photographs of Ann was inadvertently used in training; thus scores were calculated only 
from the 9 previously unseen different Brown twin pairs.
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Discriminability scores for individual subjects are shown in the “same-different 
task“ panels of Figures 3.2-3.4. The control subject scores are indicated as box-plots on 
each graph. As expected, untrained subjects could barely tell the twins apart: the mean 
discriminability score for controls was close to zero both with and without eyebrows 
visible.
Table 3.5. Experiment Id: Sample calculation of discriminability scores for one subject
(upright with eyebrows).
Smiths
Similarity rating Similarity rating Discriminability score
Same pairs Different pairs Different - Same
Subject 2 2.40 9.80 7.40
Turning to the results for the trained subjects, different patterns emerged for the 
upright and inverted conditions. In the upright orientation, performance with-evebrows 
was good for both the Smiths (see Figure 3.2, fourth column from the left) and the 
Browns (Figure 3.4a); that is, all trained subjects' discriminability scores were above 
even the best of the controls. Moreover, discriminability remained good even without- 
evebrows, again for both the Smiths (right-most column in Figure 3.2), and the Browns 
(Figure 3.4a).
In the inverted orientation, for the Smith twins, discriminability with-evebrows 
visible was generally good (Figure 3.3, fourth column from the left), excluding Subject 
12 (the person who never learned these twins in training). Without-evebrows visible 
(Figure 3.3, right-most column), however, performance dropped dramatically, with no 
trained subject outside the range of controls, and the average across all trained subjects 
being approximately zero. For the Brown twins, all subjects showed good 
discriminability with-evebrows visible (Figures 3.4b and 3.4c, fourth column from the 
left). Without-evebrows visible, subjects who reported using eyebrows as a strategy 
showed a drop in performance (Figure 3.4b, right-most column), while those who did 
not mention eyebrows in their strategy reports were unaffected (Figure 3.4c, right-most 
column).
In summary, subjects in the upright condition showed good generalisation to the 
same-different task (i.e., a new task using new photographs), and once again showed no
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sensitivity to the removal of eyebrows. This is consistent with the assumption that, 
upright, a holistic representation of each twin had been learned. In contrast, subjects in 
the inverted condition were again relying primarily (and in the case of the Smith twins, 
entirely) on eyebrow information. Thus, these subjects had not picked up enough 
information about the rest of the twins' faces to tell them apart even when they were 
seen simultaneously.
3.1.6 Experiment 1 - Summary
The results of Experiments la-Id, taken together, lead to a straightforward 
conclusion. As expected, subjects who were trained on upright faces learned the twins 
very well, generalised this knowledge to new photographs and a new task, and showed 
no noticeable decrement in performance when the most discriminating local feature (the 
eyebrows) was covered from view. Given that holistic processing is well-known to 
occur for upright faces, I presume that this pattern reflects subjects having learnt a 
whole-face representation of each individual twin.
In contrast, subjects who learned the twins in the inverted orientation showed 
evidence of using only local feature strategies, even after 1100 exposures to each twin 
during the training phase. In the case of the Smith twins, this finding was particularly 
striking: all subjects used the same feature (a minor difference in eyebrow 
combing/plucking) to differentiate the twins, and when this feature was covered, 
subjects could no longer tell the Smiths apart. Thus, Experiment 1 strongly suggests that 
practice with inverted faces does not induce holistic processing. This is consistent with 
the failure to develop holistic processing for inverted faces in several earlier studies 
(Martini et al., 2002, cited in McKone et al, 2003; McKone, 2004; McKone et al. 2001). 
However, while those studies used extensive practice with a single image, the present 
study provided experience with many different images of each twin in a variety of 
views, confirming that even these broader learning conditions do not lead to 
development of a holistic representation for inverted faces.
It is also worthwhile emphasising that the local feature selected by the inverted 
subjects is hardly an obvious one. An “eyebrow” strategy is not likely to support real- 
world or generalisable differentiation between twins: differences in eyebrow plucking 
can only be seen on close inspection, and, in the real world, people can change their
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exact patterns of eyebrow combing from day to day. Moreover, most of the subjects in 
the upright condition did not even notice the eyebrow differences. Thus, it is not the 
case that the current stimuli included a striking featural difference that might have 
outweighed subjects' attempts to learn the twins' faces holistically. Instead, for the 
Smith twins at least, it seems that the faces were so similar that subjects were searching 
desperately to find any way of distinguishing between them (this was certainly the case 
for Subjects 1 and 12).
3.2 Experiment 2 - Learning without eyebrows
In Experiment 1, subjects failed to learn a holistic representation of the inverted 
faces, despite extensive practice. In Experiment 2 ,1 explored what would happen if the 
featural cue used by subjects in the first experiment was unavailable. Specifically, only 
the Smith twins were used, and new subjects were trained with the twins' eyebrows 
covered at all times.
With the most discriminating feature removed from the Smith's faces, several 
outcomes were considered possible. First, subjects trained on inverted faces might fail 
to learn the twins at all (cf. Subject 12 in Experiment 1). Second, subjects might learn 
somewhat, but fail to generalise to new photographs and task, suggesting they had been 
forced to rely on remembering individual photographs. Third, subjects might learn and 
generalise well, but have done so only by finding some new local feature to discriminate 
the Smiths. The reason for running Experiment 2, however, was to test another 
alternative, namely that removal of the easiest-to-find feature cue might force subjects 
to learn a holistic representation.
3.2.1 Experiment 2 - Method
3.2.1.1 Subjects and Design.
New subjects were selected for training in Experiment 2. All were university
students, paid $10 per session or first year psychology students participating for course
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credit. There were N=9 in the inverted face condition (age 19-29) and N=8 in the 
upright face condition (age 18-41). As in Experiment 1 all were Caucasian and reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
The amount of identification training for each twin remained similar in 
Experiment 2 (288 individually-named training trials per twin) to that in Experiment 1 
(352 individually-named training trials per twin). This was achieved in only four 
sessions by dropping the gender level of categorisation training, and including only the 
same-different task as a test of generalisation.
3.2.1.2 Stimuli and Procedure.
Unless otherwise specified, the procedure for each task was as for Experiment 1. 
For the training phase, stimuli included 92 photographs of each twin taken from 
Experiment la. Each full training session (Sessions 1-3) included five subblocks of 56 
trials, with Session 4 including one subblock and the same-different task (using 
previously unseen photographs). Within each subblock there were 20 trials at the family 
level and, for the Smiths, 36 trials at the individual level. Across sets of four subblocks, 
particular photographs were re-assigned randomly into the various conditions. Results 
will be presented in terms of "Blocks" of practice (equal to two 56-trial subblocks), 
which are approximately equivalent in number of individual level training trials with the 
Smiths (72) to a Session of Experiment la (88).
During training, an eyebrow mask was added to all images. This was different in 
shape from the Experiment 1 "headbands", and extended beyond the boundaries of the 
face region (see Figure 3.1e). To avoid subjects learning, for example, that the distance 
between the eyelids and the bottom of the mask was greater for Liz than for Ruth, the 
position of the mask was shifted up or down randomly within a 3 pixel range from trial 
to trial.
3.2.2 Experiment 2 - Results and Discussion
Table 3.6 shows mean identification accuracy during training. Learning of the 
individual Smiths was somewhat poor even in the upright orientation (cf. Table 3.1 for
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Experiment l)5. Inverted faces were learnt more slowly than upright faces. At least 
some learning in the inverted orientation did occur.
Table 3.6. Experiment 2: Average identification accuracy for the Smiths over the course 
of training. Each Block contains approximately the same number of individual level 
questions as a Session of Experiment 1.
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 Block 7 Block 8
Familv
Upright 83 96 97 96 95 97 99 98
Inverted 80 95 96 96 97 97 99 99
Individual
(Smiths)
Upright 59 61 77 76 79 78 81 80
Inverted 56 63 65 67 68 66 69 73
Note : Chance = 50%.
In assessing same-different performance only subjects who attained a criterion 
of 80% accuracy by the end of training (N=5 upright, and N=4 inverted) were included. 
In the upright orientation (Figure 3.5a), subjects performed the same-different task 
noticeably better than controls, as expected.
In the inverted orientation (Figure 3.5b), subjects showed two patterns of 
response. Three subjects generalised poorly to the same-different task; this argues that 
their good performance in the training phase had relied merely on learning of particular 
images. One person (Subject 3), however, generalised extremely well. This might, 
perhaps, be taken as evidence that covering the eyebrows during training had forced at 
least one person to learn a holistic representation of inverted faces. However this idea 
was refuted by her strategy report, which indicated a clear reliance on featural 
information. Specifically, in the absence of the eyebrows, Subject 3 had been able to 
find a tiny difference between Liz and Ruth’s eyelashes. She reported that: “There was a 
notch in Ruth’s towards the outer side of her face, her eyelashes were also much denser; 
Liz had a few clumps of eyelashes in the middle, her eyelashes were also much less
5 There are a number of possible reasons for this. The eyebrow masks disrupt some holistic information 
by covering the connection between nose and brow-ridges, which might affect even upright subjects. 
Practice was also less spaced in time in Experiment 2 than in Experiment la and this may have produced 
poorer learning (cf. Donovan & Radosevich, 1999). It is also possible that subjects who knew they would 
be paid (in cash or course credit) regardless of how they performed, were less motivated than the personal 
friends of the experimenter tested in Experiment 1.
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dense”. Note that, as with eyebrow plucking, this “eyelash” strategy would hardly 
provide a viable method for identifying people outside an experimental setting.
same-different task
(a) upright (b) inverted
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no eyebrows no eyebrows
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Figure 3.5. Experiment 2: Individual subject results in the same-different task for 
those who achieved the 80% accuracy criterion by the end of training. Control 
scores (taken from Experiment Id) are shown as box plots with mean, ± 1 SD and 
range. One subject of particular interest is numbered (S3).
In summary, Experiment 2 tested learning when the easiest to find featural 
difference between the twins had been removed. There was no evidence, however, that 
this encouraged subjects in the inverted condition to form a holistic representation.
3.3 Experiment 3 - Composite test for holistic processing
So far, the only direct test of holistic processing for upright faces has been via
the effects of removing one specific feature (the eyebrows). In Experiment 3 ,1 used the 
composite paradigm (Young et al., 1987) to further assess whether trained twin
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discrimination had relied on holistic representations in Experiments 1 and 2. The 
composite paradigm is a well established direct test for holistic/configural processing. 
Subjects name a half-face of a familiar person, presented simultaneously with the other 
half of someone else's face; the two halves are presented either aligned or unaligned, as 
shown for the twin stimuli in Figure 3.6. The standard composite effect is that when 
faces are presented upright, half-faces (e.g., top half) are named slower in the aligned 
condition than in the unaligned condition; this interference from the irrelevant half 
indicates perceptual integration of the whole in the aligned stimulus. When faces are 
presented inverted, no composite effect occurs, indicating that the two halves are 
processed independently even when they are aligned.
In Experiment 3 ,1 tested as many of the Experiment 1 and 2 subjects as 
possible, with each participating in the same orientation condition as before. My 
primary prediction was that the composite effect should be obtained in the upright 
orientation (indicating holistic processing) but not in the inverted orientation (indicating 
part-based processing). Possible overall differences in naming accuracy between top- 
half-faces and bottom-half-faces were also of interest, particularly for the inverted 
orientation, where the local features subjects had reported using were primarily in the 
top half of the face (i.e., eyebrows and eyelashes).
3.3.1 Experiment 3 - Method
3.3.1.1 Subjects.
Subjects were paid $10 for their participation. The delay since completion of 
their previous experiment was approximately 1 year for Experiment 1 subjects (upright 
and inverted), 3 months for the upright condition of Experiment 2, and 7 months for the 
inverted condition of Experiment 2.
There were several constraints on the number of subjects available for the 
composite task. Only Experiment 1 subjects could be tested on the Brown twins. From 
Experiment 2 ,1 approached only subjects who had achieved 80% accuracy by the end 
of training. Finally, within Experiment 3 I used a brief retraining procedure to ensure 
that subjects could name whole-face stimuli accurately before proceeding to naming 
half-faces; here, I accepted only subjects who were at least 80% accurate for each twin
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by the end of two short re-training blocks. These various constraints left me with a total 
of N=6 for upright Browns, N=6 for inverted Browns, N=10 for upright Smiths, and 
N=7 for inverted Smiths.
3.3.1.2 Design.
Each subject participated only in their trained orientation condition. Face halves 
were referred to as "forehead" and "chin", to avoid confusion with "top" and "bottom" 
when faces were presented inverted. For a given block of composite trials, subjects 
named one half of the face for one set of twins (e.g., the chin half of the Smiths); this 
avoided confusion about what was to be named, and also allowed for binary key 
responses (e.g., Liz or Ruth). Order of half-to-name, and family for the Experiment 1 
participants, was counterbalanced across subjects.
Within each block, aligned and unaligned trials were presented in random order. 
The comparison of interest came from aligned vs. unaligned composites of different 
twins (i.e., half of the composite from each sister). I also included same-twin 
composites (i.e., halves from two different photographs of the same person), for which 
data are not presented, to preclude a situation in which subjects could infer the identity 
of one half indirectly by knowing the other half (e.g., recognising the top half as Liz and 
realising that in all cases the bottom half had to be Ruth).
3.3.1.3 Stimuli.
The stimuli for the composite task were created from 12 previously unseen full- 
face (0°) photographs of each twin. These were treated as described in the General 
Method section of Experiment 1 and then cut in half horizontally. There were no 
eyebrow masks. In forming composites, each half face could be recombined with every 
other face from the same family, except for the one to which it originally belonged (e.g., 
Liz_l top half could be combined with all Smith bottom halves except Liz_l). Note that 
there was no touching up of composite faces; the two halves were simply placed in the 
appropriate position relative to each other. In Young et al.'s (1987) stimuli, this 
procedure left an obvious join across the middle of aligned composites, making it clear 
to the subject where each half-to-name ended. The twin’s faces were so similar to each 
other, however, that aligned composites connected almost perfectly. Thus, a marker line 
at the mid-point was added (see Figure 3.6).
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Figure 3.6. Examples of the composite faces used in Experiment 3.
Each condition of the composite test (e.g., naming "forehead" halves of Smith 
twins) included 128 trials. Of these, 64 comprised different-twin halves, and 64 
comprised same-twin halves. Within each of these categories, 32 trials showed aligned 
stimuli, and 32 showed unaligned. For unaligned stimuli, the direction of offset was 
then varied (i.e., chin half moved left in 16 cases, and right in 16 cases). For each 
subject, the photographs appearing in each condition were randomly selected from the 
pool of 132 same-twin composites and 144 different-twin composites.
3.3.1.4 Procedure.
Experiment 1 subjects participated for 1.5 hrs (Smiths and Browns), and 
Experiment 2 subjects for 45 mins (Smiths only). Equipment was as in Experiment la, 
with responses recorded using a NewMicros button box measuring reaction times (RTs) 
accurate to 1 ms. The size of an aligned composite was equal to a whole face presented 
in Experiment 1 a.
The retraining procedure was similar to the original training in Experiments 1 
and 2, with two exceptions: only individual level categorisation was required; and the 
name verification procedure was replaced with a simple two alternative forced choice. 
On each trial, a stimulus face was presented until the subject responded (i.e., for the 
Smith twins, one button for Liz and another for Ruth), followed by a feedback stimulus 
(face plus correct name). Each short retraining block included 80 trials (e.g., 40 of Liz 
and 40 of Ruth), with photographs taken from the subject's original training set.
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In the composite test, practice trials were given using male faces. Each trial in a 
given block then began with the word "chin" or "forehead" for 500 ms. The composite 
twin face (either aligned or unaligned) was then presented until the subject responded or 
for a maximum of 3,000 ms, followed by a 1,500 ms interval between trials. No 
feedback was given.
3.3.2 Experiment 3 - Results and Discussion
In the standard version of Young et al.'s (1987) paradigm, using famous faces, 
accuracy is high and thus the composite effect is assessed via reaction times. With the 
twin stimuli, however, I suspected that accuracy might be the more relevant measure. 
With accuracy, a composite effect takes the opposite direction from the usual effect 
with reaction times; that is, interference from the irrelevant half-face would be revealed 
as lower accuracy scores in the aligned condition than in the unaligned condition, rather 
than (or possibly in addition to) higher reaction time scores in the aligned condition.
Figure 3.7 shows accuracy for identifying half-faces in aligned and unaligned 
composites, separately for each set of twins (Browns and Smiths), and for "chin" and 
"forehead" halves of the face. Reaction times for correct responses are given in Table 
3.7. Results are shown averaged over subjects.
Table 3.7. Experiment 3: Average reaction time (ms) for the composite task in each 
condition.
Brown forehead Brown chin Smith forehead Smith chin
aligned unalign aligned unalign aligned unalign aligned unalign
Upright 874 847 1411 1282 1096 1109 1389 1315
Inverted 833 904 1164 1078 833 863 1444 1333
For the upright orientation (Figure 3.7a), a clear composite effect is apparent in 
three of the four conditions, with aligned less accurate than unaligned for naming the
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"chin" half of the Browns, /(5)=2.61, p <.05, the "forehead" half of the Smiths,
?(9)=1.99, p <.05, and the "chin" half of the Smiths, /(9)=1.99, p <.05. The only 
exception was for naming the "forehead" half of the Brown twins, where accuracy in 
both conditions was at ceiling and so there was no room for any composite effect to 
emerge (reaction times were also very fast; see Table 3.7). In terms of individual 
subjects, the pattern was more variable (given the smaller number of trials) but six out 
of ten subjects showed a significant composite effect for at least one of the conditions 
tested (x2CritO, N=6A) = 3.84, p < .05). Also note that the composite effect did not 
reflect a speed-accuracy tradeoff. Averaged across all conditions, reaction times were 
55 ms slower for aligned stimuli than for unaligned stimuli, and this composite effect on 
reaction times in fact reached significance for one condition (naming the "chin" half of 
the Browns, ?(5)=2.95,p <.05). Thus, as predicted, the composite test demonstrated 
holistic processing for upright twin faces.
a) Upright b) Inverted
E] aligned 
□  unaligned
Brown Brown Smith Smith 
forehead chin forehead chin
Brown Brown Smith Smith 
forehead chin forehead chin
Figure 3.7. Experiment 3: Naming accuracy on the composite task for subjects in 
the upright (a) and inverted (b) conditions. Error bars are ± (VMSE / VN), 
appropriate for the within-subjects comparison of aligned versus unaligned; * = p 
< .05, one-tailed t-test.
In the inverted orientation, in contrast, no composite effect emerged. Figure 3.7b 
shows that three conditions produced effects trending in the wrong direction, and the 
one trend in the correct direction (the "chin" halves of the Browns) was not significant, 
f(5)=l .78, p >.05. In terms of individual subjects, there were no cases of a significant
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composite effect on accuracy for any subject for any condition (x Crit(K N=6A) = 3.84, 
all p > .05). Table 3.7 also shows no evidence for a composite effect on reaction times: 
aligned was only 23 ms slower overall than unaligned, and two out of the four 
conditions showed trends in the wrong direction.
For inverted faces, the difference in overall accuracy for the two halves of the 
Smith twins is also of interest. In the upright condition (Figure 3.7a), overall accuracy 
did not differ greatly between the "chin" half of the Smiths and the "forehead" half, but 
in the inverted orientation (Figure 3.7b), "forehead" halves of Smiths were identified at 
ceiling levels, while "chin" halves were close to chance. This pattern in the inverted 
orientation is consistent with previous evidence that the 7 individuals included in this 
test were all using information in the top half of the face (eyebrows in six cases, 
eyelashes in one case) to support discrimination of the Smiths. Interestingly, this 
includes Subject 12 from Experiment 1 who, in that experiment, failed to learn the 
Smith twins in 8 hours of training. During the re-training phase of the present 
experiment, however, his performance suddenly jumped from chance levels in the first 
retraining block to 90% correct in the second retraining block. According to his self- 
report, the reason for this was that, subsequent to Experiment 1, friends had informed 
him that the difference between the Smiths lay in their eyebrows, and he located the 
difference at the end of the first retraining block.
In summary, the composite test results provide direct confirmation that holistic 
processing occurred for upright twin faces (i.e., a composite effect), but not for inverted 
twin faces (i.e., no composite effect). It also again supported the conclusion from 
previous experiments, that subjects in the inverted condition were using featural 
information in the top half of the face.
2
3.4 General Discussion
The aim of the present study was to assess whether inverted faces could come to 
be processed holistically with practice. The current results argue strongly that this is not 
possible within the constraints of a training study. In terms of the amount of practice, I 
used a number of individually named trials with each twin which was easily greater than
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that used by Gauthier and Tarr (1997) in investigating face-like processing for greebles, 
and far greater than that shown by Tarr and Pinker (1989) to produce template-like 
representations of objects in new trained orientations. In terms of the style of practice, I 
presented each twin in multiple different photographs and across multiple different 
poses, thus giving subjects every opportunity to develop a generalisable whole-face 
representation. Finally, in using identical twins, I made learning based on local features 
as difficult as possible. This was very important. Had there been any obvious feature 
that discriminated the individual faces (e.g., light eyes vs. dark eyes), subjects in the 
inverted condition could have been expected to learn identity very easily (as occurred 
for the family decisions). In discriminating between identical twins, however, I 
provided maximum need for the perceptual system to develop a holistic representation 
of the whole face, if and where this were possible.
For inverted faces, no holistic processing emerged despite the careful selection 
of stimuli and practice level. There was no composite effect for inverted faces, directly 
confirming that processing remained part-based following practice. Instead, two basic 
patterns emerged. If a subject trained on inverted faces was able to find some tiny 
featural difference between the twins (usually after some effort), then the subject could 
(a) identify each twin reliably, and (b) generalise this ability to new photographs and 
new tasks, but (c) was unable to tell the twins apart if the preferred feature was not 
available in the stimulus (e.g., with the eyebrows covered in Experiments lc and Id, or 
with the wrong half-face in Experiment 3). The second pattern for subjects trained on 
inverted faces occurred when a subject was not able to locate a featural difference 
between the twins: here, the subject either failed to learn at all, or showed only non- 
generalisable learning of particular training-phase photographs.
The extraordinary reliance of inverted face learning on local features in the 
present experiments is perhaps most clearly emphasised by three individual cases. In 
Experiment 1, Subject 1 discovered the eyebrow difference in the Smith twins five 
hours into training, and suddenly jumped from chance levels to > 70% correct in a 
single session. Subject 12 from Experiment 1 failed to notice the eyebrow difference at 
all and correspondingly failed to reliably learn the Smiths for the entire eight sessions of 
training; in re-training for Experiment 3, however, he suddenly attained 90% accuracy 
after advice from other study participants on which feature to look for. In Experiment 2, 
with eyebrows not available, Subject 3 was the only person to find another featural 
difference between the Smith twins (eyelash clumping); correspondingly, she was the
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only subject in the inverted condition to show learning that could generalise ŵ ell 
beyond the training phase photographs.
In contrast to this constant emphasis on tiny features for the inverted faces, 
strategy reports showed that most subjects who learned the twins upright did not even 
notice that these featural differences existed. Instead, upright subjects showed learning 
that generalised well and demonstrated two specific hallmarks of holistic processing: 
first, identification accuracy was unaffected by removal of a single feature from the face 
(eyebrows in Experiment 1; cf. similar results in Moscovitch et al., 1997); and second, 
half-face identification accuracy showed the standard composite effect (Young et al., 
1987).
3.6.1 Possible caveats
I believe that I have made a compelling case against learning of holistic 
processing for inverted faces under the most conducive circumstances possible in a 
training experiment. However, I cannot, of course, conclude that there are no 
circumstances that could lead to development of holistic processing for inverted faces. 
The current training procedure, while using multiple poses and pictures, was still a 
rather limited version of real-world learning, in which thousands of different faces are 
seen in different poses, expressions, lighting conditions and so on, over a period of 
many years. It remains possible that a similar type of exposure to inverted faces could 
eventually lead to the development of holistic processing. I suggest that dentists and 
anaesthetists - who have at least moderate real-world exposure to inverted faces -  might 
make interesting subjects for future investigation of this issue.
A more general caveat is that an inability to learn holistic processing in a novel 
orientation might perhaps arise from competition with any pre-existing holistic 
representation in the upright orientation, rather than being specific to faces. Thus, for 
example, if dog experts were able to develop a holistic representation of their breed-of- 
expertise in the upright orientation, it might be impossible for them to learn a 
subsequent holistic representation in the inverted orientation. To my knowledge this has 
not yet been tested.
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3.6.2 Theoretical implications of the present results.
The primary importance of the present results is in showing that the "special" 
type of processing used for upright faces is not easily learned in the inverted orientation. 
This is an important finding for faces because of the apparent difference from the 
situation with other objects (at least in non-experts). For other objects, orientation 
effects disappear very quickly with practice (e.g., McKone & Grenfell, 1999), even 
when within-class discrimination is required (Tarr & Pinker, 1989; see also Tarr, 1995). 
This argues that it is easy to learn upright-like processing of nonface objects in new 
non-canonical orientations. The current results, however, indicate that the processing of 
faces remains highly orientation-specific even following substantial practice with the 
inverted orientation.
My results have less to say about the origin of “special” processing for faces. 
Had I shown learning of holistic processing for inverted faces in only 8 hours of 
practice (cf. the claims of the greeble studies), this result would have provided 
compelling evidence for the expertise hypothesis. The fact that I did not obtain this 
result does not allow the expertise hypothesis to be rejected, however, although note 
that my results are at least consistent with the alternative view that generic learning 
during adulthood is fundamentally different from learning of faces in infancy (de Hann, 
Humphreys & Johnson, 2002; Le Grand et al, 2001,2003, 2004).
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CHAPTER 4: WHICH TASKS BEST MEASURE “SPECIAL” PROCESSING FOR
FACES?
4.1 Overview.
When choosing a task to evaluate whether face-like processing can sometimes 
emerge for objects (e.g., for human bodies or for objects-of-expertise), it is 
advantageous to know that under ordinary circumstances: (a) face-specificity has been 
fully demonstrated via comparison against multiple object classes with various different 
properties; and (b) the task produces a signature effect for faces that is completely 
absent for objects, rather than merely disproportionately large for faces. A review shows 
that the disproportionate inversion and part-whole effects satisfy (a) but not (b). My 
experiments then evaluate composite effects (a test of holistic/configural processing), 
plus contrast reversal. Both were tested for the first time with a natural object class 
(dogs). These and the tested inversion effect demonstrated face-specificity, but only the 
composite effect was completely absent for dogs. Note that, in the experiments 
described in the present chapter, all subjects were non-experts with dogs.
4.2 Introduction.
A long-standing idea is that faces are “special” in that upright faces are 
processed in a holistic/configural manner, while inverted faces, scrambled faces and 
objects are processed in a part-based manner. There is controversy regarding the exact 
nature of the processing used for upright faces (e.g., see Maurer, Le Grand, & 
Mondloch, 2002). Here, I conceptualise it as strong perceptual integration across the 
entire region of the face (excluding hair), that either involves no decomposition into 
parts beyond simple image components processed in early vision (a more “holistic” 
interpretation; Farah, 1996; Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997; Tanaka & 
Sengco, 1997), or else interactions between multiple parts across the face (a more 
“configural” interpretation; Rhodes, 1988). I do not distinguish between these two 
slightly different interpretations, and use the term holistic throughout as shorthand for 
“the holistic/configural processing style apparently special to upright faces”.
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In this chapter, I examine several tasks that have been associated with face- 
specific processing. My aims are (a) to determine the extent to which the phenomena 
revealed in these tasks are truly specific to faces, and (b) to evaluate the extent to which 
the phenomena are theoretically associated with holistic processing. This work is 
important because of the use, or potential use, of these tasks in evaluating theories of the 
origin of “special” processing for faces. While it might be that faces are special due to 
some innate representation of structure (Morton & Johnson, 1991) and/or preferential 
exposure to faces during a critical period in early infancy (Le Grand, Mondloch,
Maurer, & Brent, 2001,2004), the alternative theory is that generic expertise in 
individual-level identification (eg. dog 1 vs. dog 2, by analogy with Bill vs. Sam for 
faces) leads to the development of special processing for faces. The method of 
evaluating this expertise hypothesis (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; 
Meadows, 1974) then relies on testing experts in non-face object domains (e.g., dog- 
show judges looking at dogs) for the phenomena suggested to be associated with face- 
specific processing in the paradigms discussed here. It is therefore essential to know that 
these phenomena produce a clear dissociation between faces and objects in novices: that 
is, subjects who have some level of general familiarity with the object class tested, but 
are not expert at making within-class discriminations (e.g., have poorer discrimination 
of two dogs than of two faces).
4.2.1 Disproportionate inversion effect on memory.
Most objects are somewhat harder to remember when learned and tested inverted 
than when learned and tested upright. However, across many studies it has consistently 
been found that the inversion effect on recognition memory for faces (commonly 20%- 
25% decrement) is much larger than for objects (usually 0%-8% decrement). This 
disproportionate inversion effect for faces has been reported in comparison to 
aeroplanes, period costumes, houses, stick figures, buildings, landscapes, dog faces, and 
side-on views of dogs of several breeds (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Scapinello &
Yarmey, 1970; Yin, 1969). The large inversion effect is usually interpreted in terms of 
holistic processing assisting memory for upright faces, but not inverted faces or objects 
in either orientation.
As a method of assessing face-specific processing, the strength of the inversion 
paradigm lies in the wide range of other objects to which faces have been compared. It
is difficult to choose any one object class as the perfect control stimulus for faces. It is 
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generally accepted that all members of the object class should share a common basic 
structure (a “first order” configuration, eg. all dogs have a head attached to a body 
above four legs; Diamond & Carey, 1986). Beyond this, however, there is no single 
object class that exactly matches faces in terms of complexity, spatial frequency 
components, degree and type of variability between individuals, surface texture, clarity 
of part boundaries, natural versus manmade status, and so on. Thus, the fact that faces 
produce large inversion effects in comparison to a broad range of objects is very 
important in establishing face-specificity.
The inversion effect on memory unfortunately also has two significant 
disadvantages as a measure of face-like processing. The first is that the signature of 
face-specific processing is a disproportionate inversion effect, rather than the presence 
as opposed to absence of an inversion effect. This means that, when testing experts for 
example, the question tested must be whether objects-of-expertise produce an inversion 
effect as big as for faces, or substantially larger than in novices, rather than whether 
they produce an inversion effect at all.
The second disadvantage is that there is no direct theoretical logic linking 
disproportionate inversion effects with holistic processing (Valentine, 1988, 1991). Yin 
(1969) was correct in his suggestion that upright faces are processed holistically, while 
inverted faces are not, but the evidence for this came from other paradigms discussed 
below. Thus, for objects, even if a face-sized inversion effect on memory were found, 
this would not, in itself, be sufficient to demonstrate holistic processing.
4.2.2 The part-whole paradigm.
The part-whole effect (Davidoff & Donnelly, 1990; Tanaka & Farah, 1993) has 
a logical connection to holistic processing in that it examines the effect of surrounding 
context from the whole on memory for a part. In Tanaka & Farah (1993; also see 
Tanaka & Sengco, 1997), subjects first learned whole faces (e.g., John). In a subsequent 
memory test, stimulus pairs were presented, either as isolated parts (e.g., John’s nose vs. 
Bill’s nose) with subjects asked to choose the studied part (John’s nose), or in the 
context of the whole face (e.g., John’s nose in John’s face vs. Bill’s nose in John’s face) 
with subjects asked to choose the studied face (John’s face). In the upright orientation, 
memory for the face part was substantially better in the whole face condition than in the 
isolated part condition, arguing for some form of holistic processing.
81
Several studies (Davidoff & Donnelly, 1990; Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999; 
Tanaka & Farah, 1993) have confirmed that inverted faces and scrambled faces do not 
produce any part-whole effect. This same finding -  namely a zero part-whole effect -  
has been shown for houses in the specific methodology used by Tanaka and Farah 
(1993; Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999). However, although results of this one object class 
suggested that the part-whole effect might provide a presence versus absence difference 
from faces, tests with other objects did not replicate the finding. Car fronts, biological 
cells, and dog faces (Tanaka et al. 1996, cited in Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997), and the 
artificial objects “greebles” (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997) have all demonstrated small part- 
whole effects. Even houses have produced a part-whole effect, using an immediate- 
memory version of the paradigm that avoids repetition of particular parts across more 
than one study exemplar (Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999). The same result has also been 
obtained for chairs (Davidoff & Donnelly, 1990). Across studies it is clear that objects 
show a nonzero part-whole effect, but one that is substantially smaller than that for 
faces; that is, there is again a merely a disproportionately large effect for faces.
Why might a method apparently tapping holistic processing still produce some 
effect for objects? There are three a priori possibilities. The first is that a small amount 
of “face-specific” holistic processing occurs for objects. Results of other paradigms, 
however, argue against this idea (see below and the General Discussion). Second, it 
could be that the part-whole effect does not actually tap face-like holistic processing, 
but instead taps more general context, gestalt, or global processing effects. As a 
methodology, the part-whole effect seems related to word superiority and shape 
superiority paradigms (Davidoff & Donnelly, 1990). In the word superiority effect, a 
degraded letter is identified more accurately in a word (e.g., the third letter in knit vs. 
knot) than alone (i vs. o) or in a random letter string (gjik vs. gjok; Reicher, 1969; 
Wheeler, 1970). Similarly, the angle of a line is more accurately perceived in the 
context of a connected shape (e.g., a parallelogram) than when tested alone (e.g., Enns 
& Gilani, 1988). The advantage of whole over parts for objects might then reflect 
similar generic context effects, in which processing of any type of part is enhanced by 
placing it in a coherent or familiar structure. Under this view, the part-whole effect for 
faces would arise from the same generic source. This idea, however, fails to explain 
why the part-whole effect is much larger for faces than for objects. A third alternative is 
that the part-whole effect measures contributions from two sources: it arises partly from 
face-specific holistic processing, and partly from generic context or global processing
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effects. This view can explain both the fact that objects show a nonzero part-whole 
effect, and the fact that it is much larger for faces.
Even under this last view, the part-whole effect does not provide a pure measure 
of face-specific holistic processing. Instead, as with the inversion effect, any claim of 
face-like processing for objects (e.g., for objects-of-expertise), would always require 
demonstrating a part-whole effect that was as large as that for faces, or at least much 
larger in experts than novices.
4.2.3 The composite effect.
In Young, Hellawell, and Hay’s (1987) composite paradigm using famous faces, 
the top half of one person’s face was combined with the bottom half of a different 
person’s face (e.g., Tony Blair’s forehead with George Bush’s chin). For upright faces, 
when these two halves were physically aligned, subjects were slower to name either half 
(e.g., the top half) than when the two halves were offset, indicating holistic processing 
when the halves were aligned. For inverted faces, in contrast, there was no difference in 
naming times for aligned and unaligned stimuli, showing no holistic processing (also 
see Carey & Diamond, 1994). This pattern has been confirmed for novel faces using a 
same-different judgement and aligned vs. unaligned composites (Le Grand et al., 2004). 
A composite effect for novel faces has also been demonstrated indirectly by Hole 
(1994), who tested only aligned composites and relied on the difference between upright 
and inverted conditions being in the opposite direction to usual (i.e., inverted was better 
than upright) to argue that holistic processing must have occurred for upright 
composites.
From a theoretical perspective, the composite paradigm in its aligned vs. 
unaligned version would seem to provide a particularly strong way of tapping 
perceptual fusing of parts into a new whole. This is because (a) unlike the part-whole 
effect, the context provided by the other half is present on the screen in both aligned and 
unaligned conditions, and (b) simple response competition from the two halves (one 
suggesting “Blair”, one suggesting “Bush”) is also matched across the two conditions. 
Despite a general appreciation of the theoretical value of this paradigm for faces (e.g., 
Maurer, et al., 2002), it has been tested on only one class of objects, namely greebles. 
Results showed no composite effect in greeble novices; indeed, the effect was 
approximately a 2% (and 42 ms) difference in the reverse direction for a composite
effect (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002). This raises the possibility that, unlike inversion and the
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part-whole effect, the composite paradigm might produce an absence of its signature 
phenomenon for objects, rather than merely a disproportionately large effect for faces. 
To support this conclusion, however, it would be necessary to have data on other object 
classes.
4.2.4 Contrast reversal effects.
A final test that has been suggested to produce face-specific effects is the 
contrast reversal paradigm. A contrast reversed image is one in which the luminance 
values of pixels have been reversed so that the picture looks like a photographic 
negative. (This manipulation is also sometimes referred to as contrast inversion, but 
“reversal” is used here to more clearly distinguish it from the change in orientation 
meant by the term “inverted face”.)
Theoretically, I do not see contrast reversal effects as arising from holistic 
processing for faces. Instead, in agreement with other authors, I presume that contrast 
reversal for faces disrupts information about shape-from-shading extracted in mid-level 
vision, rather than tapping holistic processing in high-level vision. In support of this 
interpretation, Kemp, McManus, and Pigott (1990) showed that inversion and contrast 
reversal each reduced accuracy in a match-to-sample task, but did so in an additive 
fashion (i.e., inverted faces were as strongly affected by contrast reversal as upright 
faces), arguing that inversion and contrast reversal effects arise from different stages of 
the visual processing stream (also see Bruce & Langton, 1994). Further, Hole, George 
& Dunsmore (1999) found a composite effect (i.e., evidence of holistic processing) for 
contrast reversed faces showing that the two effects are independent.
Although there is no link between contrast reversal effects and holistic 
processing, it is of interest that contrast reversal effects for faces are very large (e.g., 
Bruce & Langton, 1994; Johnston, Hill, & Carman, 1992; Kemp, Pike, White, & 
Musselman, 1996). This has led to the suggestion that sensitivity to contrast reversal 
might be a phenomenon specific to faces in novices, and so worth evaluating in experts 
(Gauthier, Williams, Tarr & Tanaka, 1998). I have some doubts that contrast reversal 
will always be face-specific even in novices (the idea that recognition of complex 
scenes is sensitive to contrast reversal will have occurred to anyone who has looked at 
photographic negatives of their holiday snap-shots), but empirical evidence with objects 
tested to date is consistent with face-specificity. In the only published study, Gauthier et
al. (1998) found no effect of contrast reversal for identifying greebles. In two 
84
unpublished conference presentations, Subramaniam and Biederman (1997) reported the 
same result for chairs, and Nederhouser, Mangini, Biederman, and Kazunori (2002) the 
same result for “blobs” (pictures of smooth three-dimensional objects with a number of 
random looking protrusions).
The size of the contrast reversal effect for objects in these prior studies has been 
essentially zero, rather than merely smaller than for faces. This potentially indicates an 
important all-or-none signature of face-specific processing. However, the zero contrast 
effect might be partly attributable to the type of objects tested. Chairs and greebles are 
both artificial objects with relatively clear part-boundaries that could reduce reliance on 
shape-from-shading information. Although ‘blobs’ were introduced in an attempt to 
deal with this criticism, the blobs had little in the way of surface texture (unlike faces).
4.2.5 The present study.
Of the techniques commonly used as measures of holistic processing in faces, 
two -  the inversion effect on memory and the part-whole task -  have been clearly 
established to produce face-specific effects. For both these tasks, faces have been 
contrasted with a broad range of objects, differing in many properties. Unfortunately, 
however, both inversion effects on memory and the part-whole effect show only a 
quantitative rather than a qualitative difference between faces and objects. That is, the 
effects are disproportionately large for faces, but are not absent for objects. This means 
that the simple presence of one of these effects cannot be used to establish holistic 
processing (e.g., in objects-of-expertise).
The other effect that appears to be associated with holistic processing -  the 
composite effect -has strong theoretical logic linking it to perceptual integration across 
the whole of the stimulus1. Its empirical status as producing face-specific effects,
1 One further paradigm that has been associated with holistic processing in faces is relational versus local 
alteration, where faces are varied either on the spacing between face parts (e.g., nose-mouth distance), or 
on local part information (e.g., eye colour, lower lip shape). Small spacing changes are detected much 
more poorly in inverted faces than in upright faces, but local changes are less sensitive or insensitive to 
inversion (Gilchrist & McKone, 2003; Leder & Bruce, 1998; Le Grand et al., 2001). The “second-order” 
relational processing for upright faces demonstrated in these paradigms is considered to be a key part of 
face-specific holistic/configural processing, but I have not discussed this paradigm here because it does 
not transfer neatly to objects. For example, it is not clear whether increasing the distance between the 
forelegs and hind legs in a dog should be treated theoretically as a relational change (altered spacing), or 
as a part change (longer torso).
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however, has not been fully established; it has been tested only for greebles, and not for 
any natural objects.
The primary aim of my experimental work was thus to test the composite task 
for a class of natural objects (dogs). I was also interested in testing the effects of 
contrast reversal on a natural stimulus class. While there is no single “perfect” control 
stimulus for faces, dogs were chosen as well-matched to faces on a number of important 
variables. Both have a canonical upright, and individual members of the class all share a 
first-order configuration. Both are natural stimuli for which differences between 
individuals arise from genetic variability; this genetic component means that, unlike 
manmade objects such as greebles, individuals differ from each other on a great many 
dimensions at once (length of chin to shoulder, and length of hip to foot, and size of 
foot, and so on) rather than just three or four. Finally, both dogs and faces have some 
degree of surface texture, and include fuzzy part boundaries (eg., the neck merges 
smoothly into the torso for dogs, just as the nose merges smoothly into the cheek in 
faces). The dogs used were labradors. These have even colouring across their bodies, 
and were chosen to avoid introducing a deliberate emphasis on parts such as might 
occur for breeds with strong colour boundaries (e.g. beagles).
The core results are presented in Experiment 6 (composite task). Inversion 
effects on memory are also tested in Experiment 4, to ensure I could replicate the 
standard finding of a larger inversion effect for faces than objects for the current stimuli. 
In Experiment 5 ,1 examined contrast reversal effects for dogs. Although there is no 
evidence that contrast reversal has anything to do with holistic processing, I thought it 
worthwhile assessing whether contrast reversal effects remain face-specific when 
compared to a natural stimulus with fuzzy part boundaries and some degree of surface 
texture (i.e, an object class in which shape-from-shading information is potentially 
important).
4.3 Experiment 4 -  Inversion Effects On Recognition Memory
In recognition memory tasks, faces usually show larger inversion effects than 
other objects even when the task requires within-class processing (e.g., Yin, 1969).
Experiment 4 aimed to replicate this finding for the current labrador stimuli.
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An important factor affecting memory performance is the similarity between the 
items in a given class, with better memory if the stimuli are more different from each 
other than if they are more similar. To equate internal similarity between the face 
stimulus set and the dog stimulus set, I took the approach of matching performance 
levels in the inverted orientation. In this orientation, subjects should not be able to apply 
special processing mechanisms to either faces or dogs.
4.3.1 Experiment 4 - Method
4.3.1.1 Subjects.
Twenty-two Caucasian subjects (11 males) completed the memory task for 
course credit (N= 14) or $3 (N=6) for the 15min experiment. Most also participated in 
other unrelated experiments in a longer session. Age ranged from 18-43, with most 
subjects aged 18 years (only two were over 35 years). All reported normal or corrected- 
to-normal vision.
4.3.1.2 Design.
Stimulus class (dogs vs. faces) and orientation (upright vs. inverted) were 
manipulated within subjects. For each stimulus class and orientation (e.g. upright dogs) 
there was a study (learning) phase, followed by a distracter phase, and then the memory 
test phase. Order of stimulus class and orientation conditions was counterbalanced 
across subjects. On each test trial, subjects saw two dogs (or two faces), one of which 
had appeared at study (“old”) and one of which was unstudied (“new”), and were asked 
to select the old one. The dependent measure was accuracy on this two alternative 
forced choice (2AFC) recognition memory task (chance = 50%).
For the purposes of the 2AFC presentation, 60 dogs (and 60 faces) were 
organised into 30 pairs, with appearance and stance matched as closely as possible 
across the exemplars in each pair. Within each stimulus class, subjects received half of 
the pairs in the upright condition and the other half in the inverted condition with the 
particular set received in each orientation counterbalanced across subjects. Within each 
pair, one of the two items was designated as studied while the other remained unstudied. 
Assignment to studied/unstudied status was counterbalanced across subjects. Thus for
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each condition (e.g., upright dogs) 15 exemplars were studied w'ith 15 corresponding 
pairs presented at test.
4.3.1.3 Stimuli.
Dog stimuli were photographs of 60 yellow labrador retrievers, shown standing 
in side-on pose (i.e. a standard show-dog pose). Examples are shown in Figure 4.1, and 
the full set is presented in Appendix I. There were 16 female labradors and 44 males (all 
are referred to as dogs). Dogs were taken from a mixture of sources including books 
(The Book of the Labrador Retriever, Nicholas, 1983; The Labrador Retriever Club of 
Victoria Inc’s “Gold Book”) and breeder web-sites in the public domain. Most of the 
dogs were American (approximately 38) or Australian (14) with the rest English or 
Canadian. There was a range of lighting direction in the photographs, as well as 
variability in image quality. Dog pictures were converted to greyscale and scaled to 4.9 
cm -  6 cm from nose to tail (average 5.7 cm) by 3.5 cm - 4.6 cm from top of head to 
paws (average 4.2 cm). At the experimental viewing distance of approximately 45 cm, 
images subtended visual angles of 7.2° horizontal and 5.3° vertical on average. Any 
extraneous information (e.g., grass stalks over paws; handler's fingertips on tail) was 
edited out of the image. Half of the dogs faced to the left and half faced to the right.
Face stimuli were photographs of Caucasians. These were taken from a mixture 
of different online databases in the public domain (Stirling PICS: Nottingham-scans; 
University of Ljubljana CVL and CV, PTER, Velenje; Max-Plank Institute for 
Biological Cybernetics, Tuebingen, Germany), to match the variability in lighting 
direction and image quality in the dog stimulus set. To match the variability in sex, 
there were 10 females in the total of 60 faces. Example faces are shown in Figure 4.2, 
and the full set is presented in Appendix II. All pictures were front view with neutral 
expression, and contained no extraneous information such as glasses or beards. Each 
face was cropped by hand to exclude hair, but to retain as much forehead, cheek and 
chin shape as possible. This was necessary for the composite task (Experiment 6) and 
also meant that, as with the dogs, the outline shape varied from face to face. After 
cropping, each face image was sized to 3.1 cm - 3.8 cm at the widest point (average 3.4 
cm) by 4 cm - 4.6 cm at the tallest point (average 4.4 cm), corresponding to an average 
of 4.3° by 5.6° at 45 cm viewing distance. Small blemishes on the faces were edited out.
All stimuli were placed on a neutral grey background. Brightness and contrast
were equated within each stimulus class set as far as possible, but there was still quite a 
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lot of variation. Inverted stimuli were created by rotating the pictures 180°. All 
manipulations were done using Adobe Photoshop (5.5) software.
Figure 4 .1 . Examples of the range of dog stimuli used in Experiments 4-6, shown 
here paired as for the test phase in the memory task (Experiment 4).
It was impossible to obtain two different photographs of each of 60 labradors, 
and thus the same images were used at study and test for both dogs and faces. The dog 
recognition task could then technically be considered a picture recognition task (as is 
true of all studies reviewed in this article); however, note that the close pairing of dogs 
within test pairs, combined with the multiple slight differences in appearance across all 
60 dogs, makes it very unlikely that accurate memory could rely on a single local cue 
(e.g., angle of tail) or purely image-based information (exact level of contrast). Also 
note that faces were similarly shown in the same image at study and test, meaning that 
any differences between dogs and faces could not be attributed to picture repetition.
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Figure 4.2. Examples of faces from each of the databases used in Experiments 4-6 
(shown here paired as described in Figure 4.1).
4.3.1.4 Procedure.
Pictures were presented on an iMac computer, with a 17” monitor, using 
PsyScope software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993). Responses were 
recorded via the keyboard.
During each study phase, dogs or faces were presented one at a time in the 
centre of the screen. Subjects were instructed to learn these for a later memory test.
Each picture was presented for 5000 ms, with an intertrial interval of approximately 575 
ms. Presentation order was randomised for each subject.
During each distracter phase, subjects were presented with multiplication 
problems on screen and were instructed to answer, on paper, as many as they could in 1 
min. No subject completed all the problems in this time.
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In each memory test phase, the two stimuli presented on each trial were shown 
simultaneously at the same height and 13.3 cm (16.8°) apart centre to centre. Subjects 
pressed the “z” key to indicate that the left exemplar was “old” and the “m” key to 
indicate that the right exemplar was “old”. The old exemplar appeared on the left and 
right equally often. Viewing time was unlimited and the intertrial interval was 
approximately 100 ms.
4.3.2 Experiment 4 - Results
The percentage of trials on which the old stimulus was correctly chosen was 
calculated for each subject for each condition. Figure 4.3a shows scores averaged across 
subjects for faces and dogs. A first point is that, as intended, performance for inverted 
faces and inverted dogs did not differ, t < 1, arguing that the two classes had equal levels 
of internal similarity. However, when the stimuli were upright, and subjects should be 
able to apply face-specific perceptual mechanisms, faces were remembered much better 
than dogs, /(22)=3.25, p <.01. A 2-way repeated-measures Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) confirmed a larger inversion effect for faces than for dogs, via a significant 
interaction between class (faces vs. dogs) and orientation (upright vs. inverted), F(l, 21) 
= 5.74, MSE = 186.01, p <.05. Memory was better for upright than inverted faces, t(21) 
= 5.10, p <.001, and the smaller inversion effect for dogs was also significant, r(21) = 
2.41, p  <.05.
A possible concern is that the smaller inversion effect for dogs than faces could 
reflect less room to show a decrement because of poorer upright performance in the 
former case. To anticipate this concern, two brief additional experiments were 
conducted2. These tested dogs only, and varied overall performance via changes in the 
memory set size. In the first (N=14), the 15 to-be-learned dogs in a given orientation 
were split into two study-test cycles of 8 dogs (i.e., the subject learned 8 dogs and was 
tested on 8 pairs) and then 7 dogs (the subject learned the remaining 7 dogs and was 
tested on 7 pairs). This produced better upright performance but still only a small 
inversion effect (Figure 4.3b). In the second (N=16) the 15 dogs were split into three 
study-test cycles of 5 dogs each. This improved performance for upright dogs (Figure
2
These were designed by me. but subject recruitment and testing was conducted by a research assistant 
(Jacqui Brewer).
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4.3c) to approximately match that for upright faces in the original experiment (Figure 
4.3a), but again produced only a small inversion effect for dogs.
dogs dogs
Figure 4.3. Experiment 4: Recognition memory test, (a) faces and dogs (set size = 
15, n = 22), (b) dogs (set size = 8 + 7, n = 14) (c) dogs (set size = 5 + 5 + 5, n = 
16). Error bars are the equivalent to SEM for making the within subjects 
comparison between upright and inverted orientations. *** p < .001, * p < .05, ns 
=  p > .05.
4.3.3 Experiment 4 - Discussion
The current results confirm a disproportionately large inversion effect on 
memory for faces as compared to the labrador stimuli. The size of the inversion effect 
for dogs across the three tests (Figures 3a-3c) fell in the usual range of approximately 
0%-8%. Thus this experiment replicates many previous studies contrasting faces with a 
broad range of manmade and natural objects.
4.4 Experiment 5 -  Contrast Reversal
Face recognition is very adversely affected by contrast reversal, namely 
swapping luminance values in a picture so that it looks like a photographic negative 
(e.g., Galper, 1970). In Experiment 5 the contrast reversal effect for dogs was tested.
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While contrast effects have previously been examined for greebles and (in unpublished 
conference presentations) for chairs and “blobs”, the current labrador stimuli provided 
the first test of contrast reversal effects for a natural as opposed to manmade object 
class. The effects of orientation inversion and its interaction or otherwise with contrast 
reversal were also examined; this has not previously been done for any object class.
The task was simultaneous-presentation identity matching, in which the two 
stimuli could be either (a) both original contrast, (b) both reversed contrast or (c) one 
reversed and one original contrast. Stimulus presentation time was limited and accuracy 
was used as the measure. I predicted that faces would be affected by contrast reversal 
and also independently by inversion (Bruce & Langton, 1994; Kemp et al., 1990). The 
question of interest was whether dogs would show the same pattern.
4.4.1 Experiment 5 - Method
4.4.1.1 Subjects.
Twenty new Caucasian subjects (5 male) completed the experiment for course 
credit (N=5) or $5 for the half-hour experiment. Age ranged from 18-30 years, and all 
subjects reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
4.4.1.2 Design.
Class (dogs vs. faces), orientation (upright vs. inverted) and contrast condition 
(both original vs. one original one reversed vs. both reversed) were all manipulated 
within subjects. Class and orientation were blocked (e.g., a block of upright dogs) with 
block order counterbalanced across subjects. The order of contrast condition was 
randomised for each subject within each block. On each trial a pair of dogs (or faces) 
was presented simultaneously for a brief period. The dependent measure was accuracy 
to judge whether the exemplars were of the same identity or different identity, 
regardless of whether the contrast was the same or not.
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4.4.1.3 Stimuli.
The stimuli were created from the 60 faces and 60 dogs used in Experiment 4. 
For each item a contrast reversed version was created using the Inverse function in 
Photoshop. Examples are shown in Figure 4.4. For same identity pairs both stimuli 
showed the same dog (face) exemplar, in one of the three contrast combinations. All 60 
possible same identity pairs were created in the format where both stimuli were original 
contrast, and also in the format where both stimuli were reversed contrast. In the format 
where one of the stimuli was original and one contrast reversed the reversed item could 
appear on either the left or the right giving 120 possible same identity pairs. For each 
subject, 30 both original pairs, 30 both reversed pairs and 60 one original one reversed 
same identity pairs were chosen at random from the full set to be presented in each 
orientation condition. For different identity pairs, each trial showed two different but 
similar exemplars (the pairs developed for the memory task in Experiment 4 were used). 
To create the contrast reversal conditions the procedure used for the same identity pairs 
was repeated. In total there were 240 trials in a block.
Figure 4.4. A contrast reversed face and dog as they appeared in Experiment 5.
4.4.1.4 Procedure.
Apparatus was as for Experiment 4, with the addition of a NewMicros Button 
Box connected to the iMac via a Keyspan USB twin serial adaptor. Subjects had the 
task explained to them, and were given 10 practice trials on a version of the task using 
chairs as stimuli (chair pictures courtesy of Bruno Rossion & Michael Tarr). On each 
trial, the stimulus pair was presented until the subject responded or for 600 ms. This 
brief presentation allowed subjects to look at each exemplar only 1-2 times because
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Stimuli were far enough apart that eye movements were required to foveate each 
stimulus. Subjects were warned that they might feel they were guessing on some trials 
but were required to enter a response anyway. A green/right button indicated same 
identity, a red/left button indicated different identity. After response, there was a blank 
screen for at least 200-400 ms (longer if the subject responded before the stimulus had 
disappeared from the screen). Subjects were told that on 50% of the trials, the pair 
would have the same identity and that on 50% of the trials they would have different 
identities.
On each trial, the position of each stimulus on the screen was jittered. Jittering 
was used to ensure that subjects could not learn to spatially focus their attention on 
particular regions of the screen before the stimuli were presented, thus discouraging 
decisions based on a single local part of the stimuli (e.g. the dogs’ tails). Each exemplar 
of a pair could appear in a one of five positions. For dogs these ranged from 7.5 cm to 8 
cm (9.5° to 10.2°) apart horizontally from centre to centre and 2 mm to 5 mm (0.3° to 
0.6°) apart vertically. For faces these ranged from 8 cm to 11 cm (10.2° to 13.9°) apart 
horizontally from centre to centre and 2 mm to 1 cm (0.3° to 1.3°) apart vertically. The 
actual position selected was chosen randomly for each stimulus on each trial, with the 
constraint that the two exemplars were never presented at exactly the same height.
4.4.2 Experiment 5 - Results
Mean accuracy in the same-different task for all conditions is presented in Table 
4.1. The both original and both reversed conditions were focused on first. Comparing 
these conditions allows the best assessment of the extent to which contrast reversal 
damages stimulus processing, because the conditions are otherwise equivalent; 
specifically, for same-identity trials the stimuli in a pair are physically identical in both 
cases. (Comparing the both original condition with the one-original-one-reversed 
condition is not valid because, in the latter condition, stimuli in a pair are never 
physically identical). Results for these conditions collapsed across same and different 
trials are plotted in Figure 4.5 and analysed below.
A repeated measures ANOVA including class (dogs vs. faces), orientation 
(upright vs. inverted) and contrast condition (both original vs. both reversed) revealed 
no three-way interaction, F( 1, 19)= 1.66, MSE = 16.74, p > .2, but class showed
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significant two-way interactions with both orientation, F{ 1, 19) = 8.15, MSE = 41.74,/? 
< .01, and contrast condition F(1, 19) = 39.97, MSE = 25.86, p < .001. Thus, further 
analysis was conducted for faces and dogs separately.
Table 4.1. Experiment 5: Mean same-different accuracy (% correct and SEM) for dogs 
and faces in each contrast condition (collapsed across same and different trials).
Both
original
upright 
One original 
one reversed
Both
reversed
Both
original
inverted 
One original 
one reversed
Both
reversed
Faces 85.17 63.42 68.83 76.00 59.79 63.25
(1.58) (1.46) (2.19) (1.89) (1.42) (1.97)
Dogs 74.33 66.04 69.83 72.67 65.04 68.42
(2.36) (1-39) (1.837) (1-76) (1.84) (1.67)
For faces, two results are apparent in Figure 4.5a. First, with respect to the 
effects of contrast reversal, same-different accuracy was substantially higher in the both 
original condition than in the both reversed condition. Second, with respect to 
orientation, performance was worse for inverted faces than for upright faces for each of 
the contrast conditions. A 2-way ANOVA confirmed a main effect of contrast, F( 1, 19) 
= 150.09, MSE = 28.18, p < .001, and a main effect of orientation, F(l, 19) = 41.89, 
MSE = 25.97, p<  .001. There was no interaction, F(l, 19) = 2.55, MSE = 25.17,/? > 
.12, replicating Kemp et al.’s (1990) finding, and indicating that contrast reversal and 
inversion have independent effects on identification of faces. A priori t-tests also 
showed that there was significant contrast reversal effect for upright faces considered 
alone, /(19) = 10.47,/? < .001, and for inverted faces considered alone, /(19) = 7.49,/? < 
.001.
For dogs, results did not show the same patterns as for faces with respect to 
either contrast reversal or inversion. The contrast reversal effect followed the same 
trend as that for faces, but the differences were much smaller (see Figure 4.5b). There 
was also no inversion effect. A 2-way ANOVA revealed no main effect of orientation, 
F{ 1, 19)= 1.00, MSE = 47.32, p > .3 and no interaction, E < 1, MSE = 16.91. There was 
a main effect of contrast, F{ 1, 19) = 21.474, MSE = 17.83, /? < .001, and the difference 
between both original and both reversed was significant both for upright dogs, /(19) = 
4.07, p < .01, and for inverted dogs, r( 19) = 2.91 ,/? < .01.
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Figure 4.5. Experiment 5: Accuracy to say that both original contrast or both 
reversed contrast pairs are the same or different identity for (a) faces and (b) 
dogs. Error bars are equivalent to ± 1 SEM for the within subjects comparison of 
the two contrast conditions. ***,/? < .001, ** p < .01, ns =p > .05.
Finally, results of the one-original-one-reversed condition are considered. As 
can be seen in Table 4.1, these pairs produced slightly less accurate identity judgments 
than the both reversed pairs. This effect occurred across the board. I attribute this to the 
additional disruption arising from the fact that pair members were never physically 
identical.
4.4.3 Experiment 5 - Discussion
For faces, the current results replicated several previous findings. Contrast 
reversal and orientation inversion both impaired identity-match judgements, and these 
effects were independent and additive (i.e, contrast reversal effects were as large for 
inverted faces as for upright faces; cf. Kemp et al., 1990). In agreement with previous 
authors, I suggest that the two effects arise from different stages of the visual processing 
stream. Presumably, the contrast reversal effects arise from difficulty in extracting 
shape-from-shading information in mid-level vision, while the inversion effects arise 
largely from disruption of holistic processing in high-level face processing (Hole et al., 
1999; Kemp et al., 1990; Lewis & Johnston, 1997).
The new test was of contrast reversal effects for dogs. Despite the greater 
potential value of shape-from-shading information for labradors than for previously-
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tested object classes (particularly chairs and greebles), contrast reversal effects were 
still much weaker than for faces. Still, unlike in earlier results, a significant contrast 
reversal effect was found. The current results thus argue that, across a broader range of 
objects, contrast reversal effects can be merely disproportionately large in faces, rather 
than necessarily absent in objects.
A final observation of interest was the total lack of any inversion effect for dogs 
in Experiment 5. This result in the identity matching task contrasts with the small but 
nonzero inversion effect obtained on recognition memory (Experiment 4). A probable 
reason for this is that in the recognition memory task, each stimulus was seen only once 
whereas, in the present experiment, each dog stimulus was used many times. Inversion 
effects on object recognition are known to disappear rapidly with practice (e.g., 
Jolicoeur, 1985), consistent with rapid learning of part-based processing in 
noncanonical orientations. The stability of large inversion effects for whole faces in 
Experiment 5, however, is consistent with earlier findings that the inversion effect on 
holistic processing in faces is not removed even with substantial repetition (Chapter 3; 
McKone, 2004).
4.5 Experiment 6 -  Composite Effect
Young et al.’s (1987) aligned vs. unaligned composite effect was used to provide 
a direct measure of holistic processing. The only object class previously tested in this 
task is greebles. Interestingly, greebles produced no composite effect at all in novices, 
rather than merely an effect that was smaller than that for faces (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002). 
In Experiment 6 ,1 assessed whether this result would extend to the natural class of dogs 
(labradors).
The logic behind the aligned vs. unaligned version of the composite effect is that 
when two half faces of different individuals (e.g., the top half of George Bush with the 
bottom half of Tony Blair) are physically aligned, the two integrate to form a percept of 
a new individual, making it difficult to process the identity of a single half. When the 
same two halves are presented horizontally offset (unaligned), however, cues from early 
vision tell the face system that two people rather than one are being presented, thus
allowing independent processing of each half to occur. Importantly, the aligned and 
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unaligned conditions are otherwise comparable, in that simple response competition 
between the names (“Bush” arising from one half and “Blair” from the other) is the 
same in both cases. Thus, a finding that it is more difficult to name one half of the face 
in the aligned condition than in the unaligned condition provides clear evidence for 
holistic integration of the two halves in the former case. In Young et al.’s (1987) 
experiments, this composite effect was obtained for upright faces and not inverted faces 
(also see Carey & Diamond, 1994).
In Young et al. (1987), all stimuli were famous faces and so naming could be 
used as the response task. In the present study, however, the stimuli were novel. A 
technique suitable for novel faces was developed by Hole (1994; also see Le Grand et 
al., 2004). Hole simultaneously presented pairs of composite faces as shown in Figure 
4.6, and subjects made a same-different identity response to one half (in his experiment, 
only the forehead). Each composite was formed from two different individuals. Across 
the pair of composites, the half-to-compare was either the same in identity or different 
in identity, and the half-to-be-ignored was always different in identity. Hole also jittered 
the position of each stimulus pair on each trial so that subjects could not pre-focus an 
attentional window on the expected location of the target half. Any such pre-focusing of 
an attentional “spotlight” would work against the emergence of a composite effect, as it 
could allow tuning out of the half-to-ignore at a very early stage of visual processing 
such that the face-recognition system never received information from that half.
Experiment 6 tested upright and inverted dogs as well as upright and inverted 
faces. Several features of Hole’s (1994) procedure were incorporated. However, I used 
the full aligned versus unaligned comparison, rather than relying on upright vs. inverted 
differences in the aligned condition alone as did Hole. I also tested both foreheads and 
chins as target halves and, rather than measure reaction time as the dependent variable, 
used a limited presentation time and measured accuracy.
I considered only the results of same trials, and not different trials, to be of 
theoretical interest (see also, Hole et al., 1999; Le Grand et al., 2004). The predictions 
corresponding to the existence of holistic processing in each case are not the same. For 
same trials, the prediction is clear. The pattern of aligned versus unaligned difference 
should match that found in Young et al. (1987), namely the aligned condition should be 
less accurate than the unaligned condition. This is because when the top half of the 
same individual is paired with two different bottom halves, any holistic integration 
between aligned halves will make the tops appear less similar to each other than they
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really are, making it harder to say “same”. Readers should be able to observe this 
perceptual phenomenon for faces in the upright orientation in Figure 4.6: the two top 
halves are the same identity (although differing in size and brightness), but this is more 
difficult to see in the aligned condition than in the unaligned condition.
Figure 4.6. Experiment 6: Examples of same aligned, different aligned, same 
unaligned and different unaligned composite face pairs. In the examples here the 
half-to-compare is the forehead (so the chins are always different).
Now consider different trials. Here, the prediction corresponding to holistic 
processing is intrinsically unclear. When responding to the top half, if the two different 
bottom halves are quite different in appearance then perceptual integration should make 
the aligned condition more accurate than the unaligned condition (i.e. the reverse 
prediction to same trials). This is because the additional perceived dissimilarity should 
enhance performance in the aligned condition by making it easier to make the correct 
“different” judgement. However, it is also possible that two randomly-chosen bottom 
halves might happen to be fairly similar. In this case, perceptual integration with the top 
halves might make the two different top halves appear less different than they would by 
themselves. This would predict it should be harder to make the correct “different” 
judgement if holistic processing has occurred, rather than easier. The fact that holistic 
processing can thus predict either pattern of outcome for different trials (aligned > 
unaligned, or unaligned > aligned) means that analysing results of these trials is of no 
value in assessing holistic processing.
same identity aligned different identity aligned
same identity unaligned different identity unaligned
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For same trials, I expected that the pattern corresponding to holistic processing 
would be revealed for upright faces, but not inverted faces. The question of interest was 
whether there would be any composite effect for dogs (see Figure 4.7 for example 
stimuli).
same aligned different aligned
same unaligned different unaligned
Figure 4.7. Examples of same aligned, different aligned, same unaligned, and 
different unaligned composite dog pairs. In each case the half-to-compare is the 
head/tail.
4.5.1 Experiment 6 - Method
4.5.1.1 Subjects for Experiment 6a (dogs only).
Twenty-four subjects completed Experiment 6a, half for course credit and half 
for $10 for the 1 hr session. None had participated in earlier experiments. Ages ranged 
from 18-43 (most 18-21); seven were male; all were Caucasian. All subjects reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. These subjects completed the full experiment 
(faces and dogs), but a mistake in the creation of some of the face stimuli was 
discovered after the testing. Thus, only their data for dogs was used.
4.5.1.2 Subjects for Experiment 6b (faces and dogs).
Twenty-three additional subjects were tested on corrected stimuli for both faces 
and dogs, participating for course credit (N=8) or $10 (N=15). Ages ranged from 18-30; 
approximately half were male; all were Caucasian. All subjects reported normal or
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corrected-to-normal vision. Thirteen of these subjects had previously participated in 
Experiment 5.
4.5.1.3 Design.
A simultaneous presentation, same-different version of Young et al.'s (1987) 
composite paradigm was used. Each composite stimulus was created by taking the top 
half of one face (dog) and combining it with the bottom half of a different face (dog). 
For aligned composites, the two halves were aligned. For unaligned composites, the two 
halves were offset horizontally by approximately a quarter of the width of the face 
(dog). On each trial, two composites were presented simultaneously, either both aligned 
or both unaligned. The subject's task was to indicate whether a given half of the two 
stimuli (e.g., the top half) was the same or different in identity. The half-to-be-ignored 
(e.g., the bottom half) was always different for the two stimuli. Figure 4.6 shows 
examples of aligned same, unaligned same, aligned different, and unaligned different 
trials for faces. Figure 4.7 does the same for dogs. In instructions to subjects, halves 
were referred to as “forehead'’ versus “chin” for faces, and “head” versus “legs” for 
dogs, to avoid confusion with “top” and “bottom” when the stimuli were presented 
inverted.
Class (faces vs. dogs), orientation (upright vs. inverted), half-to-compare 
(forehead vs. chin for faces, head vs. legs for dogs) and alignment (aligned vs. 
unaligned) were all manipulated within subjects. Class, orientation and half-to-compare 
were blocked; for example, one block of trials presented dogs inverted for matching of 
the legs half. Order of testing for the blocked conditions was counterbalanced across 
subjects. Each block included an equal number of aligned and unaligned trials, 
presented in a different random order for each subject. On each trial, the composite 
pairs were presented for 600 ms, and accuracy of same-different responses was the 
dependent measure. Instructions were to judge identity with any changes in size or 
brightness/contrast to be ignored.
4.5.1.4 Stimuli.
Twelve dogs and twelve faces were chosen from the larger set of faces and dogs 
used for Experiment 4. Each class was divided into two sets of six exemplars. A given 
subject saw one set of exemplars for matching top halves and the other for matching 
102
bottom halves, with assignment of sets to half-to-compare condition counterbalanced 
across subjects. Stimuli within each set of six exemplars were chosen to satisfy several 
criteria: (1) they were all the same sex (all male); (2) they were chosen from only one 
book/database so that quality of photographs was similar across the set; and (3) when 
cut in half, any half-exemplar could be made to fit with any other half-exemplar 
reasonably well, allowing for changes in size and brightness/contrast only, with no 
distortion of the shape.
Forming composites. To make halves, each face was cut just below the eyes, and 
each dog was cut from mid-chest to just below the tail. Within a set of six exemplars, 30 
composites were then formed by combining the top half of each exemplar with the 
bottom half of all other exemplars (6 top halves each combined with 5 possible bottom 
halves = 30 composites). Two versions of each of the 30 composites were created. In 
one version, the two halves were made to join up reasonably neatly by keeping the 
bottom halves unaltered and adjusting the size and brightness/contrast of the top half. 
These top-half-altered versions were used in blocks requiring matching of the top half, 
forcing subjects to base their decisions regarding “same” or “different” for a pair of 
composites on whether the top half had the same identity, rather than simply matching 
low level visual information such as size or brightness/contrast. In the other version of 
the 30 composites, the two halves were made to join up by keeping the top halves 
unaltered and adjusting the size and contrast of the bottom half. These bottom-half- 
altered versions were used in blocks requiring matching of the bottom half.
To manipulate alignment, the 30 composites of each version that had been 
created in the aligned format were then also created in the unaligned format. Each of the 
30 composites was created in a left-offset format (i.e. the bottom half shifted to the left) 
and a right-offset format (i.e., the bottom half shifted to the right).
Forming pairs of composites. To form pairs of composites for simultaneous 
presentation, the following procedure was used. For each set of 30 composites (derived 
from 6 exemplars), all 60 possible same pairs were created (for a top-half-to-compare 
block these include: topl-bottom2 composite paired with topl-bottom3 composite; 
topl-bottom2 composite paired with topl-bottom4 composite; etc). All possible 
different pairs were also created. With the constraints that the top half must be different 
across the pair, the bottom half must be different across the pair, and that the two halves 
of a given original face should not appear on the screen simultaneously (i.e., as the top
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half of one composite and the bottom half of the other), there exist 180 such 
combinations for each set of 30 composites.
Structure within each block. Subjects performed one block of 240 trials for each 
class x orientation x half-to-compare condition (e.g. dogs inverted legs-to-compare). 
Within a block, each subject saw the 60 same trials for the assigned set of exemplars, 
plus 60 different trials selected randomly from the 180 possible such trials. These were 
all in the aligned format. A further 60 same unaligned trials and 60 different unaligned 
trials were presented, for the total of 240 trials per block. For every aligned composite 
trial, there was another trial that presented exactly the same composite items in the 
unaligned format. For unaligned trials, offset was to the left on half the trials and to the 
right on half the trials. The two composites shown always had offsets in the same 
direction, with the particular items assigned to each offset direction chosen randomly 
for each subject. Once a given subject's trial assignment had been determined for a 
given class and half-to-compare in the upright orientation (e.g., for dogs upright legs-to- 
compare), the trial structure of the inverted orientation was exactly matched to this. That 
is, all stimuli were exactly the same except rotated by 180° (and presented in a new 
random order).
Screen appearance. So that subjects did not forget which half to compare part­
way through a block, all trials showed two short horizontal lines either above the stimuli 
(match the part on the upper half of the screen) or below the stimuli (match the part on 
the lower half of the screen). These half-to-compare indicator lines were set to the side 
so as to be visible in peripheral vision but not to interfere with processing of the 
composites.
The position of each composite on the screen was jittered from trial to trial. 
Because half-to-compare was blocked, jittering was particularly important to avoid pre­
focusing of an attentional “spotlight” on the region where one half would appear. Each 
composite stimulus of a pair appeared in one of 5 positions. The horizontal 
displacement between the two composites (centre to centre) varied from 8 cm (10.2°) to 
11 cm (13.9°) for faces and 7.5 cm (9.5°) to 8 cm (10.2°) for dogs. The vertical 
displacement varied from 2 mm (0.3°) to 1 cm (1.3°) for faces and 2 mm (0.3°) to 5 mm 
(0.6°) for dogs. Position selected was chosen randomly for each composite on each trial, 
with the constraint that the two were never presented at the same height.
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4.5.1.5 Procedure.
Apparatus was as for Experiment 5. The task was explained to subjects using 
pairs of composite faces or dogs made from exemplars seen nowhere else in the 
experiment. Detailed instructions were given for the first class of stimuli (faces or dogs) 
to be seen by each subject. Instructions included a step by step talk through of a same 
trial and a different trial, to ensure the subject understood that the task was to match 
identity of the target half, not low-level appearance. Subjects were then warned that the 
stimuli on each trial would be available for only a brief period, and were then given 14 
practice trials.
Subjects responded same via the green/right button and different via the red/left 
button on the button box. On each trial, the pair of composites was presented for a 
maximum of 600 ms followed by a blank screen until the subject responded. If the 
subject responded before 600 ms (this rarely happened), the stimulus was removed. The 
next trial began 200-400 ms after response. Subjects were informed that the correct 
answer would be same on 50% of trials and different on 50% of trials (pilot testing had 
revealed a bias to respond same as the default answer if no difference was found in the 
600 ms). Prior to each experimental block, subjects were informed of the upcoming 
class, orientation and half-to-compare, and shown a schematic picture (e.g. an upside 
down dog with arrows pointing to the legs).
4.5.2 Experiment 6 - Results
Accuracy in matching halves (percentage of “same” responses for same trials, 
and percentage of “different” responses for different trials) was calculated for each 
subject for each condition3. This was done collapsing over top-half trials and bottom- 
half trials to give maximum power. (Results did not change when each half was 
analysed separately.) Mean accuracy for Experiment 6a (dogs only) and Experiment 6b 
(dogs and faces) is presented in Table 4.2.
3 RTs are not reported because, where a brief presentation procedure is used, RTs are not meaningful.
This is because, for example, if the subject is unsure of the correct response at the offset of the 600ms 
stimulus presentation, they could respond by guessing very quickly because no more stimulus information 
will be made available (i.e., very short RTs), or respond by considering their decision at length, perhaps 
attempting to remember the stimulus (i.e., very long RTs). In general, RT is only a meaningful measure 
when the stimulus stays on the screen until response.
105
To contrast dogs and faces within a single design, the results of Experiment 6b 
were first analysed. One observation from Table 4.2 was that there was slightly more 
bias to say that the dogs were the same, than to say faces were the same. This means 
that dogs had slightly (but significantly) higher accuracy than faces for same identity 
trials, F( 1,22) = 4.89, MSE =131.06, p < .05, but that faces had a slightly, but not 
significantly, higher accuracy for different identity trials , F(1,22) = 3.72, MSE = 
627.63, p > .06.
Table 4.2. Mean accuracy (% correct) to match one half in the composite task of 
Experiments 6a and 6b. Part (a) shows same identity trials, part (b) shows different 
identity trials. SEM shown in brackets.
upright inverted
N aligned unaligned aligned unaligned
a) same identity trials
E6a - 24 85.45 86.25 82.01 81.56
dogs (1.91) (1.85) (2.36) (2.55)
E6b - 23 87.10 86.30 88.62 87.79
dogs (2.71) (3.33) (2.07) (2.18)
E6b - 23 81.67 85.83 83.51 83.88
faces (2.63) (2.74) (3.28) (3.44)
b) different identity trials
E6a - 24 69.37 69.76 66.11 65.45
dogs (3.44) (3.33) (2.95) (3.20)
E6b - 23 61.09 64.60 56.88 57.50
dogs (4.04) (4.10) (4.83) (4.71)
E6b - 23 74.85 69.75 62.97 61.01
faces (3.89) (3.91) (3.99) (4.10)
As discussed earlier, the analysis of the composite effect considered same trials 
only. Results are plotted in Figure 4.8 (face at the top and dogs bottom left). A three- 
way ANOVA including class, orientation, and alignment condition revealed a 
significant 3-way interaction F(l, 22) = 6.15, MSE = 6.64, p < .05, indicating that 
alignment and orientation had different effects for faces and for dogs.
For faces, a two-way ANOVA then revealed exactly the expected pattern of 
results. There was a significant interaction between alignment and orientation, F(l, 22) 
= 30.867, MSE = 2.70, p < .001, and follow-up t-tests showed that this reflected a
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significant composite effect (i.e., aligned worse than unaligned) for upright faces, t{22) 
= 4.85, p  < .001, but no composite effect (i.e., aligned equal to unaligned) for inverted 
faces, t < 1.
Faces (Experiment 6b)
El aligned 
M unaligned
Predicted pattem if 
composite effect 
(i.e., holistic processing) 
is present.
inverted
Dogs (Experiment 6b) Dogs (Experiment 6a)
-------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
^  upright inverted upright inverted
Figure 4.8. Experiment 6: Accuracy to compare one half of a pair of composites 
(simultaneous presentation same-different task). Results are for "same" trials only 
collapsed across top-half-to-compare and bottom-half-to-compare trials. Error 
bars are equivalent to ± 1 SEM for the within subjects comparison of aligned and 
unaligned conditions. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, ns = p >.05. The predicted pattem 
for a composite effect (holistic processing) is that accuracy should be lower for 
aligned than unaligned trials.
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Thus, for upright faces, the aligned condition produced perceptual integration of 
halves into new wholes, making it hard to see that two top halves (for example) were 
the same when the respective bottom halves to which they were joined were different.
Turning to dogs in Experiment 6b, a different pattern emerged. There were no 
main effects of orientation, F( 1,22) = 1.36, MSE = 38.11, p > .25, or alignment, F < 1, 
MSE = 15.28, and no alignment x orientation interaction, F < 1, MSE = 8.78. A priori t- 
tests also revealed no differences between the aligned and unaligned conditions for 
either upright dogs, t < 1 , or inverted dogs, t < 1 , indicating no evidence of a composite 
effect in either case. The results of Experiment 6a (dogs only; Figure 4.8) agreed. There 
was no alignment x orientation interaction, F <1, MSE= 10.9, and most importantly, 
there was no evidence of any composite effect for upright dogs / < 1. This independent 
replication of the null effect indicates there is no reason to doubt its reliability.
4.5.3 Experiment 6 - Discussion
The results showed a strong composite effect for upright faces, but no composite 
effect for inverted faces, replicating previous findings (Carey & Diamond, 1994; Hole, 
1994; Hole et al., 1999; Young et al., 1987; Le Grand et ah, 2004). For dogs, there was 
no composite effect in any condition. This provides the first generalisation of the 
previous result with greebles (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002) to a natural stimulus class.
Another important aspect of the results is that the composite effect for dogs was 
not merely smaller than that for faces but was in fact not there at all (aligned vs. 
unaligned difference = +0.8 Experiment 6a, -0.8 Experiment 6b, where a negative 
number indicates an effect in the reverse direction for a composite effect). Gauthier and 
Tarr obtained a similar result for greebles (aligned vs. unaligned difference = -2% 
change in reaction times). It thus seems that face-specific processing in the composite 
paradigm is associated with the presence versus absence of the signature phenomenon, 
rather than merely a disproportionately large effect for faces as in the inversion effect 
and the part-whole effect. This argues that the composite task provides a more powerful 
and direct way to assess holistic processing than other techniques.
108
4.6 General Discussion
The current experiments took three tasks known to produce strong signature 
phenomena for faces, and used these tasks with a natural stimulus class (dogs). My 
interest was in (a) whether the signature effects would be smaller for dogs than for 
faces, and (b) whether any effects might be completely absent for dogs.
Experiment 4 replicated many similar studies, in confirming that the inversion 
decrement on memory for labadors was much smaller than for faces, but was still 
significantly greater than zero. Thus, inversion effects on memory were merely 
disproportionately large for faces, rather than absent for dogs. In Experiment 5 ,1 found 
that the contrast reversal decrement on identity-matching was much smaller for 
labradors than for faces, extending similar findings with manmade objects (chairs, 
blobs, greebles) to a natural object class. Unlike the earlier studies, however, dogs 
produced a small but significant contrast reversal decrement. Thus, the contrast reversal 
effect was also merely disproportionately large for faces. In Experiment 6 ,1 tested 
Young et al.'s (1987) aligned vs.unaligned composite effect. Here, I obtained a result 
where the signature phenomenon was absent for objects. Despite establishing a clear 
composite effect for faces, there was no effect for labradors, extending a similar 
previous finding with greebles to a natural object class.
4.6.1 How reliable is the “zero” effect in the composite task?
In the final experiment, an important issue is the reliability of the conclusion that 
the effect was completely absent for dogs. I address this issue, first, by considering the 
statistical reliability of the data. In the composite task of Experiment 6, each subject 
completed a relatively large number of trials (60 for every condition), and I ran the dog 
section of the experiment on two independent sets of subjects (N=24 and N=23). Each 
set of subjects produced only a tiny accuracy difference between the aligned and 
unaligned conditions for dogs. This difference went in opposite directions across tests 
(+0.8 % correct in one case, -0.8 % correct in the other) and, collapsed across the total 
of 47 subjects, the 95% confidence interval on the size of the composite effect was 
tightly centred around zero (-1.44 to +1.47 % correct) and allowed only a trivially small 
positive effect. These results argue that there was genuinely no composite effect.
An equally important factor in evaluating a “zero effect” conclusion is the nature 
of the object class chosen. I consider the findings to be particularly strong because of
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my careful matching of face and non-face stimuli. While there is no one object class 
that perfectly matches faces on all possible variables, dogs provide a good choice. Ways 
in which dogs are matched to faces include having a canonical upright, a shared first- 
order configuration, some part boundaries that are fuzzy rather than sharp, and a 
moderate degree of surface texture. These properties are not true of all other objects; for 
example, houses and greebles include clear part boundaries, and thus potentially could 
be more separable into parts than dogs. Moreover, dogs are natural stimuli produced by 
genetic mechanisms, meaning that individuals differ from each other on a great many 
shape dimensions at once, and that, as for faces, these shape differences are distributed 
all over the spatial extent of the dog. These properties potentially require a greater 
emphasis on global processing than for object classes where exemplars differ on only a 
few dimensions, as is common in manmade and artificial objects.
4.6.2 Which tests are best?
An active debate in the literature is whether apparently face-specific cognitive 
phenomena might emerge for objects under certain conditions. The most common 
theory is the “expertise hypothesis”, which predicts that objects should show face-like 
processing where the subject has extensive expertise in making individual-level 
discriminations (e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; but see McKone 
& Kanwisher, in press); other ideas are that within-class discrimination alone might be 
sufficient to produce face-like processing (e.g. Damasio, Damasio, & Van Hoesen,
1982), or that some objects are processed like faces when right-hemisphere coordinate 
relations rather than left-hemisphere categorical relations are required (Cooper & 
Brooks, 2004). To test any of these various theories, it is important to choose tasks that 
are known to reliably dissociate faces from objects under ordinary circumstances. I now 
summarise my views on the status of various tasks that could be used as measures of 
face-specificity.
A first point is that, if the intention is to assess holistic face-like processing, then 
it is essential to use a task that has a demonstrated association to holistic processing in 
faces, such as producing its signature phenomenon for upright faces, but not for inverted 
faces, scrambled faces and/or isolated face features. The inversion effect on memory, 
the part-whole task, the composite effect and the peripheral inversion paradigm 
(McKone, 2004) all meet this criterion. The contrast reversal effect does not. (This does
not mean that it is of no value to assess contrast reversal effects in experts, merely that 
110
any emergence of face-like effects for objects would not be indicative of holistic 
processing.)
Second, there is the question of the degree of dissociation of processing between 
faces and objects. It is clear that inversion effects on memory and the part-whole effect 
do not totally dissociate face from object processing. Both tasks produce signature 
effects that are much larger for faces than for objects, but which are still present to some 
extent for objects. These results argue that neither of these tasks provides a pure 
measure of face-specific processing. Instead, in both cases, it seems likely that the task 
partly taps face-specific holistic processes, but also includes some general component. 
For the inversion effect, this general component presumably is the advantage to memory 
provided by the familiar structure available in the canonical upright (Maurer et al., 
2002). In the case of the part-whole effect, the general component is presumably some 
kind of context, gestalt or global processing effect analogous to the word superiority 
effect (Davidoff & Donnelly, 1990).
Turning to contrast reversal, the results of earlier studies had suggested that 
contrast reversal effects were absent for objects. No significant decrement had been 
reported for three classes of manmade objects, namely greebles, chairs, and “blobs” 
(Gauthier et al., 1998; Nederhouse et al., 2002; Subramaniam & Biederman, 1997). My 
results, however, demonstrated a small but nonzero contrast reversal effect for dogs. I 
therefore conclude that, looking across a broader range of object types than previously 
tested, contrast reversal effects also do not purely dissociate face and object processing.
Conversely, the composite paradigm appears to provide a complete dissociation, 
and also provides a theoretically strong measure of holistic processing. The composite 
effect has been found to be absent for both greebles and dogs, thus spanning artificial 
and natural object classes.
I conclude that the composite effect is the best of the standard tasks to use when 
assessing whether “face-like” holistic processing emerges for objects under special 
circumstances, such as when the subject is an expert in the relevant domain. This 
conclusion is important because this is exactly the task that has not been substantially 
investigated in experts. Instead inversion effects (e.g, Diamond & Carey, 1986), and 
part-whole effects have been tested (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Tanaka et al. 1996, cited in 
Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997).
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4.6.3 Implications of the results for the “within-class discrimination” and '‘coordinate 
representations” hypotheses
I finish with a brief comment on the implications of the results for two theories 
(other than expertise) of why faces are special. One older view is the within-class 
discrimination hypothesis (e.g., see Faust, 1955, cited in Benton, 1990). This view 
suggested that faces might merely appear to be special because, in most everyday 
circumstances and some experimental tests (e.g., early studies of prosopagnosia), 
individual level discrimination of faces (Bill vs. Sam) had been contrasted with basic 
level recognition of objects (chair vs. table) rather than individual level discrimination 
of objects (labrador 1 vs. labrador 2). This hypothesis is generally held to have been 
disproved and, indeed, all the studies reviewed in this chapter, and more fully in 
Chapter 1 (inversion effects, part-whole effect, and so on) have contrasted individual 
processing of faces with individual processing of objects, and confirmed different 
effects for faces and objects in every case. Despite this evidence, however, the within- 
class discrimination hypothesis has been considered in a number of surprisingly recent 
papers (de Gelder & Rouw, 2000; Gauthier, Tarr et al., 2000; Tarr, 2003; Tarr & Cheng, 
2003). Note that, in choosing dogs as a well matched stimulus to faces, and requiring 
individual-level identification in each case, the current results confirm on three separate 
tasks that the within-class discrimination hypothesis cannot explain “special” processing 
for faces.
Another theory comes from the literature on object recognition. Cooper and 
Brooks (2004) have suggested that, while normal face processing requires “coordinate 
relations” (detailed metric information), much object recognition requires only 
“categorical relations” between parts (above, below, side-of, etc). These authors then 
argue that processing of objects relies on coordinate relations -  that is, the same type as 
those supporting face recognition -  when the objects to be distinguished are all 
reasonably similar in form and detailed metric information about shape becomes 
necessary to distinguish between them (see also White, 2002). However, the objects 
required to be discriminated in the present experiments (individual labradors) are all 
extremely similar in basic shape, and yet showed patterns of data that were very 
different from those for faces. Thus, while it might well be that the categorical versus 
coordinate relations distinction is useful for understanding object processing (e.g., 
Heilige & Michimata, 1989; Keane, Hayward, & Burke, 2003; Kosslyn et al., 1989),
1 1 2
Cooper and Brooks' assumed equivalence between coordinate relations and the style of 
processing used for faces cannot be correct.
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CHAPTER 5: EXPERTISE AND FACE-LIKE PROCESSING: THE CASE OF
LABRADOR EXPERTS.
5.1 Overview
The idea that apparently “special'’ face processing might be due to greater 
expertise with faces compared to other objects was first tested by Diamond and Carey 
(1986). They showed an inversion effect for dog experts looking at dogs which was as 
large as that for the same experts looking at faces. Here I attempted to replicate this 
result for labrador retriever experts looking at labradors. Further, I tested for face-like 
effects on a test of contrast reversal, and most importantly tested for holistic/configural 
processing using Young et al.’s (1987) composite task. In no case did labrador experts 
show face-like effects for labradors. Experts showed a smaller inversion effect for dogs 
than for faces, no effect of contrast reversal, and no holistic processing. I conclude that 
face processing does not result from a generic expertise system, in which holistic 
processing can be learned with practice at any point throughout life. Instead 
interpretations in terms of either a critical period for developing face processing (Le 
Grand et ah, 2001) and/or an innate representation of face structure are discussed.
5.2 Introduction
The previous chapter compared results for faces and labrador dogs in dog 
novices on three tests that had been suggested to produce face-specific effects. Results 
confirmed that within-class discrimination alone was not sufficient to induce face-like 
processing of objects on these tests. The current chapter investigates the more 
interesting possibility that within-class processing of objects-of-expertise would induce 
face-like processing in dog experts, using the same tests as in the previous chapter.
Given that people are generally much more expert at distinguishing individual 
faces than at distinguishing individuals from other classes of stimuli, the idea that 
differences between faces and objects might be due to expertise (Meadows, 1974) is the 
major competing theory to the claims of domain-specificity (i.e., that faces per se are 
special). Diamond and Carey (1986) suggested that any object might be holistically
processed if three criteria are met. First, the objects of a class should share a first-order
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configuration; this is satisfied by dogs, for example, in that (nearly) all have a body, 
with four legs beneath, a head at one end and a tail at the other. Second, individual level 
identification is required; this is satisfied if the task requires discriminating, for 
example, labrador 1 from labrador 2. Third, sufficient experience at discriminating 
members of the class is required; this is satisfied by using subjects with many years’ 
experience in the relevant domain (e.g., dog show judges if using dogs as the stimuli).
Currently, the question of whether expertise can change the style of processing 
used for objects is a matter of active debate. Some authors argue that “certain classes of 
objects might be ‘special’ not because of their intrinsic status, but because we have 
expertise with them’’ (Palmeri, Wong, & Gauthier, 2004, p. 378); or that “while face 
recognition is certainly the most complicated discrimination task most of us ever learn 
to perform, it is still part and parcel of general recognition mechanisms, albeit 
mechanisms that have been tuned to recognise specific faces through many years of 
experience with objects” (Tarr, 2003, p. 192). Conversely, other authors argue that 
“Substantial evidence supports the domain-specificity of face processing in humans” 
(McKone & Kanwisher, in press, p.339) or that “several lines of evidence suggest that 
[the] ability to individuate faces may result from the operations of a specialised neural 
module that encodes faces, and not other objects” (Rhodes, Byatt, Michie, & Puce, 
2004, pi 89). My own opinion is that most of the evidence argues against the expertise 
hypothesis and in favour of domain-specificity.
Expertise has generally been tested at two levels of experience - laboratory 
trained (e.g., greeble experts) and real-world experts (e.g, car experts) -  and with both 
manmade objects (e.g., greebles, cars) and natural objects (e.g, birds). It is important to 
note that to give the strongest argument either for or against the expertise hypothesis a 
wide range of objects needs to be considered, preferably combined with experience for 
that object class. I will begin with a review of the previous studies on expertise for 
objects. These include neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies assessing whether 
objects-of-expertise are processed in the same brain areas as faces, and behavioural 
evidence regarding whether the same style of cognitive processing is used for both 
objects-of-expertise and faces.
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5.2.1 Neural processing of faces versus obiects-of-expertise
5.2.1.1 Expertise and the FFA.
In novices, the Fusiform Face Area (FFA) is more activated for faces than a 
wide range of other objects (Grill-Spector, Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004; Kanwisher, 
McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Rhodes, Byatt et al., 2004; Tong, Nakayama, Moscovitch, 
Weinrib, & Kanwisher, 2000). The expertise hypothesis, however, suggests that the 
FFA might be a general expertise area rather than a face specific area. If this were the 
case, it would predict that experts with a given object class (e.g., car experts) should 
show greater activation (percent signal change from baseline in the BOLD response) 
within the FFA for that class than shown by subjects with less expertise for that class 
(i.e., car novices). Further, if the level of expertise is high enough, activation for 
objects-of-expertise should approach that for faces.
In the first study to investigate this issue, Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, 
and Gore (1999) tested BOLD response in the FFA before and after seven hours 
training with greebles, using both a passive viewing and one-back matching task (the 
latter ensures attention to individual identity). They compared the activation difference 
between upright and inverted greebles, as well as the difference between upright and 
inverted faces. Gauthier et al. found that the difference between upright and inverted 
greebles was more similar to the difference between upright and inverted faces after 
greeble training than before, and interpret this as increased activation in the FFA with 
expertise. However, as McKone and Kanwisher (in press) point out, given that the FFA 
shows only a small inversion effect (Kanwisher, Tong, & Nakayama, 1998) this is a 
rather odd choice of measure. Also, unfortunately, Gauthier et al. did not report the 
direct percent signal change from baseline for faces and greebles, so it is not clear 
whether this study found an increase in activation to upright greebles with training (as 
opposed to a decrease to inverted greebles which would also increase the difference 
between upright and inverted), or whether activation for upright greebles ever 
approached that for upright faces.
Several other studies have reported more direct comparison to faces, testing car, 
bird, and Lepidoptera (butterfly and moth) experts. In these studies, real-world experts 
of three to thirty years’ experience were tested. Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, and 
Anderson (2000) tested bird and car experts on a one-back matching task comparing 
activation for birds, cars and faces. Bird experts, who were also novices with cars,
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showed higher activation for birds than for cars in the FFA. Car experts, who were 
novices with birds, showed approximately equal activation for birds and cars. In both 
cases the activation for objects was less than the activation for faces. These results could 
be taken as indicating that bird experts, at least, use the FFA to process birds, with the 
weaker activation to birds than to faces reflecting less experience with birds than faces. 
However, Grill-Spector et al. (2004) showed that event-related activation1 to birds was 
higher than other object classes even in non-experts (possibly because birds have 
heads), thus questioning whether the result found in Gauthier, Skudlarski et al. was due 
to expertise rather than reflecting an already stronger than usual response further 
enhanced by attention (Wojciulik, Kanwisher, & Driver, 1998).
Grill-Spector et al. (2004) also tested car experts. Experts showed no greater 
activation for cars than did novices. There was no correlation between success at 
identifying or detecting cars and FFA activation in car experts, thus failing to replicate 
Gauthier, Skudlarski et al.’s (2000) bird expert result in a more sensitive design.
Rhodes, Byatt et al. (2004) found slightly stronger FFA activation for Lepidoptera in 
experts than novices, but activation for faces was also slightly stronger in the 
Lepidoptera experts than in novices (and in both groups activation for faces was 
stronger than activation for Lepidoptera). Further, when voxels active for faces were 
compared to those active for Lepidoptera the overlap was less than 15% even in experts. 
Thus, while there is still active controversy, the results from neuroimaging studies seem 
more consistent with the idea that faces per se, not expertise, leads to strong activation 
of the FFA.
5.2.1.2 Expertise, the N170 and the M l70
The temporal properties of activation to faces versus objects-of-expertise have 
also been studied. Based on the face-specific N170 response in ERPs, Rossion, 
Gauthier, Goffaux, Tarr, & Crommelinck (2002) studied an N170 response in greeble 
experts. They argue that the delayed and enhanced response in inverted faces compared 
to that for upright faces is a more reliable measure of face-specificity than comparing 
the response to faces (or objects-of-expertise) to that for other objects. They therefore 
compared the difference in response to upright and inverted greebles after training to 
that for faces. They found that results for greebles after training were more similar to
1 Correlation on a trial-by-trial basis between the stimulus and the BOLD response.
118
those of faces than results before training, being both increased in amplitude and 
delayed in latency. However, this effect was only found in the left hemisphere, whereas 
faces usually show a bias to right hemisphere processing (e.g., Gauthier, Skudlarski et 
al., 2000; Rhodes, 1993).
Using real-world experts, Gauthier, Curran, Curby and Collins (2003) found a 
difference in N170 between car experts looking at cars and novices looking at cars. Car 
experts showed larger amplitude in the N170 to cars than did novices but, as in Rossion 
et al. (2002), this was only in the left hemisphere. Comparing bird and dog experts, 
Tanaka and Curran (2001) reported a larger N170 response to objects-of-expertise than 
to the other class. However, there was no comparison made to faces, meaning that the 
size of effect relative to faces cannot be assessed. Given that there is some N170 effect 
for many object classes (Rossion, Gauthier et al, 2000) this makes it difficult to say 
whether the N170 is related to expertise rather than faceness. Further, as Tanaka and 
Curran themselves note, the site at which this N170 was found was again different to 
the site at which it is usually found for faces (although in this case it was in the right 
hemisphere). Thus, these three studies suggest that an N170 can be identified which is 
larger (and delayed) for experts looking at objects-of-expertise than for novices on the 
same objects. However, this appears to be coming from different brain areas than the 
N170 for faces (e.g., left versus right hemisphere).
Further, using MEG, Xu, Liu, and Kanwisher (2004) showed that the M l70 did 
not correlate on a trial-by-trial basis with successful car identification in car experts, 
although it did correlate with successful face identification. Overall, the evidence from 
the N170 and M l70 seems to support the domain specificity of face processing rather 
than the expertise hypothesis.
5.2.1.3 Expertise and neuropsychology.
Results from neuropsychology also indicate face specificity rather than 
expertise. If faces are special due to expertise, then damaging face-processing areas of 
the brain should also affect any expertise with objects. Similarly, intact face processing 
should mean that processing for objects-of-expertise also remains intact. That is, it 
should not be possible to dissociate expertise with objects and ability to process faces.
Patient CK is object agnosic, but not prosopagnosic, from a brain injury. Despite 
his extremely good face recognition skills, CK cannot recognise the individual toy 
soldiers or aeroplanes with which he was an expert before his injury (Moscovitch,
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Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997). There are also three cases of prosopagnosic subjects who 
retained, or gained, expertise with non-face objects after the onset of prosopagnosia. 
ELM was an expert with brass instruments before his stroke. Although after brain injury 
he was worse than controls at recognising faces (and individual stringed instruments), 
he was better than controls at recognising brass instruments (Dixon, Desmarais, 
Gojmerac, Schweizer, & Bub, 2002). Similarly, WJ learned to individually recognise 
his sheep after acquiring prosopagnosia (McNeil & Warrington, 1993), and Edward (a 
developmental prosopagnosic) did not differ from normal controls at learning to 
recognise greebles (Duchaine, Dingle, Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2004). These studies 
thus suggest a double-dissociation between the area of the brain used for face- 
recognition and that used for recognition of objects-of-expertise.
5.2.2 Behavioural studies of obiects-of-expertise
Behavioural studies have tested experts in several paradigms which produce 
effects “special’ to faces in novices. The next sections will review studies on effects 
associated with holistic processing (inversion, part-whole, composite) as well as 
contrast reversal. Results of these tasks were reviewed for novices in Chapter 4. The 
question of interest here is whether the results are different for experts; in particular, 
whether effects are bigger for objects-of-expertise and whether these ever reach the 
same size as effects for faces.
5.2.2.1 Expertise and inversion effects on recognition memory.
Inversion effects do not directly measure holistic processing (as previously 
noted). Indeed, given that most objects show some inversion effect, they are likely to be 
partly due to general familiarity with objects in one orientation. The expertise 
hypothesis explains disproportionate inversion effects for faces by noting that our level 
of experience with upright faces is much greater than our experience with inverted 
faces, whereas for other objects the level of experience at different orientations is more 
similar. Thus, becoming an expert with a particular object class in an upright orientation 
should increase the size of inversion effects. In terms of empirical tests, the effect of 
inversion for objects-of-expertise was first studied by Diamond and Carey (1986). They
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conducted two experiments with dog experts. In the first (Experiment 2 in their paper), 
the inversion effect for dog experts was not significantly larger than that for novices, 
and was still smaller than for faces (a 19% decrement for faces, 12% for dogs in dog 
experts; a 17% decrement for faces, 8% for dogs in dog novices). In this experiment the 
breed of dogs used as stimuli was not specifically matched to the breeds with which the 
experts were expert. When breed was more carefully matched to expertise (in Diamond 
& Carey’s Experiment 3), dog experts showed the same sized inversion effect for faces 
and dogs (20% for faces, 22% for dogs). This effect for dogs was significantly larger 
than that for novices (less than 5%). This result was particularly convincing because 
upright performance for faces and dogs was the same for dog experts.
This result has been taken as strong evidence for the expertise hypothesis, and is 
regularly cited as such (e.g., Collishaw & Hole, 2002; Fallshore & Schooler, 1995; 
Morton & Johnson, 1991; Rhodes, 1993). However, the finding of a face-sized 
inversion effect has never been replicated. Bruyer and Crispeels (1992) claim to have 
replicated Diamond and Carey’s result in handwriting experts. The abstract implies that 
they have replicated the face-sized inversion effect, but the actual paper reports 
replicating Diamond and Carey’s Experiment 2 results. Specifically, experts showed a 
larger inversion effect for handwriting than novices (approximately 10% for experts vs. 
approximately 5% for novices), but the effect was still only half the size of that for faces 
(approximately 20% for both groups). It could perhaps be argued that this is not a fair 
comparison, as the upright performance was not matched for faces and handwriting. 
However, performance for inverted stimuli (for which experts and novices should be 
equally inexpert) was matched. In a similar example, Rossion et al. (2002) found a 
significant interaction between orientation and level of expertise for greebles. In a 
sequential same-different task the inversion effect on reaction time was 25 ms for 
greebles in greeble novices and 46 ms in greeble experts (accuracy was high and similar 
in all conditions), but this effect was still smaller than the 75 ms inversion effect for 
faces. (In this case performance for upright faces and greebles was well matched.)
Several other studies include information on inversion effects in objects-of- 
expertise for experts and novices, but with no comparison to faces. Gauthier, Williams, 
Tarr, & Tanaka (1998) compared upright greebles to “mis-oriented” greebles (data 
collapsed over greebles presented at 60°, 120° and 180° from upright) and, contrary to 
the expertise hypothesis, found a larger mis-orientation effect for novices than experts 
(231 ms vs. 180 ms, respectively). Gauthier, Skudlarski et al. (2000) compared the
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performance for bird and car experts looking at both birds and cars. While the car 
experts showed a larger inversion effect for cars than for birds (differences in the 
sensitivity measure d’ was cars = 0.84, and birds = 0.05), the bird experts showed the 
same pattern (cars = 0.57, birds = 0.30). In this study performance was not matched 
across the two stimulus types at either orientation. Xu et al. (2004) also reported d’ 
prime for novices and car experts looking at cars. Their article reports a larger inversion 
effect for experts than for novices on this measure. However, performance was again 
not matched for either orientation, and experts were in fact much better in both 
orientations than novices. Moreover, when results are reported as percentage correct 
(Diamond & Carey’s, 1986, measure), Xu et al.’s data show no difference in the size of 
inversion effect between the two groups (upright: car experts = 90%, car novices =
71 %; inverted: experts = 82%, novices = 63%; inversion effect = 8% for both groups; 
personal communication, Xu & Kanwisher, September, 2004).
Overall, results suggest that expertise increases inversion effects in some cases 
(e.g., handwriting experts in Bruyer & Crispeels, 1992; greeble experts in Rossion et al., 
2002), but has no effect in others (e.g., greeble experts in Gauthier et al, 1998; bird 
experts in Gauthier, Skudlarski et al., 2000; car experts using the % measure in Xu et 
al., 2004). Moreover, except for the original study by Diamond and Carey (1986) there 
is no evidence that inversion effects are the same size as for faces. Given that face- 
specificity manifests as a disproportionate inversion effect, this is an important point.
Another problem for the expertise hypothesis is that in some studies expertise 
obtained for objects in the upright orientation improved experts’ recognition of inverted 
objects with respect to that of novices. This is what occurs for both Xu et al.’s (2004), 
and Rossion et al’s data (2002; a 7% and 81 ms improvement in experts for inverted 
greebles compared to a 2% and 102 ms improvement for upright greebles). It is not 
clear how the expertise hypothesis can explain this, while at the same time explaining 
the disproportionate inversion effects for faces.
5.2.2.2 Parts versus wholes paradigm.
As discussed in Chapter 4, in novices, the part-whole effect (Davidoff & 
Donnelly, 1990; Tanaka & Farah, 1993) is similar to the inversion effect in being 
disproportionately large for faces compared to objects, rather than being present for 
faces and absent for objects. Several studies have compared the part-whole effect for 
novices to that for experts with non-face objects. Most of these have been conducted
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using greebles and greeble experts and did not test faces as a comparison. For upright 
greebles, Gauthier and Tarr (1997) found that greeble experts were significantly more 
accurate at recognising a part in the learned whole greeble than in isolation (11% 
difference), there was a small non-significant effect for inverted greebles in the same 
direction (5% difference), and the overall pattern of results was not reliably different 
from that of greeble novices (part-whole difference for upright = 5%, for inverted =
2%). Gauthier and Tarr also tested a transformed version of the part-whole effect, in 
which a part is tested either in isolation, in the original whole or in the context of a 
whole with a spacing change between features (the “transformed” condition). The usual 
finding for faces (Tanaka & Sengco, 1997) is that performance is more accurate and/or 
faster in the original condition than in the transformed condition. Gauthier and Tarr 
(1997) found that for greeble experts there were no significant effects on accuracy, but 
parts were recognised significantly faster in studied whole greebles than in transformed 
greebles. For greeble novices, there were no differences between original and 
transformed greebles. The interaction between expertise and condition (transformed vs. 
original) for reaction time (RT) was not quite significant (the interaction for accuracy is 
not reported).
Gauthier et al. (1998) also tested both the original and transformed versions of 
the part-whole effect. For experts, one of the parts tested (the “quiff’) was recognised 
significantly better in the original whole than the isolated part configuration, and nearly 
significantly better than the transformed configuration (p=.059). However, results for 
the other two parts trended in the opposite direction (worse performance for parts in the 
original whole configuration than alone). Moreover, for novices, recognition was also 
better for original whole greebles than for isolated parts for one of the three tested parts 
(the “dunth”). Thus, this study did not show any consistent effect of expertise.
Gauthier and Tarr (2002) found a slight advantage for parts in the original 
configuration over parts presented in isolation for both novices and experts (a difference 
of about 1.4 on a d' measure for both groups). There was also an advantage for 
recognising parts in original, as compared to transformed greebles, for both groups but 
this was primarily for recognising the particular part which had been moved to make the 
transformed stimuli (a difference in d’ of about 1, compared to a difference in the other 
parts of 0.3). Overall, the greebles studies have found small part-whole effects that are 
no larger in experts than in novices. None of these studies tested faces as a comparison,
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so it is difficult to directly assess whether the effects for greebles would be of a similar 
size to those found for faces.
The only study to test the part-whole effect in real world experts is by Tanaka et 
al. (1996, cited in Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997). They tested car experts, dog experts and 
biological cell experts and compared the results for objects-of-expertise to those for 
faces. For experts, there were small part-whole effects for each group for objects-of- 
expertise (approximately 10% for cells, 6% for cars and 8% for dog faces). These 
effects were not larger than the effects for novices except perhaps for dog-faces 
(approximately 16% for cells, 8% for cars and 2% for dog faces). In all cases these were 
also smaller than the effects for faces (approximately 26% for cell experts, 18% for car 
experts and 20% for dog experts, and approximately 25% for object novices).
In summary, there is no evidence that expertise reliably increases the size of the 
part-whole effect for either greeble experts or real-world experts compared to the small 
effects found in novices. Gauthier and Tarr (2002) argue that the part-whole effect 
provides no evidence for face-specific processing because the increased effect for faces 
reflects only increased expertise. This is inconsistent with the findings above, namely 
that expertise with non-face objects does not increase the size of the part-whole effect 
compared to that for novices.
5.2.2.3 Composite effect.
As shown in Chapter 4, the composite effect (Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987), 
unlike the part-whole effect, is absent for novices looking at non-face objects. The 
composite effect has only been tested in one group of experts, that is, greeble experts. 
Using a direct implementation of Young et al’s (1987) original procedure with famous 
faces, Gauthier et al. (1998) tested experts’ (but not novices’) ability to name one half of 
a familiar greeble, either aligned or unaligned with another half greeble. For accuracy 
there was no difference between aligned and unaligned conditions where the halves 
were from the same “family”, and there was a trend for aligned composite greebles with 
halves from different “families” to be named more accurately than unaligned 
composites. This is the opposite pattern to that predicted for a composite effect. For RT, 
when the halves came from different families there was a trend for aligned composites 
to be named faster than unaligned (again, the opposite pattern to the standard composite 
effect), but for composites made from halves from the same family there was a trend for 
aligned composites to be named slower than unaligned composites. There are no
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statistics reported for these comparisons, but from an examination of the error bars it 
seems likely that the aligned and unaligned conditions do not differ significantly in any 
of these comparisons.
Gauthier and Tarr (2002) conducted a sequential same-different version of the 
composite effect with both greeble experts and novices. Results for aligned and 
unaligned same trials (the appropriate comparison for looking for a composite effect in 
this version of the composite task; see Chapter 4) are only reported for RT. Gauthier 
and Tarr claim that the composite effect increased with expertise. However, the close- 
to-significant interaction with expertise (p = .07) reflected a pattern in which there was 
initially no difference between processing speed of aligned and unaligned composites, a 
difference in the reverse-to-predicted direction (i.e., aligned faster than unaligned) in the 
second and third sessions of training, and then no difference again in the final two 
sessions. From their data (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002, Figure 4c, p. 439, Table 2, p. 441) it is 
clear that there is no difference between aligned and unaligned trials at the end of 
training (i.e., in experts).
In summary, in the one object class tested, there is no evidence of a composite 
effect for experts viewing objects-of-expertise. Note, however, that no natural object 
classes or real-world experts have been tested. It is thus still possible that extensive real- 
world experience with a natural object class might produce a composite effect with 
objects-of-expertise.
5.2.2.4 Contrast reversal.
Results from Chapter 4 showed that, in novices, there was a disproportionate 
contrast reversal effect for faces compared to labrador dogs. Previous research had also 
shown essentially no effect of contrast reversal for greebles, blobs or chairs in novices 
(Gauthier et al., 1998; Nederhouser, Mangini, Biederman, & Kazunori, 2002; 
Subramaniam & Biederman, 1997). Contrast reversal does not assess holistic 
processing; however, as noted in Chapter 4, it does seem to be a task on which faces and 
objects differ (at least in the magnitude of the effect) and it thus worth investigating in 
experts.
There have been two studies of the effect of contrast reversal on objects-of- 
expertise. In the only published study, Gauthier et al. (1998) found that greeble experts 
were worse at recognising contrast reversed greebles compared to original contrast 
greebles. They were also worse at recognising contrast reversed greebles than were
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greeble “novices”. (The amount of training given to “novices” is not reported, but it was 
enough that they could verify the names of greebles at an accuracy not significantly 
different from experts.) Both groups were the same at recognising original contrast 
greebles. Reporting in a conference presentation, Nederhouser et al. (2002), found no 
effect of contrast reversal on matching blobs for either novices or experts (the only 
effect of expertise was to make experts faster at the task overall). Thus, there are 
contradictory results in the two studies of the effect of contrast reversal on objects-of- 
expertise. Further, natural objects and real-world experts have not been tested.
5.2.2.5 Summary of behavioural studies.
Inversion effects have been taken as strong evidence for the expertise 
hypothesis. However a review of the literature has shown face-size inversion effects for 
object-of-expertise only in Diamond and Carey’s (1986) study with dog experts (and 
only in Experiment 3). Other studies reported smaller or no effects of expertise on 
inversion. Also, inversion effects do not directly demonstrate holistic processing (i.e., 
the aspect suggested to be special to faces). Two tests which do directly test holistic 
processing have been performed with experts. The part-whole effect, like the inversion 
effect, is smaller for objects than for faces in novices. For experts, there is no increase in 
the size of the effect for a range of natural and manmade objects. There is no composite 
effect for greeble experts looking at greebles (i.e., no holistic processing). However, no 
natural object classes or real-world experts have been tested on this paradigm. This is 
important as training in an experimental setting may be insufficient to develop this face- 
specific processing, and thus a finding of no effect in experiment trained experts cannot 
refute the expertise hypothesis.
5.2.3 Present study
The aim of the present study was to test real-world experts on the three tasks 
used in Chapter 4. These were a test of the effect of inversion on recognition memory, a 
test of the effects of contrast reversal (and inversion) on a simultaneous matching task, 
and a test of holistic processing using Young et al’s (1987) composite effect. Although 
it would be very interesting if face-like effects were found after only ten hours of
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training, the fact that they are not does not necessarily mean that the expertise 
hypothesis is wrong. Some of the potentially most interesting tests of face-like 
processing (e.g., the composite effect) have not previously been tested with real-world 
experts.
The particular experts tested here were experienced with labrador retrievers. 
Labradors are considered to be particularly suitable stimuli to compare to faces for the 
reasons listed in Chapter 4; briefly, dogs are a naturally occurring stimulus class with 
individuals differing in multiple parts and relationships between parts, they share a first- 
order configuration, have a canonical upright, and information from shape-from-shading 
is potentially important.
Further, dog experts are a particularly good group of experts to test. Individual 
level discrimination is important when testing the expertise hypothesis (Diamond & 
Carey, 1986). Dog experts, especially judges and breeders, are used to looking at 
individual animals. Other classes of experts previously tested may not in fact do this.
Car experts distinguish cars at the level of make/model and year (Gauthier et al., 2003). 
Biological cell experts also usually differentiate cells by type rather than as individuals. 
Bird experts usually make judgements at the level of species. When individual birds are 
identified it is usually on the basis of coloured bands on their legs, and/or behaviour, 
rather than the visual appearance of the bird itself (personal communications, from 
members of the Canberra Ornithological Group). This requirement of looking at the 
individual is also the main reason for not testing sheep experts (farmers in Australia 
typically have large flocks and are unlikely to know individual sheep), or flower 
experts.
Only a few classes of objects appear to be identified at an individual level by 
experts. These include dogs, cats and horses. Here I chose to test dogs. Given the results 
of Diamond and Carey (1986; Experiment 3), I matched the breed of dog to the breeds 
with which the experts have expertise. Labradors are a very popular breed in Australia 
and initial enquires suggested that this would be the breed for which most experts could 
be found (keeping in mind other constraints such as not using dogs with strong colour 
boundaries to parts). For these reasons, labradors and labrador experts were selected as 
best for the present experiments.
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5.2.3.1 Subjects: characteristics of the labrador experts.
Fifteen experts participated. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Most experts were contacted from lists of qualified judges obtained from the Australian 
National Kennel Council website, or from lists of local breeders obtained from the ACT 
Canine Association website2. Additional recommendations were also obtained from 
some of the dog experts (most of those recommended were also on the ANKC list). All 
of the experts were Caucasian (the same race as the face pictures); seven were male.
The experts ranged in age from 41-76 years, with most 55-66 years (mean age 58.2 
years; median age 60 years). Highest education level was also recorded and ranged from 
early High school to postgraduate, with most having completed either Year 12 (High 
school) or tertiary education. Experts were tested in their own homes, except for two 
who preferred to be tested at the university, and were given a bottle of wine or book 
voucher to show appreciation for their time.
Level of expertise was assessed in a number of ways. All expert subjects except 
four were qualified All-Breeds judges (n=7) or Gun-dog Group3 judges (n=4). Of the 
gun-dog judges, two also bred labradors, one had an animal transport business, and the 
fourth had handled labradors in the ring for friends. Of the four subjects who were not 
qualified judges, two bred labradors, one was involved in field-trials (in which labradors 
participate) and had owned labradors, and the fourth was a labrador guide-dog puppy 
trainer and dog-obedience trainer.
Subjects were asked several questions relating to experience with dogs in 
general, and labradors in particular. The aim of the questions was to ascertain the 
number of years subjects had been involved in various activities (e.g., judging, 
attending shows) and the number of individual labradors subjects would have seen in 
these activities. The method used was based on the personal history time-line method 
used to obtain long-term histories of drug use (Anglin, Hser, & Chou, 1993). This 
allows subjects to link levels of exposure with various important points in their life. In 
the drug use case, it has been shown to correlate fairly reliably with actual use. For most 
dog experts their involvement with dogs was fairly consistent over the years; however, 
the structure of the questions did seem to aid recall.
2
‘ http://www.ankc.aust.com/ and http://www.actca.asn.au/ respectively.
3
Labradors are one of the four most common dogs in this group, the others being cocker spaniel, golden 
retriever, and Irish setter.
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For each subject, the total number of years for which they had been involved 
with labradors and an estimate of the number of dogs seen was calculated (based on 
estimates of the number of years, shows per year and number of dogs per show, number 
of dogs bred etc.). Table 5.1 gives these estimates. Of these measures, the number of 
years is likely to be more reliable than the number of labradors seen. The full table 
including all estimates making up the total is given in Appendix III.
Table 5.1. Summary characteristics for each of the 15 dog experts (SI-SI5) showing 
age, years of experience, dog shows attended per year and approximate number of 
labradors seen over the years.
Age
(years)
Years of 
experien 
ce
Dog shows 
/year
Approximate 
labradors seen
SI 76 37 25 11635
S2 66 25 20 1100
S3 46 42 50 10677
S4 59 30 12 3300
S5 64 32 12 3120
S6 55 23 6 2716
S7 56 23 6 2716
S8 60 34 25 8305
S9 60 10 45 400
S10 62 8 1 900
Sll 70 8 1 900
S12 41 5 1 43
S13 51 19 20 2644
S14 63 22 6 4688
S15 44 28 20 15159
average 58.2 23.1 16.7 4553
From Table 5.1, the important points to note are that: all but three subjects had 
over 10 years’ experience (exceptions had 5, 8, and 8 years); the overall mean was 23.1 
years; and ten of the subjects had over 20 years’ experience (mean 29.6 years for this 
sub-set). This compares favourably with previous studies of expertise (see Table 5.2 for 
the level of expertise from a range of studies). The dog experts tested here attended an 
average of 16.7 dog shows per year of which 4.9 were attended specifically with the
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purpose of looking at labradors (either to show or to judge). On average, experts had 
seen something in the order of 4550 labradors in their years involved with dogs. Note 
that the only expert who had seen less than 400 was the guide-dog trainer; although she 
had not seen as many dogs, she was personally familiar with those 43 individual dogs.
Table 5.2. Level of expertise reported in previous studies.
Study Kind of expert Average experience
Diamond & Carey (1986) Dog Not listed (listed as
Experiment 2 belonging to clubs etc.)
Experiment 3 Irish setters & cocker 
spaniel
Mean = 31 years
Rhodes & McLean (1990) Birds Not listed (mean rating as 
5/7 on expertise scale)
Tanaka & Taylor (1991) Bird > 10 years, most > 20 years
Dog > 10 years, most > 20 years
Bruyer & Crispeels (1992) Handwriting Not listed (profession given 
as related)
Tanaka et al. (1996) Biological cells >5-10 years
Car >5-10 years
Rottweiler dogs >5-10 years
Johnson & Mervis (1997) Song birds Not listed (mean peer 
rating of expertise >5/7)
Tropical fish Not listed (mean peer 
rating of expertise >5/7)
Gauthier et al. (2000) Bird Mean = 18 years
Cars Mean = 20.6 years
Tanaka & Curran (2001) Bird > 10 years, most > 20 years
Dog > 10 years, most > 20 years
Gauthier et al. (2003) Cars Not listed (expertise 
measured as the difference 
in sensitivity to matching 
cars and birds)
Gill-Spector et al. (2004) Cars As for Gauthier et al. 
(2003)
Rhodes, Byatt et al. (2004) Lepidoptera 3-30 years, mean 12.8
(butterflies & moths) years
Anecdotal evidence of expertise was obtained during the experiment and in a 
post-test questionnaire. Throughout the experiments, experts were very good at picking 
which were American dogs, and several recognised that some of the Australian dogs
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were bred by a particular breeder. Many of the experts commented that even though 
there is a list of features (the breed standard) to which the dog must confirm, when they 
judge they look at the whole dog.
5.2.3.2 Structure of the testing sessions for experts.
Each expert participated in two sessions of approximately one hour each.
Session 1 included an expertise questionnaire, the test of inversion on recognition 
memory (Experiment 7) and the contrast reversal test (Experiment 8). Session 2 
consisted of the composite test (Experiment 9) and a post-test questionnaire to see 
whether experts personally recognised any of the dogs used in the experiments. Because 
experts participated in all three experiments, order of stimulus class (faces vs dogs), and 
orientation (upright vs inverted) was counterbalanced across subjects but remained the 
same for each subject across experiments. That is, if an expert saw upright dogs first in 
the memory test they also saw upright dogs first in the other two tests.4
5.3 Experiment 7 -  Inversion Effects On Recognition Memory
Inversion effects are disproportionately large for faces compared to other objects 
when subjects have no specific expertise in that domain (Yin, 1969). In experts, 
Diamond and Carey (1986; Experiment 3) found inversion effects for dog experts 
looking at dogs that were as large as those for faces. This result has never been 
replicated and has not been found for other object classes (Bruyer & Crispeels, 1992; 
Rossion et al., 2002; Xu et al., 2004). Experiment 7 attempted to replicate Diamond and 
Carey’s result for dog experts testing recognition memory in labrador experts as a 
function of stimulus class (labradors vs. faces) and orientation (upright vs. inverted).
A possible problem with Diamond and Carey’s result is that dog pictures were 
taken from the archives of the American Kennel Club. Given that the experts were 
American Kennel Club judges it is possible that they were previously familiar with the
4 The number of experts allowed one cycle of counterbalancing, plus one short of a second cycle. The 
final subject would have seen the dogs inverted first. A final subject was not tested because no further 
suitable (and available) experts could be found in the region.
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actual photographs used and/or could individually name the dogs pictured. That is, the 
effect found may be due to specific pre-experimental familiarity with these dogs or 
pictures, rather than a general effect of expertise with the class.5 To control for this 
possibility, in the current experiment, a post-test questionnaire was administered (after 
the composite task, Experiment 9). In this experts were presented with pictures of the 
dogs used in the experiments and asked to name each (or give relevant information such 
as breeder, or champion in a certain year). Of the 15 dog experts only 5 gave specific 
information about any dog. None correctly named any dog, although four each 
misnamed one dog as another which did appear in the experiments. Thus, any increase 
in inversion effects found in this experiment cannot be attributed to the experts having 
specific familiarity with the dogs tested.
5.3.1 Experiment 7 - Method
The method was the same as that used for novices (Chapter 4, Experiment 4) 
except that responses were recorded via a NewMicros Button Box connected to the 
iMac via a Keyspan USB twin serial adaptor. The yellow (middle) button was used for 
progressing through instructions and the buttons on left and right (red and green 
respectively) were used in the test phase to indicate which dog of a pair had appeared in 
the study phase.
5.3.2 Experiment 7 - Results
The percentage of test trials on which the “old” stimulus from an old-new pair 
was correctly chosen was calculated for each subject for each condition (2AFC, chance 
= 50%). These are shown averaged across expert subjects in Figure 5.1a. The results for 
novices from Chapter 4 are presented in Figure 5.1b for comparison. Note that novice 
subjects were mostly 18 years old whereas experts were mostly 55-66 years so overall
5 To understand the difference, remember that disproportionate inversion effects for faces are found both 
for faces which are unknown prior to the experiment as well as for those which are familiar.
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levels of accuracy are not comparable given that memory usually declines with age 
(e.g., Fastenau, Denburg, & Abeles, 1996).
Figure 5.2 contains RTs for experts and novices. These are the RTs for all trials 
including both correct and incorrect responses. (Results for correct-only responses were 
similar but, given the low accuracy in some conditions and the small number of trials, 
the RTs for correct-only responses were likely to be less reliable.)
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Figure 5.1. Experiment 8: Accuracy for the recognition memory test on faces and 
dogs, (a) expert subjects, (b) young adult novice subjects, N = 22, from Chapter 4 
(Experiment 4). Error bars are appropriate for making the within subjects 
comparison between upright and inverted orientations (i.e., ± 1 SEM of the 
difference scores). *** p  < .001, * p < .05, ns = p > .05.
5.3.2.1 Results for dog experts.
To show that the stimuli were well matched in conditions in which there should 
be equivalent expertise (i.e., essentially none) a first test compared faces and dogs in the 
inverted condition. As for novices, accuracy on inverted faces and inverted dogs did not 
significantly differ, t < 1.
A 2-way repeated-measures ANOVA for experts then revealed a significant 
main effect of orientation, F(l, 14) = 15.41, MSE = 190.76, p < .01, which was 
modified by a significant interaction between class (faces vs. dogs) and orientation 
(upright vs. inverted), F(l, 14) = 6.95, MSE = 102.34, < .05. This reflects the fact that 
the inversion effect was much larger for faces (21 %) than for dogs (7 %; see Figure 
5. la). A priori t-tests showed that memory was significantly better in the upright than 
inverted orientation for faces, /(14) = 4.69,/? < .001, but not for dogs, r( 14) = 1.62, 
p > . 1. In case a larger effect of inversion was being diluted by the fact that some
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experts had relatively few years of experience, the analysis was re-run with the sub-set 
of the experts who had over 20 years’ experience (N=10). However, the inversion effect 
for dogs was still small (6 %) and non-significant, /(9) = 1.30, p > .2. Thus, dog experts 
did not show face-like inversion effects for dogs.
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Figure 5.2. Experiment 8: Reaction times for the recognition memory test on 
faces and dogs, formatted as for Figure 5.1 (a) expert subjects, (b) young adult 
novice subjects, N = 22, from Chapter 4 (Experiment 4).
Results for RTs were also analysed. Analysis was conduced for all RTs and for 
correct RTs only. As the results were basically the same, and the number of correct 
trials in some cases approached chance, only results from analysing all RTs will be 
reported. A 2-way repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
orientation, F(l, 14) = 8.68, MSE = 1404324, p <. 02, as well as a significant main 
effect of class, F( 1, 14) = 8.69, MSE = 1413406, p <. 02. The interaction between 
orientation and class was not significant, F(l, 14) = 1.73, MSE = 909233, p > .2, but a 
priori t-tests revealed that upright faces were recognised more quickly than inverted 
faces, /(14) = 3.88, p < .01, whereas there was no difference between upright and 
inverted dogs, /(14) = 1.27, p > .2. Given the relatively poor power associated with the 
RT data (RT is a very variable measure and there were only 15 trials for each of 15 
experts), the RTs results were taken as sufficiently consistent with those for accuracy 
presented above.6
6 Note that testing more trials to increase the reliability of RTs is not possible in a memory experiment as 
accuracy would be too close to floor. Note also that the number of trials tested here (15) is slightly more 
than used by Diamond & Carey (1986, Experiment 3) in which two lots of 6 trials were used.
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5.3.2.2 Comparison between dog experts and novices.
The pattern of means for the experts was very similar to those of the novices in 
Chapter 4. On the accuracy measure, the statistical results were the same in both groups 
except that the small effect of inversion for dog-experts looking at dogs (7%, N=15) 
was not significant, whereas it had been for novices (7%, N=21). To compare experts 
directly to novices a 3-way mixed ANOVA was completed with expertise as the 
between subjects factor. The main effect of expertise was not significant, F < 1, and 
there were no interactions with expertise, all Fs < 1. A t-test comparing the size of the 
inversion effect for dogs (dogs upright -  dogs inverted) for novices and experts also 
showed that there was no difference, t < 1. It is worth noting that the overall level of 
accuracy for dogs is similar for novices and experts (presumably because these are not 
age-matched controls), which has the advantage of guaranteeing a fair comparison 
between the size of the inversion effect for dogs.
Results from RTs (Figure 5.2) were again consistent with accuracy results. 
Experience did not interact with any other variables, Fs < 1, nor show any main effect, 
F < 1. Thus, dog experts did not have larger inversion effects in response to dogs than 
did novices.
novices
years of experience with dogs
Figure 5.3. Experiment 7: Scatter plot of the size of the inversion effect (upright 
% correct - inverted % correct) for dogs versus the number of years experience. 
Each filled diamond represents one expert. The unfilled diamond on the left is the 
average for novice subjects ±1 SD.
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5.3.2.3 Correlations with experience for experts.
To assess the effects of individual level of expertise, a scatter plot of expertise 
against the inversion effect for dogs was plotted (Figure 5.3). This showed that there 
was no relationship between the size of the inversion effect and years of experience, 
r -  .096, p > .5. There was also no significant relationship between the size of the 
inversion effect and number of dogs seen (a much less reliable measure) although there 
was a small trend in this direction, r = .324, p > .2.
5.3.3 Experiment 7 - Discussion
For faces, dog experts showed the standard pattem of a large inversion effect on 
recognition memory. For dogs, however, experts showed the same small inversion 
effect as shown by novices (Chapter 4, Experiment 4), and not the large face-sized 
inversion effect reported by Diamond and Carey (1986, Experiment 3). The lack of any 
expertise effect was confirmed both by comparing the results of experts to novices, and 
also by testing for correlations between expertise and the size of the inversion effect for 
dogs.
Although the failure to replicate Experiment 3 of Diamond and Carey (1986) 
might initially seem surprising given that the result is often cited in the literature, it 
should be noted that Diamond and Carey’s Experiment 2 did not find the face-sized 
inversion effect for dogs. Further, as reviewed in the introduction, face-like inversion 
effects for other objects-of-experts have not been found. I tentatively suggest that 
Diamond and Carey’s finding of a face-sized inversion effect was due to subjects’ 
specific familiarity with the dogs used as stimuli rather than a general effect of 
expertise.
There are, however, two possible concerns with the current results that deserve 
consideration. The first is a lack of overall difference in recognition performance 
between experts and novices on dogs, which could be taken to suggest that the experts 
were not really expert. However, given that memory is known to decrease with age, the 
fact that the older experts were as good as younger novices does not necessarily indicate 
a lack of expertise with dogs. Indeed, the lack of overall difference in performance 
between dog experts and novices may be due to experts having spared memory in both 
their areas of expertise (faces and dogs).
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Data from age-matched controls7 suggests that the age-based interpretation is 
correct. Control subjects were matched to individual experts on age (within 2 years), sex 
and education level. Results for the experts with more than 10 years experience (N=12) 
show the expected poorer performance for upright dogs in these age-matched novices 
compared to the experts (63% for novices vs. 74% for experts; t( 11)= 1.97, p < .04, 
one-tailed), despite almost identical performance for faces (83% for novices vs. 82% for 
experts; t < 1). There will also be behavioural evidence that the dog experts are expert in 
Experiment 8.
The second possible concern is that, in Diamond and Carey’s Experiment 3 
experts’ performance was matched for faces and dogs in experts in the upright 
orientation by using smaller learning sets for dogs. In the current experiment 
performance was matched for faces and dogs in the inverted orientation instead. This 
was done because it is the inverted condition for which experts should be similarly 
inexpert, whereas experience for upright faces is likely to exceed that for upright dogs 
even in dog experts. It could be suggested that the lack of a face-sized inversion effect 
was due this lack of matching performance in the upright orientation; however 
attempting to match upright performance in novices (the two additional experiments 
reported in Chapter 4) if anything decreased the size of the inversion effect (see Figure 
4.3). Further, in the next experiment performance on upright dogs and faces for experts 
was matched, allowing this interpretation to be tested.
5.4 Experiment 8 -  Contrast Reversal
Results from dog novices presented in Chapter 4 (Experiment 5) showed that 
contrast reversal had different effects in face and dog recognition. For faces, both 
contrast reversal and inversion were detrimental to performance (there were main 
effects of each) and these effects were independent of each other (there was no 
interaction).
7 I designed this additional experiment; testing and some subject recruitment was conducted by a research 
assistant (Jacqui Brewer).
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For dogs, the main effect of contrast reversal was much smaller, there was no 
main effect of inversion and no interaction. The aim of the present experiment was to 
test whether the results would be different for dog experts. Contrast reversal has 
previously only been tested with experiment-trained experts on artificial stimuli, and 
produced contradictory results: after training, greeble experts were significantly slower 
at recognising contrast reversed greebles than they had been before training (Gauthier et 
al., 1998), but blob experts showed no effect of contrast reversal on accuracy or RT 
(Nederhouser, et al., 2002).
The present experiment provides the first test of contrast reversal for real-world 
experts, and for a natural stimulus class. The task used was the same-different identity 
judgement of pairs of dogs or faces, as used for the novices in Chapter 4. Stimuli in 
each pair were both original contrast, both reversed contrast, or one original and one 
reversed contrast. If the effect of contrast reversal becomes face-like with expertise, 
then it is predicted that dog experts should show a difference in accuracy between 
original and reversed dogs that is larger than that found in novices, and potentially as 
large as the difference for experts between original and reversed faces.
5.4.1 Experiment 8 - Method
Methods were as for novices in Chapter 4 (Experiment 5), with one exception. 
With the young adult novices, the presentation time on each trial in Experiment 5 was 
600 ms. Presentation time was increased for the older dog experts to keep performance 
off floor, and to achieve similar performance levels to the novices. In early testing, 
experts reported that they had trouble making fast enough eye movements to see both 
stimuli in a pair in the 600 ms allowed. For each expert, presentation time was adjusted 
in the practice phase until they felt that they could see both stimuli. The final time per 
trial ranged from 600-700 ms with longer durations generally given for older experts, 
and most tested at 650 ms.
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5.4.2 Experiment 8 - Results
Table 5.3 presents mean accuracy in the same-different identity task for each 
condition8. As argued in Chapter 5, the both original and both reversed conditions are 
logically the most straightforward to interpret, and are plotted in Figure 5.4 (collapsed 
across same and different trials). In both Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4 the results from the 
young adult novices in Chapter 4 (Experiment 5) are included for comparison.
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Figure 5.4, Experiment 8: Accuracy to say that both original contrast or both 
reversed contrast pairs are the same or different identity for faces and dogs for (a) 
experts and (b) novices from Chapter 4 (Experiment 5). Error bars are appropriate 
for the within subjects comparison of the two contrast conditions (i.e., ± 1 SEM 
of the difference scores). *** p < .001, * p < .05, ns = p > .05.
8 There were no effects on RT. Given that the task involved limited presentation time, rather than a 
present-until-response procedure, this is not surprising or particularly interesting: under these conditions, 
reaction time is a largely meaningless measure.
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5.4.2.1 Results for dog experts.
For experts, Figure 5.4 shows the usual substantial effect of contrast reversal for 
faces, but no contrast reversal effect for dogs in either orientation. A 2x2x3 repeated 
measures ANOVA involving stimulus class (dogs vs. faces), orientation (upright vs. 
inverted), and contrast condition (both original vs. both reversed vs. one original-one 
reversed) revealed a significant three-way interaction, F(2, 28) = 3.57, MSE = 47.55, 
p < .05. There was also a significant two-way interaction between stimulus class and 
contrast condition F(2, 28) = 7.42, MSE = 44.21, p < .01. Thus, further analysis was 
conducted separately for faces and dogs. The one original-one reversed condition was 
also excluded from further analysis, as the low-level differences between stimuli make 
it inherently harder than the other conditions (see Chapter 4).
Table 5.3. Mean accuracy (and SEM) in dog experts on the same-different task for each 
stimulus class, orientation, and contrast condition. Results from novices (Chapter 4,
Experiment 5) are presented for comparison.
Faces Dogs
Both
original
Both
reversed
One
original,
One
reversed
Both
original
Both
reversed
One
original,
One
reversed
D og
E xp erts
Upright 75.89
(3.79)
61.33
(2 .96)
58.39
(1.78)
76.44
(2.97)
76.67
(3.10)
71.167
(2.13)
Inverted 63.56
(3.72)
60.67
(2.29)
58.39
(2.55)
76.00
(3.36)
76.67
(3.29)
71.00
(2.21)
N o v ices
Upright 85.17
(1.58)
68.83
(2.19)
63.42
(1.46)
74.33
(2.36)
69.83
(1.84)
66.04
(1.39)
Inverted 76.00
(1.89)
63.25
(1-97)
59.79
(1.42)
72.67
(1.76)
68.42
(1.67)
65.04
(1.84)
For faces, a 2x2 ANOVA on the expert’s data confirmed a main effect of 
contrast reversal, F( 1, 14) = 21.71, MSE =52.57, p < .001, and a main effect of 
orientation, F(l, 14) = 9.84, MSE = 64.41,/? < .01. There was also a significant 
interaction, F(l,14) = 7.89, MSE = 64.68, p < .02. A priori t-tests showed that there
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were significant contrast reversal effects for upright faces, /(14) = 6.70,/? < .001, but not 
for inverted faces, t < 1. A priori t-tests also showed that there was a significant 
inversion effect for the both original condition, /(14) = 3.93, p < .01, but not for the both 
reversed condition, t < 1. These results partially replicate the standard finding for 
upright faces (Novices in Chapter 4; Kemp, McManus, & Pigott, 1990), in that faces 
show a large contrast reversal effect. One difference from the previous results was the 
smaller contrast effect for inverted faces than for upright (i.e., a significant interaction). 
While this could be meaningful, it was not previously obtained with the dog novices 
where performance was better, and could have arisen here simply because performance 
for inverted faces is approaching floor.
For dogs, 2x2 ANOVA on the expert’s data revealed no main effects or 
interaction, all Fs < 1. A priori t-tests showed that there was no effect of contrast 
reversal in either orientation, ts < 1, or of orientation for either of the contrast 
conditions, ts < 1. The results for the sub-set of experts with over 20 years’ experience 
(N=10) were basically the same. In particular, t-tests again showed no effect of contrast 
in either orientation, ts < 1, or of orientation for either contrast condition, ts < 1. Thus, 
dog experts did not show the same pattern for dogs as for faces, with respect to either 
contrast reversal or inversion.
5.4.2.2 Comparison between dog experts and novices.
There was no indication that dog experts looking at dogs were more strongly 
affected by either contrast reversal or inversion than novices (Figure 5.4). This was 
confirmed by a 4-way mixed ANOVA directly comparing experts and novices as the 
between subjects factor, and including class (faces vs. dogs), orientation (upright vs. 
inverted), and contrast condition (both original vs. both reversed) as within subjects 
factors. The ANOVA showed no 4-way interaction involving experience,
F(l,33) = 1.87,/? > .18, and the relevant 3-way interactions involving experience were 
also far from significant. In particular, the pattern of 2-way interaction between class 
and contrast condition (i.e., the larger contrast reversal effect for faces than dogs) did 
not differ between experts and novices, as demonstrated by the lack of class x contrast x 
experience interaction, F < 1; and the pattern of 2-way interaction between class and 
orientation condition (i.e., the larger inversion effect for faces than dogs) did not differ 
between experts and novices, as demonstrated by the lack of class x orientation x
experience interaction, F < 1. Thus, there was no evidence that dog experts developed
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contrast reversal or inversion effects for dogs that were any different from those found 
in novices.
The 4-way ANOVA did reveal two significant interactions involving expertise. 
First, collapsing over both contrast condition and orientation, there was a 2-way 
interaction between class and experience, F( 1,33) = 24.08,/? < .001. This is important 
in that it provides behavioural evidence of expertise in the dog experts. Recall that the 
overall levels of performance are not directly comparable, because the dog experts were 
older and also given more time. However, despite the fact that the (older) dog experts 
were significantly poorer than the (younger) novices with faces (experts = 63 %, 
novices = 69 %; f(33) = 2.40, p < .05), the experts tended to be better than the novices 
with dogs (experts = 75 %, novices = 69 %; f(33) = 1.93, p = .06). This pattern was also 
confirmed when the upright both original contrast condition was considered alone, 
namely the condition for which dog experts should have most expertise. There was 
again a class x experience interaction, F(l, 33) = 6.89, p < .02, reflecting poorer 
performance in experts than novices for faces (experts = 76 %, novices = 85 %,
/(18.88) = 2.26, p < .05, with degrees of freedom adjusted for unequal variance), but 
somewhat better performance in experts than novices for dogs (experts = 73 %, novices 
= 69%, t< 1).
The second interaction from the 4-way ANOVA was that, collapsing over class 
and orientation, there was a 2-way contrast x experience interaction, F(l, 33) = 22.22, 
p < .001. As can be seen in Figure 5.4, this reflects the fact that experts showed slightly 
smaller contrast reversal effects than novices, for both faces and dogs, and in both 
orientation conditions. This result is of little interest in itself. More important is the 
finding that when upright dogs are considered alone, the contrast reversal effect (both 
original -  both reversed) did not differ between experts and novices, /(33) = 1.81, 
p > .07, and indeed the non-significant trend was towards a smaller contrast reversal 
effect for dog experts. The result was the same when experts with more than 20 years’ 
experience were considered, with novices again tending to show a larger contrast 
reversal effect, /(28) = 2.02, p = .053.
5.4.2.3 Correlations with experience for experts.
Within the expert group, a scatter-plot of expertise against the contrast reversal 
effect (see Figure 5.5) showed no relationship between size of the effect for upright
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dogs and years of experience, r = 16, p > .5. There was also no relationship with
number of dogs seen, r = -. 10, p > .7.
novices
years of experience with dogs
Figure 5.5. Experiment 8: Scatter plot of the size of the contrast reversal effect 
(both original % correct - both reversed % correct) for dogs versus the number of 
years experience. Formatting as in Figure 5.3.
5.4.3 Experiment 8 - Discussion
In a same-different identity judgement task, dog experts were affected by both 
contrast reversal and inversion for faces, replicating previous results (Chapter 4; Kemp 
et al., 1990). For dogs, however, experts showed no effect of either contrast reversal or 
orientation. Further, amount of experience was not related to the size of the contrast 
reversal effect, and results for experts and novices did not differ in any way that 
suggested larger contrast reversal or inversion effects in experts.
Experts and novices differed in only two ways. Experts were slightly less
sensitive to contrast reversal than novices and this applied to all stimuli (faces, dogs, 
upright, inverted), rather than showing a greater contrast effect restricted to upright dogs 
as would be predicted by the expertise hypothesis. Secondly, dog experts performed
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relatively better with dogs than with faces as compared to novices, confirming their 
expertise via behavioural performance.
In conclusion, results of Experiment 8 show that, while experts had enhanced 
overall performance with their objects-of-expertise as compared to novices, standard 
patterns of “face-specific” processing did not emerge for labradors. Of the studies to 
previously test contrast reversal with expertise, only Gauthier et al. (1998) found an 
effect with greeble experts. Nederhouser, et al. (2002), conversely, found no effect of 
contrast with blob experts. In the present result, dog experts were if anything slightly 
less affected by contrast reversal than novices, even though the stimuli were natural 
objects, and of a class where shape-from-shading is potentially useful.
As a final point, inversion effects were also tested in this experiment. In the 
present experiment, unlike in Experiment 7, performance for faces and dogs was 
equivalent in dog experts in the upright orientation (see white bars in Figure 5.4). 
Despite this fact, face-size inversion effects for dogs were not found. This argues that a 
failure to equate performance for upright faces and dogs cannot explain the results of 
Experiment 7.
5.5 Experiment 9 -  Composite Effect
Experiment 9 was a direct test of holistic processing using the composite test 
(Young et al., 1987). The task was simultaneous matching, as suitable for unfamiliar 
faces and dogs, and results from aligned and unaligned composites were contrasted (i.e., 
the same task and comparisons as for the novices tested in Chapter 4, Experiment 6). 
Composites were made so that the half-to-compare (e.g., forehead) could be the same or 
different, but the half-to-ignore (e.g., chin) was always different. For the novices, in 
Chapter 4, for upright faces it was harder to correctly say that the half-to-compare was 
the same if the two halves were aligned than if they were unaligned. For inverted faces, 
and for dogs (both upright and inverted) there was no difference between aligned and 
unaligned conditions. That is, the composite effect (i.e., holistic processing) occurred 
only for upright faces, and not for dogs or inverted faces.
For experts, the composite test has only previously been used with greebles. No
reliable evidence of a composite effect was found (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Gauthier et
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al., 1998). This is the first test of holistic processing using the composite paradigm in 
real-world experts. For face stimuli, results are predicted to be the same for dog experts 
as for novices. That is, accuracy should be lower for aligned than unaligned trials but 
only in the upright orientation. The question of interest is then whether dog experts 
show a composite effect for dogs. A lack of composite effect, and thus the same results 
as for novices, would indicate no holistic processing for objects-of-expertise. In 
contrast, a composite effect (aligned harder than unaligned) for dogs, and a 
corresponding interaction with level of experience, would indicate that objects-of- 
expertise are holistically processed. As in the previous chapter, the focus will be on the 
“same” trials where the predictions are clear.
5.5.1 Experiment 9 - Method
The method was the same as for novices (Chapter 4, Experiment 6) with the 
following changes. Expert subjects were given extra time to view the stimuli, adjusted 
for each subject as in Experiment 8 (contrast reversal test). Times per trial ranged from 
650-800 ms and, as with Experiment 8, longer times were used for older experts. After 
testing 12 experts it was noticed that some had a strong bias to respond same rather than 
different, particularly for dogs, meaning that scores in some of the conditions of interest 
were approaching ceiling. Two methods to overcome this were tried. The first was to 
give subjects longer to view the stimuli. This was used with one subject (850 ms) but 
did not remove bias. A version of the experiment was then created which included 
feedback (a beep on incorrect responses) to discourage bias. This was pilot tested with 
five novice subjects similar in characteristics to those described in Chapter 4 (at 600 ms 
to match the original novices). These five showed less bias than the original novices. 
Thus, the last two experts were tested with auditory feedback. As the pilot subjects also 
showed general improvement, time for the last two experts was reduced again to 650 ms 
and 600 ms respectively. Note that the primary comparison is between aligned and 
unaligned conditions which is fully within subjects. Thus, these procedural differences 
between subjects cannot affect the presence or otherwise of a composite effect.
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5.5.2 Experiment 9 - Results
Accuracy in matching halves (percentage of “same” responses for same-identity 
trials, and percentage of “different” responses for different-identity trials) was 
calculated for each subject for each condition (results are presented in Table 5.4 
separated by half-to-match). A 4-way repeated measures ANOVA showed that patterns 
differed across same and different trials with a significant 4-way interaction between 
stimulus class, orientation, alignment, and trial type, F(l, 14) = 5.23, MSE = 26.27, 
p < .05. From a theoretical perspective, there are clear predictions corresponding to a 
composite effect for same trials, but not for different trials (see Chapter 4); Figure 5.6 
gives the results for same trials for both faces and dogs. Results of the two sets of young 
adult novices tested in Chapter 4 (Experiment 6a & 6b) are provided for comparison.
5.5.2.1 Results for dog experts.
For the dog experts (Figure 5.6a), a 3-way repeated measures ANOVA (class x 
alignment x orientation for same trials) revealed a non-significant 3-way interaction,
F(l, 14) = 1.75, MSE = 28.04, p >.2, but a significant 2-way interaction between 
orientation and alignment, F( 1, 14) = 12.43, MSE = 11.33,p < .01, and a 2-way 
interaction between class and alignment that approached significance, F(l, 14) = 3.78, 
MSE = 15.93,p = .072. Figure 5.6a indicates that these results reflect a pattern in which 
there was a composite effect only for upright faces. To assess possible composite effects 
for each stimulus class directly, dogs and faces were analysed separately. For faces, a 2- 
way ANOVA confirmed a significant interaction between alignment and orientation, 
F(l, 14) = 7.54, MSE = 23.60, p < .02. A priori t-tests showed that accuracy was 
significantly lower for aligned trials than unaligned trials for upright faces, /(14) = 3.24, 
p < .01, but not for inverted faces, t < 1. Thus, as expected, there was a significant 
composite effect for upright faces but not inverted faces.
For dogs, there was no orientation x alignment interaction, F < 1, or main effects 
of either alignment or orientation, Fs < 1. A priori t-tests also showed no differences 
between aligned and unaligned trials, either for upright dogs, t < 1, or inverted dogs 
?(14) = 1.44, p > .15 (the small trend was in the reverse direction for a composite 
effect). Thus, dog experts showed no evidence of a composite effect for dogs in either 
orientation.
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Table 5.4. Experiment 9: Mean accuracy (SEM) in dog experts for the composite task 
shown separately for (a) same and (b) different trials, and within each, by class, 
orientation, half-to-compare, and alignment. Results from Experiment 6a & 6b are also 
shown.
a) Same trials
_____________Faces____________. _____________Dogs____________.
Top half Bottom half Top half Bottom half .
Aligned Unalign Aligned Unalign Aligned Unalign Aligned Unalign
Dog Experts 
Upright 79.1 82.1 79.6 88.8 90.0 90.2 85.6 86.8
(3.1) (3.9) (3.4) (2.0) (2.6) (1.8) (2.4) (2.3)
Inverted 86.8 86.7 85.2 83.8 92.4 90.6 84.7 84.4
(2.9) (2.9) (2.4) (2.9) (1.9) (2.2) (3.5) (4.3)
Novices (6b) 
Upright 80.6 85.3 82.8 86.4 90.2 87.8 84.1 84.8
(2.9) (2.7) (3.2) (3.3) (2.4) (2.9) (3.7) (4.2)
Inverted 85.9 84.1 81.2 83.6 90.7 90.8 86.6 84.8
(2.9) (3.6) (3.9) (3.8) (1.7) (1-6) (3.2) (3.8)
Novices (6a) 
Upright 87.1 88.6 83.8 83.9
(1.8) (1.5) (2.3) (2.4)
Inverted - - - 84.5 84.5 79.5 78.6
(2.3) (2.7) (2.7) (2.8)
b) Different trials
Faces Dogs
Tod half Bottom half . Tod half Bottom half
Aligned Unalign Aligned Unalign Aligned Unalign Aligned Unalign
Dog Experts 
Upright 69.8 66.9 69.1 61.6 71.3 74.0 44.4 46.7
(6.0) (5.7) (5.5) (4.8) (4.0) (4.0) (6.1) (6.0)
Inverted 59.1 55.4 56.9 56.4 63.6 59.9 42.4 43.3
(6.6) (6.4) (6.3) (6.5) (5.5) (5.8) (6.2) (5.9)
Novices (6b)
Upright 80.2 75.6 69.6 63.9 67.2 71.2 55.0 58.0
(3.5) (3.2) (5.1) (5.3) (4.2) (4.1) (5.2) (5.2)
Inverted 68.0 66.7 58.0 55.3 58.6 60.5 55.2 54.5
(3.6) (3.9) (5.1) (5.2) (5.5) (5.5) (5.4) (5.3)
Novices (6a)
Upright - - - 74.2 74.0 64.6 65.6
(2.9) (3.0) (4.4) (4.2)
Inverted - - - 67.8 69.0 64.4 61.9
(2.9) (3.2) (3.5) (3.9)
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Figure 5.6. Experiment 9: Accuracy to compare target-half of a pair of 
composites (simultaneous presentation same-different task). Results are for 
"same" trials only, collapsed across top-half-to-compare and bottom-half-to- 
compare trials. These are shown for (a) experts and (b) both groups of novices 
from Chapter 4 (Experiment 6). Error bars are appropriate for the within subjects 
comparison of aligned and unaligned conditions (i.e., ± 1 SEM of the difference 
scores). *** p < .001, * p < .05, ns = p  > .05. The predicted pattern for a 
composite effect, indicating holistic processing, is that accuracy should be lower 
for aligned than unaligned trials.
These analyses were conducted collapsing over top-half-to-compare and bottom- 
half-to-compare to maximise power. Results for top and bottom halves were also 
analysed separately. For faces, the trends described above were present for both halves
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with the only substantive difference being that the composite effect for upright faces 
was significant only for bottom halves (chins), 7( 1 4 ) = 3.21, /?< .0 1 , and was in the 
predicted direction but did not reach significance for top halves, r( 14) = 1.69, p > . 1. For 
dogs there was no composite effect, either for top-half-to-compare (7 < 1 upright;
7( 1 4 ) = 1.97, p > .06 inverted in the reverse direction to a composite effect) or bottom- 
half-to-compare (7 < 1 upright; 7 < 1 inverted). Thus, it was not the case that a composite 
effect for dogs had been hidden by collapsing over half-to-compare.
5.5.2.2 Were experts too close to ceiling?
A possible concern with the lack of a composite effect for dogs was that experts’ 
mean performance on same trials was closer to ceiling than might be desired (Figure 
5.6). To demonstrate that the lack of a difference between aligned and unaligned trials 
was not occurring for subjects further from ceiling, a sub-set of experts whose accuracy 
was 90% or less on the unaligned upright dogs condition were chosen for analysis (see 
Figure 5.7). This criterion was chosen because (a) if holistic processing were to occur 
for dogs accuracy would be higher for unaligned trials than aligned trials (thus shifting 
any effect further away from ceiling); and (b) theoretically, holistic processing would 
occur for upright dogs if anywhere as this is the orientation in which dog experts usually 
experience dogs. Data were collapsed over top and bottom halves, with mean 
performance for upright unaligned dogs (84.7%) now comfortably below ceiling 
(indeed it was slightly lower than the 85.4% for faces in the original all-experts 
analysis). As shown in Figure 5.7, Results did not differ in any important way from 
those reported above. Most importantly the a priori t-test comparing unaligned and 
aligned trials for upright dogs was not significant, 7 < 1, while the effect for upright 
faces was still present, 7(9) = 2.49, p < .05. Thus, the finding of no composite effect for 
dog experts looking at dogs cannot be attributed to ceiling effects.
5.5.2.3 Comparison between dog experts and novices.
Experts were compared to each of the two groups of novices from Chapter 4 
(Experiment 6) in turn. Comparisons were only made for dogs because of large 
differences in variance between the novices and experts for faces. There was no 
suggestion that composite effects for dogs were any larger in experts than in novices.
For dogs, there were no main effects or interactions with experience for either group, all
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ps > . 11. A priori t-tests comparing the size of the composite effect (unaligned - 
aligned) for upright dogs showed no difference between experts and either group of 
novices, t < 1 in both cases. It is worth noting that, as intended, overall accuracy on 
dogs for experts and novices was very similar (collapsed over orientation: experts = 
88.%; novices group 1 = 84%; novices group 2 = 88%)9.
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Figure 5.7. Experiment 9: Results for the aligned and unaligned composite dogs 
(collapsed over half-to-compare) for a sub-set of experts (n=10) experts whose accuracy was 
90% or less on the unaligned upright dogs condition. Formatting as for Figure 5.6.
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5.5.2.4 Correlations with experience for experts.
A scatter plot for the size of the composite effect for upright dogs against the 
number of years’ experience is presented in Figure 5.8. This did not show any increase 
in the composite effect with increasing experience. Indeed, the non-significant trend 
was in the opposite direction, r = -.48, p = .069. This was also the case for the size of 
the composite effect compared to number of dogs seen, r = -.48, p = .070.
g
Behavioural effects of expertise as found in Experiment 8 would not be expected here given that the 
task involved decisions about half dogs.
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Figure 5.8. Experiment 9: Scatter plot of the size of the composite effect 
(unaligned correct % - aligned % correct) for dogs versus the number of years 
experience. Each filled diamond represents one expert. The unfilled diamonds on 
the left represent averages for novice subjects (±1 SD) for each of the two groups 
tested (gpl = subjects in Experiment 6a, while gp2 = subjects in Experiment 6b).
5.5.3 Experiment 9 - Discussion
As expected, Experiment 9 revealed a composite effect for upright faces, and no 
composite effect for inverted faces, replicating previous findings (novices in Chapter 4; 
Carey & Diamond, 1994; Le Grand, et al., 2004; Young et ah, 1987). For dogs, in 
contrast, dog experts showed no sign of a composite effect even when the dogs were 
upright. There was also no difference between novices and experts, and if anything 
there was a slight negative correlation between level of expertise and the size of the 
composite effect for dogs. The composite effect is a particularly strong direct test of 
holistic processing (see Chapter 4). Thus, Experiment 9 shows that expertise does not 
produce holistic processing of labradors.
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5.6 General Discussion
The aim of the present studies was to assess whether many years of practice at 
discriminating individual labradors would lead to face-like processing of those 
labradors. The results of three experiments argue strongly that this does not occur, even 
with an average of 23 years’ experience. In a test of inversion effects on recognition 
memory, dog experts showed much smaller inversion effects for dogs than for faces, 
and their results did not differ from those of novices. In a test of the effects of contrast 
reversal, dog experts were affected much less by contrast reversal of dogs than of faces. 
Further, they showed, if anything, less of an effect of contrast reversal on dogs than did 
novices. Finally, in a direct test of holistic processing, using Young et al’s (1987) 
composite effect, dog experts holistically processed upright faces, but not inverted faces 
or dogs in either orientation. Results for dog experts looking at dogs again did not differ 
from those of novices. Further, in no case did the measure of face-like processing 
correlate with experience; a small but non-significant trend was found for the inversion 
effect (as might be expected) but there was none whatsoever for contrast reversal or the 
composite effect. The current studies provide strong evidence against the expertise 
hypothesis; that is, against the claim that extensive experience at making individual 
discriminations for any object class produces face-like processing.
5.6.1 Nature of the experts tested.
The present results are particularly strong because of the experts used. As noted 
in the introduction, not all experts make individual level discriminations on the basis of 
visual characteristics. Dog experts do (as do cat experts), whereas bird and flower 
experts, for example, do not. Further, the difference between Diamond and Carey’s 
(1986) Experiment 2, in which they did not find a face-sized inversion effect, and 
Experiment 3, in which they did, had suggested that experts must be expert with the 
particular sub-type (e.g., breed of dog) being used as stimuli. There is evidence that the 
current experts fulfilled this criterion. Empirical evidence came from Experiment 6, 
where experts were better with dogs than age-matched novices, and Experiment 7, 
where experts were relatively better with dogs than novices, despite being worse with 
faces. There was also anecdotal evidence from the fact that experts could recognise 
dogs as American versus Australian and as bred by a particular breeder. Dog experts are
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also a good choice of expert because dogs make a good comparison stimulus for faces: 
dogs are natural stimuli and, due to genetic variation, differences between individuals 
can occur in multiple locations all over the dog. This is more likely to encourage 
holistic processing than comparisons between individuals which only differ in terms of 
a few specific parts (e.g., greebles).
In terms of years of experience, there is also good reason to think that the 
experts in the present experiments had sufficient expertise to provide a fair test of the 
expertise hypothesis. The experts in these studies, as well as having more experience 
than those in many previous studies (see Table 5.2), had on average approximately the 
same number of years looking at dogs (mean experience = 23 years, mean age = 58 
years) as the younger novices (mean age = 22 years) had looking at faces. This may not, 
of course, mean that the dog experts had seen as many dogs as the dog novices had seen 
faces. However, it seems likely that the dog experts would have seen at least as many 
dogs as a school age child had seen faces. Literature on the development of face 
processing has shown holistic processing in 6-year-olds (composite effect, Carey & 
Diamond, 1994; part-whole effect, Tanaka et al., 1998; second order-relational 
processing, Gilchrist & McKone, 2003; Mondloch et al., 2002) and even 4-year-olds 
(part-whole effect, Pelicano & Rhodes 2003; second order-relational processing, 
McKone & Boyer, submitted). Thus, the present experts should easily have had 
sufficient expertise to test the hypothesis that expertise with a non-face object class will 
cause face-like processing to develop.
5.6.2 Comparison of the present results with previous studies.
The current finding, that expertise did not lead to a larger inversion effect for 
objects-of-expertise (in this case dogs) than that found in novices, is consistent with 
most of the previous literature (Gauthier et al, 1998; Gauthier, Skudlarski et al., 2000; 
Xu et al., 2004, when % correct is used as the measure). The inversion effect for dogs in 
experts was also much smaller than that for faces (consistent with references in the 
previous sentence as well as Bruyer & Crispeels, 1992, and Rossion et al., 2002, where 
small increases with expertise were found).
The only previous study that the current results are inconsistent with is 
Experiment 3 of Diamond and Carey (1986), where dog experts showed the same sized 
inversion effects for faces and dogs (of their breed of expertise). As noted above, the
experts in the current experiment were experts with the breed tested, but the same-sized
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effect was not found for faces and dogs even when a sub-group of experts with the same 
number of years’ experience as Diamond and Carey’s was used (30 years in the present 
study vs. 31 in theirs), or when performance for upright faces and upright dogs was 
matched (Experiment 8) as theirs was. So why was the face-sized inversion effect for 
dogs not replicated? As mentioned in the introduction and discussion of Experiment 7, 
the most likely explanation is that Diamond and Carey’s experts knew the individual 
dogs used as stimuli, and possibly even particular images of those dogs. The pictures 
used in Diamond and Carey’s study were acquired from the American Kennel Club, 
which was also the organization through which dog experts were contacted. It is thus 
entirely possible that those images formed part of the set used by the American Kennel 
Club to train judges. Being able to name images (or dogs) based on pre-experimental 
knowledge would increase memory performance but this would, at least initially, be 
specific to the orientation in which the images were learnt (cf., naming rotated object 
studies, for example, Jolicoeur, 1985). In the present study, in contrast, experts’ 
familiarity with particular dogs/images was tested, and it was ensured that none of the 
dog experts could correctly name any of the dogs. Overall, I suggest that the single 
finding of a face-size inversion effect for experts viewing objects-of-expertise can be 
better explained by specific familiarity than by generic expertise. Results from this 
paradigm do not, therefore, generally support the expertise hypothesis.
With respect to the composite task, the current studies provide the first test of 
this paradigm with a natural object class and the first test with real-world experts. The 
finding of no composite effect for dogs in dog experts is entirely consistent with the 
only previous studies of the composite effect in experts; that is, with the finding of no 
composite effect for greebles in greeble experts (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Gauthier et al., 
1998). The composite effect provides a stronger test of the expertise hypothesis than the 
size of the inversion effect, because the composite test directly assesses holistic 
processing. Further, as argued in Chapter 4, the composite effect is a particularly strong 
test of holistic processing as there is no composite effect for objects in non-experts 
rather than simply a smaller effect than occurs for faces (as in the part-whole task). 
Thus, the present result of no composite effect for dog experts looking at dogs, 
combined with the previous same result for greebles, suggests very strongly that generic 
expertise does not lead to holistic processing.
The effects of contrast reversal on objects-of-expertise have also not previously 
been tested for any natural stimulus class or real-world experts. The current finding of
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no effect of contrast reversal on objects-of-expertise is consistent with a previous 
finding of no effect of contrast reversal for blob experts (Nederhouser et al., 2002) but 
not with a finding of an effect for greeble experts (Gauthier et al., 1998). One difference 
between the studies is that both Nederhouser et al. and the present study used a 
matching task, whereas Gauthier et al. used a naming paradigm. However, given that 
matching produces a clear contrast reversal effect for faces, there seems no reason why 
it should not produce a contrast reversal effect for objects-of-expertise if one were there 
to be found.
Results from the present study are thus generally consistent with results from 
previous studies. This is true for all three paradigms tested.
5.6.3 Overall status of the expertise hypothesis.
The present results, as well as those of previous research strongly suggest that 
face-like processing, as tested on a range of behavioural tasks, is not simply a matter of 
extensive experience. In terms of previous behavioural studies the results are also 
consistent with findings from the part-whole effect. As reviewed in the introduction, 
part-whole effects are no larger for experts looking at their object-of-expertise than they 
are for novices. This has been tested for a range of manmade (car fronts, greebles) and 
natural objects (dog faces, biological cells). Of course, some aspects of cognitive 
processing for objects do change with expertise. For example, Rhodes and McLean 
(1990) showed that for bird experts, caricatures of very similar birds were recognised 
more quickly than “anti-caricatures”, but this difference was not apparent for novices 
(looking at more dissimilar birds). Similarly, experts show a downward shift in their 
level of classification compared to non-experts; that is, they are more likely to classify 
objects-of-expertise at a subordinate level rather than at the basic level (K. E. Johnson 
& Mervis, 1997; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991). However, the styles of processing which are 
special to faces in nonexperts -  holistic processing and particular sensitivity to shape 
from shading information -  do not seem to occur for objects-of-expertise.
There is also little support for the expertise hypothesis from neuropsychology 
and neuroimaging (fMRI, ERP and MEG). Neuropsychology suggests a double­
dissociation between the processing of faces and objects of expertise (Dixon et al., 
2002; Duchaine et al., 2004; McNeil & Warrington, 1993; Moscovitch et al., 1997). 
Similarly, neuroimaging suggests that the area of the brain used most specifically for 
face processing (the FFA) is still substantially less activated for objects-of-expertise
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than for faces (Grill-Spector et al., 2004) and that very few of the voxels in the area 
which are activated by objects-of-expertise are also activated by faces (Rhodes. Byatt et 
ah, 2004). Similarly, although there is a strong N170 response to some objects-of- 
expertise it is not in the same area of the brain as that found for faces (e.g., Rossion et 
al, 2002; Tanaka & Curran, 2001).
The conclusion that the available data does not support the expertise hypothesis 
may seem surprising to some readers, given that the current “Zeitgeist” is in favour of 
the expertise hypothesis. I see three general sources of confusion in this area. The first is 
that a number of critical results have been widely cited as supporting the expertise 
hypothesis when in fact their original results were much weaker than implied. In an 
extreme example, Elgar and Campbell (2001, p.29), discussing the face-specific of areas 
of the inferotemporal cortex, claim that Gauthier et al. (1999) have “shown that 
expertise in the (sub-categorical) identification of any visual material makes use of this 
substrate” (their emphasis). The study in question tested only one object class 
(greebles), and as discussed in the introduction more recent studies (Grill-Spector et al., 
2004; Rhodes, Byatt et al., 2004) have brought the results (and those of Gauthier, 
Skudlarski et al., 2000) into question. More moderately, Burgund and Marsolek (2000, 
note 4, p.489) cite Gauthier and Tarr (1997) as having shown “greater whole-based 
processing of the stimuli” with expertise; however, as detailed in the introduction to this 
chapter, part-whole effects for experts in Gauthier and Tarr (1997; or Gauthier & Tarr, 
2002; Gauthier et al., 1998) were not reliably larger than in novices. Le Grand, et al. 
(2004, p.768) similarly cite Gauthier and Tarr (2002) as having shown that greeble 
experts “show evidence of holistic processing in the composite task”. Again, as 
discussed in the introduction, there is no evidence of a composite effect in greeble 
experts.
Some studies have also been purely miscited. For example, Rouse, Donnelly, 
Hadwin, and Brown (2004, p.l) cite Gauthier, Skudlarski et al (2000) as evidence that 
“development brings an increasing ability to process faces configurally rather than in a 
piecemeal fashion”. Gauthier, Skudlarski et al (2000) studied whether activation in the 
FFA was higher for objects-of-expertise in bird and car experts than in novices, and did 
not directly measure either configural/holistic processing or development. Watanabe, 
Kakigi, & Puce (2003, p.879) cite Valentine (1988) as evidence that “the face inversion 
effect has been attributed to our ‘expertise’ with a highly homogeneous class of 
stimulus seen in one orientation in everyday life”. In fact, Valentine noted that the
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evidence available to him was inconclusive. Haggbloom & Warnick (2003, p.579) cite 
Gauthier and Tarr (1997) as one source of evidence for the statement that “an acquired 
expertise for the recognition of non-face stimuli produces a large inversion effect”. The 
sentence seems to suggest that inversion effects increase with expertise. I have no 
problem with the statement in general, but Gauthier and Tarr (1997) did not test 
inversion effects (they tested the part-whole effect in both orientations).
The second source of confusion is that, as noted above, there are some aspects of 
object processing which do change with experience, but these are not the aspects which 
are special to face processing. Mentioned above were caricature effects, and a 
downward shift in level of classification. Another aspect of object processing that 
changes with extensive practice is inversion effects. For objects these generally 
disappear rapidly with practice (for review, see McKone & Grenfell, 1999). Conversely, 
inverted faces are still processed differently from upright faces even after extensive 
practice (as shown in Chapter 3).
Finally, there is also confusion about what “holistic’ processing means. An 
important example of this is the paper by Gauthier et al. (2003) in which holistic 
processing is defined as “obligatory processing of all features of an object” (p.428).
This paper has been cited as showing a composite effect for objects-of-expertise. Le 
Grand et al (2004) cite Gauthier et al. (2003) as having found “behavioural interference 
of car processing on holistic face processing, as indicated by an attenuated composite 
face effect”. In their paper Gauthier et al. presented car “composites” made by 
combining the top half of one car with the bottom half of another. These were always 
presented aligned, but either with the top half upright or inverted. The task was a 
sequential same/different matching task (on the bottom half). Gauthier et al. measured 
“holistic” processing for cars or faces as the d’ for trials where the top and bottom 
halves of both stimuli in a pair were the same or different (“consistent” trials), minus 
the d’ for trials where the top halves of stimuli were the same or different but the bottom 
half of both was different (“inconsistent” trials). For normal cars this “holistic” 
processing was 0.56 in non-experts, for cars with the top half inverted (“transformed”) 
this was 0.49 in non-experts. The calculations for faces are not available; instead, only a 
measure of the amount that car processing interferes with face processing is given. This 
data seems to suggest that transformed cars interfere less with face processing than 
normal cars (but the results are very difficult to interpret).
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Although this task may appear similar to the composite paradigm, there are 
some very important differences. First, there is no unaligned condition equivalent to that 
used by Young et al (1987). Although inverting one half instead of off-setting it means 
that there is less difference between aligned and “transformed” conditions in the visual 
extent of the stimulus, it also means that instead of two (upright or inverted) half cars 
(or faces) being presented, half an upright car and half an inverted car are presented. 
Thus, whereas in Young et al. (1987) the aligned and unaligned conditions are 
equivalent in all respects except for the relative location of the halves, in Gauthier et al. 
(2003) they are not. If two things are presented in opposite orientations they are less 
likely to compete for attention than if both are presented in the same orientation. Thus, 
the condition in which the top half of the car is inverted (the transformed condition) 
might be easier than the condition in which both halves are upright without any true 
holistic processing (i.e., perceptual integration) occurring. Gauthier et al. also did not 
include a condition with faces transformed in the same manner, making it impossible to 
say empirically whether the effect for cars resembles an effect for faces.
5.6.4 What is the origin of holistic processing for faces?
Taking the present results and the previous literature together, I have argued that 
the expertise hypothesis is not supported by the empirical evidence. I therefore suggest 
that the domain-specificity hypothesis should be accepted as the only currently viable 
alternative. However, if holistic processing of faces is not explained by the large amount 
of expertise that we have with faces, an alternative explanation is needed as to the origin 
of holistic processing only for upright faces; in that domain-specificity is not an 
explanation in itself.
Infants prefer face-like stimuli to those which are less face-like (M. H. Johnson, 
Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991; Mondloch et al., 1999; Morton & Johnson, 1991). 
They are also able to tell their mother’s face from a strangers, although in newborns this 
may be based on hairline (Pascalis, de Schonen, Morton, Deruelle, & Fabregrenet,
1995). By the time infants are 7-months old they integrate information from the internal 
and external aspects of the face (Cohen & Cashon, 2001). Further, there seems to be a 
critical period somewhere in the first three to six months for developing holistic 
processing of faces (Le Grand et al., 2001,2003, 2004). Thus, it seems likely that either 
there is some innate basis to face recognition and/or that a period of exposure to faces in 
early infancy is essential to the normal development of holistic processing.
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5.6.5 Objects of expertise and a critical period for developing holistic processing.
I have argued that current research strongly suggests that holistic/face-like 
processing cannot occur for non-face objects after many years of experience. 
Importantly, while the expertise gained with dogs by subjects in the present study often 
began in childhood (as early as four years in one case), it was never gained in early 
infancy. Does this mean that holistic processing (of the kind that occurs for faces) can 
never occur for objects-of-expertise?
As noted above, there seems to be a critical period for developing holistic 
processing of faces. It is possible that this critical period is in fact a critical period for 
developing holistic processing in general, but that faces are the only things which babies 
get to see very much. Very few people encourage babies younger than six months to 
spend extensive amounts of time looking at lots of individual dogs or other non-face 
objects which share a first-order-configuration. Whether it is possible to develop 
holistic processing of non-face objects if these were seen extensively in the critical 
period is not something that can ethically be tested in humans. One possibility would be 
to train monkeys with individual exemplars of an object class from birth. However, this 
would first require showing that monkeys use holistic processing for faces (e.g., by 
demonstrating that they show a composite effect), which has not yet been tested.
Overall, evidence does not support the expertise hypothesis in the current form 
proposed by Diamond and Carey (1986; also see Gauthier & Tarr, 1997, 2002, etc.) 
namely that experience gained in late childhood/adulthood is sufficient to produce 
holistic processing for objects-of-expertise. Extensive further testing is needed before it 
can be established whether expertise for non-face objects could develop if seen in early 
infancy during the same critical period as for developing face processing. Regardless of 
the outcome of such studies, in any practical sense, in normal human infants holistic 
processing is likely to be restricted to faces.
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CHAPTER 6: ARE SOME DIMENSIONS IN FACE-SPACE MORE ADAPTABLE
THAN OTHERS?
6.1 Overview
In the present chapter, I turn to a rather different set of questions about the 
effects of experience than those addressed in previous chapters. Here, I am concerned 
with the effects of quite short term experience (2 mins of adaptation), and the way in 
which upright faces are represented as individuals in face-space. I am also interested in 
whether the effects of short-term experience interact with previous longer-term 
experience; in particular whether short-term experience interacts with the way in which 
longer-term experience has tuned the dimensions of face-space to suit the range of faces 
seen.
Previous researchers have shown that adaptation to distorted faces can be 
understood in terms of changing the norm of face-space. Here, for the first time, I ask 
whether different dimensions of face-space might be differently adaptable. Two 
distortion types associated with different variability in the natural range of inputs to 
face-space (i.e., different required coding ranges) are contrasted: symmetrically 
changing the height of both eyes together (large variability/range required) and 
asymmetrically changing the height difference between eyes (small variability/range 
required). Results showed that the symmetric distortion produced a greater aftereffect 
than the asymmetric distortion when distortion level of the adaptor was moderate or 
extreme with respect to required coding range. Aftereffects were similar in magnitude 
when the adaptor was within the required coding range for symmetric deviations. 
Additional results argue that, with the relational (feature spacing) distortions, the 
aftereffects for upright faces arose largely from the face system: adaptation did not 
transfer across orientations (upright to inverted, or vice versa). I consider the results in 
terms of a two-pool broadband neural model for coding dimensions in face-space.
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6.2 Introduction.
Adaptation aftereffects occur throughout the visual system, from early vision 
(e.g., colour processing) to high-level vision (e.g., face recognition). Aftereffects often 
take the form of a shift in perception in the opposite direction to the adaptor with 
respect to some perceptual centre point or “norm”. For example, in colour vision 
adaptation to red makes white (the original perceptual centre point on a red-green 
dimension) appear green. For faces, norm-based aftereffects have been shown for sex, 
ethnicity and expression (Hsu & Young, 2004; Webster, Kaping, Mizokami, & 
Duhamel, 2004).
Of direct relevance to manipulations used in the current study, adaptation may 
also affect face shape. Webster and MacLin (1999; see also MacLin & Webster, 2001) 
showed that looking at a face contracted around a vertical midline (and/or a horizontal 
midline) for 2 mins made a normal face look expanded around the midline, and vice 
versa. Adaptation to an undistorted (normal) face had no effect on perception. Rhodes, 
Jeffery, Watson, Clifford, and Nakayama (2003) found that adapting to a radially 
expanded face made an unaltered face appear contracted. In all cases these aftereffects 
generalised over changes in size and/or position between adaptor and test face (see also 
Zhao & Chubb, 2001). Rhodes et al. (2003) further demonstrated that adaptation could 
generalise over task (normality vs. attractiveness judgments). Across studies, methods 
used to assess aftereffects have included adjusting the face until it looked normal, rating 
faces for normality/attractiveness, and determining the minimum detectable distortion 
level in a normal-distorted decision.
In low-level and mid-level vision, adaptation has well established links to neural 
processing mechanisms (e.g. Clifford, Wenderoth, & Spehar, 2000; Kourtzi & 
Kanwisher, 2001; Smith & Edgar, 1994). It has been suggested (e.g., Leopold, O'Toole, 
Vetter, & Blanz, 2001; Rhodes et al., 2003) that adaptation may similarly provide 
insight into neural mechanisms of face processing. In the present chapter I am 
concerned with the implications of adaptation studies for understanding the 
representation of individual faces in “face-space”.
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6.2.1 Adaptation and face-space.
Face-space is a common heuristic used to explain the coding of face identity 
(e.g., Valentine, 1991; Valentine & Bruce, 1986). In this approach, each individual face 
is coded in terms of its position on a series of underlying dimensions. The average face 
is located at the centre of face-space, and atypical individuals lie towards the periphery. 
The dimensions of face-space are usually presumed to be built up from experience 
rather than innately specified.
It is currently unclear which aspects of faces are coded as face-space 
dimensions. In computational models based on Principal Components Analysis (e.g., 
Atick, Griffin, & Redlich, 1996; O'Toole, Abdi, Deffenbacher, & Valentin, 1995), the 
dimensions are the “eigenfaces” which explain variance in an input set of pixel-intensity 
coded images standardised for face size and orientation. These eigenfaces code 
information from across the full area of the face, and early eigenfaces (those explaining 
the most variance between individuals) tend to represent very general variables such as 
face sex, face fullness, and so on. From behavioural findings (described later), however, 
one might also suspect that aspects such as spatial relations between face features (e.g., 
how high the eyes are relative to nose or mouth position) and/or local feature shape 
information (e.g., the size of the nose) could form useful dimensions of subjects' face- 
space.
The idea of adaptation within face-space was raised by Leopold, et al (2001; see 
also Rhodes, Jeffery & Leopold, 2004, described in Rhodes, Robbins et al., in press). 
Starting from each of four individual faces, Leopold et al. created four corresponding 
"anti-faces". To do so, a large number of faces were first averaged. The original 
individual (e.g., Bill) was then morphed on a trajectory towards this average face, with 
the morphing continued past the average to create the anti-face (i.e., anti-Bill). 
Theoretically, anti-Bill then lies at an equal distance from the centre of face-space as 
Bill, but in the opposite direction on all dimensions. For example, if Bill had eyebrows 
which were 20% more bushy than the average and lips 15% narrower than the average, 
anti-Bill would have eyebrows 20% less bushy than the average and lips 15% wider. 
Results showed that, after adapting to these anti-faces for 5 secs, subjects perceived the 
average face as somewhat like the original individual (e.g., adapting to anti-Bill made 
the average face look like Bill). This was interpreted in terms of shifting the norm of 
face-space along the trajectory between the anti-face and the original.
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In the present study, the first aim was to develop upon the theoretical link 
between adaptation and face-space. The Leopold et al. (2001) manipulation varies 
multiple aspects of facial appearance simultaneously (face width, lip thickness, distance 
between the eyes, etc). I was interested in whether it would be possible to observe 
adaptation for distortions that change a single aspect of the face at a time (e.g., shifting 
the eyes while leaving the rest of the face unaltered), and which might correspond to 
relatively simple dimensions in face-space. Further, I wished to ascertain whether some 
dimensions in face-space might be more sensitive to adaptation than others -  that is, 
whether it is easier to temporarily shift the norm of face-space in some directions than 
in others -  and whether this would relate to the range of faces which need to be coded 
on given dimensions.
6.2.2 Contrasting two dimensions with different variability in face-space.
Both manipulations used here involved changing eye height within the face. 
Adaptation was contrasted for two different forms of eye-height distortion, differing in 
the range of stimulus values that face-space might be expected to code.
The two types of changes contrasted are illustrated in Figure 6.1. In the 
symmetric eve-height distortion, faces were altered by moving the two eyes up together 
(“positive’" direction), or the two eyes down together (“negative” direction). An 
adaptation aftereffect for this distortion would manifest as, for example, the original 
undistorted face appearing to have its eyes too low after adapting to an eyes-up face. 
Readers can test this phenomenon for themselves in the figure. In the asymmetric eve- 
height distortion, the alteration involved moving either the right eye up and the left eye 
down (“positive” direction), or vice versa (“negative” direction). The amount of 
distortion in each face was defined by the amount of change per eve; thus, a “50 pixel- 
per-eye” symmetric distortion (e.g., 50 pixel right eye shift up, and 50 pixel left eye 
shift up) was matched for total metric deviation to the “50 pixel-per-eye” asymmetric 
distortion (e.g., 50 pixel right eye shift up, and 50 pixel left eye shift down)1.
1 50 pixels in these stimuli corresponds to approximately 19% of the hairline to chin distance.
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Symmetrie positive
undistorted individual
Symmetrie negative
Asymmetrie positive
Asymmetrie negative
Figure 6.1. Examples of the most extreme distortions (±50 pixels-per-eye) on 
Bill, as well as an undistorted face (centre). The effect of adaptation can be 
observed by scanning one of the distorted faces for 30 s and then looking at the 
undistorted face.
The symmetric and asymmetric eye-height distortions were chosen because they 
correspond to aspects of faces that have different amounts of variability in real world 
images, and thus might be expected to require a different coding range of eye-height 
values in face-space. Physical measurements of faces show that the mean height of both 
eyes together in the face (i.e., symmetric changes) varies quite considerably across 
individuals. For Caucasians, the distance of eyes to hairline in young adult males has a 
standard deviation of 7.5 mm (around a mean of 67.1 mm), and the distance from eyes 
to chin has a standard deviation of 5.7 mm (around a mean of 124.7 mm; Farkas, 
Hreczko, & Katie, 1994). Further, up-down head rotation (e.g., nodding) also 
substantially changes the apparent position of eyes with respect to other features. In 
contrast, the asymmetry between eyes varies to a much smaller degree. Although 69%
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of the adult males measured by Hreczko and Farkas (1994) had some asymmetry 
between the height of their left and right eyes, the standard deviation was only 1.1 mm 
(around a mean difference of 2.8 mm). There is also no three-dimensional head 
movement that can increase the physical asymmetry between the eyes (e.g., tilting the 
head sideways leaves the distance from each eye to the hairline unchanged). Presuming 
that face-space is tuned to efficiently code the range of inputs to which it has been 
exposed, I would then expect that the dimension associated with symmetric eye-height 
differences would code a large range of eye-height values, while the dimension 
associated with asymmetric eye-height differences would code a smaller range of eye- 
height values 2.
A previous study (McKone, Aitkin, & Edwards, submitted) has tested subjects' 
perception of symmetric and asymmetric eye-height distortions in the unadapted state. 
For the symmetric distortion, subjects judged a relatively broad range of eye heights 
around the original as all “normaf’ or “just like Bill”. For the asymmetric distortion, 
subjects accepted a much smaller range of eye heights as “normal” or “just like Bill”. 
Subjects gave a normality or identity rating across 21 levels of distortion ranging from 
-50 to 0 to +50 pixels-per-eye. As face deviation increased away from 0 (in either 
direction), subjects initially perceived no change in normality/identity from the 
undistorted face. The critical finding was that the width of this “below threshold” region 
was substantially greater for symmetric eye-height distortions (4.89 pixels away from 
zero in each direction) than for asymmetric eye-height distortions (1.79 pixels in each 
direction). Outside this range, ratings were related to physical deviation in a logarithmic 
fashion. That is, for a unit increase in deviation, changes in perception were large 
immediately past the threshold, but were smaller towards extreme deviation levels (this 
theshold-plus-log curve shape is known as Fechner's law, an extension of Weber's law 
3). The slope of the logarithmic section was shallower for symmetric than asymmetric 
distortions, again indicating weaker sensitivity to deviations in the former case.
McKone et al. (submitted) argued that these results could be interpreted in terms 
of different variability, and thus different coding ranges, associated with different
" By the term “dimensions” I do not necessarily mean to imply that these are “core dimensions” or 
“cardinal axes” (see General Discussion); instead, readers should think of them merely as a line passing 
through the centre of face-space.
A standard example of Fechner’s law (1966, 1860) from early vision is the relationship between 
physical and perceived light intensity. Here, a very small amount of light added to complete darkness is 
not perceived at all (the below-threshold region). Once above threshold, perceived intensity increases 
logarithmically with physical intensity (e.g., lighting a single candle has more perceptual effect in a semi- 
darkened room than in bright sunlight).
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dimensions in face-space. This is illustrated in Figure 6.2. Presuming that subjects' face- 
space is sensitive to the range of previously experienced faces, exemplar faces should 
be more variably placed on a height-of-both-eves-together line drawn through face- 
space than on a (presumably orthogonal) line of height-difference-between-eves. To 
explain the existence of a subthreshold region, McKone et al. argued that 
normality/identity judgements are made taking this variability into account; for 
example, for a face to be perceived as “normal”, it does not have to be exactly average, 
but instead must fall within the normal range.
A Height difference 
between eyes
Mean height ^  ®  ™
of both eyes
y
Figure 6.2. Distributions of exemplars (black dots) in face-space along 
dimensions corresponding to symmetric distortion (mean height of both eyes) and 
asymmetric distortion (height difference between eyes). Note the greater 
variability in exemplar placement for symmetric (after McKone et al., submitted).
6.2.3 Does it matter where the adaptor is placed?
If a larger range of values is coded in face-space for symmetric than asymmetric 
eye height, a larger range of values might also be adaptable for symmetric than 
asymmetric distortions. Previous studies have tested only one adaptor position. In 
particular the stimulus used as the adaptor has been the most extreme deviation level 
within the stimulus set. The second aim of the present study was to test several adaptor 
positions, corresponding to different distances from the unadapted norm.
A standard model of norm-based adaptation (see General Discussion) would 
predict that aftereffects should be greater at more extreme values within the coded 
range, but that outside that range there would be no adaptation. If the range of values
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coded is greater for symmetric than asymmetric eye height, there might thus be adaptor 
positions for which the aftereffect is larger for symmetric than asymmetric distortions. 
Thus, predictions can be made both about the size of the aftereffect at a particular 
adaptor position, and about the range of adaptor positions which will produce an 
aftereffect.
6.2.4 How much of adaptation for faces comes from the face-specific system?
Adaptation to distorted faces can arise from multiple stages of the visual 
processing stream. These include early-, and mid-level vision in addition to both face 
and object areas within high-level vision. The third aim of the present study was to 
demonstrate that the adaptation observed had an origin within the face recognition 
system, at least when the faces were upright.
A contribution to the aftereffect from early retinotopic areas is usually ruled out 
by changing size and/or retinal location between adaptor and test. Watson and Clifford 
(2003) also showed that adaptation was not retinotopic by showing that adaptation to 
faces expanded or contracted along the vertical midline followed the orientation of the 
face stimulus (45° to the right versus 45° to the left) rather than the absolute direction of 
the distortion.
A contribution from mid-level shape-processing is more difficult to exclude. 
Adaptation has been demonstrated for several simple shape properties. For aspect ratio 
(i.e., direction of elongation), Regan and Hamstra (1992) showed that adapting to a 
vertically stretched rectangle made a square appear horizontally stretched. This effect 
transferred across size and also shape type -  adapting to a vertically stretched rectangle 
made a circle appear as a horizontally flattened ellipse -  indicating that the effects 
originated from post-retinotopic areas of visual cortex. Adapting to a square (i.e. the 
perceptual centre point) had almost no effect on perception. For other shape properties, 
Suzuki and Cavanagh (1998) showed that adapting to a left pointing triangle made a 
square appear as a trapezoid pointed in the opposite direction, and adapting to an 
upwardly curving shape resulted in a diamond being perceived as curving downward. 
Suzuki (2001, 2003) also showed that adaptation to a concave hour-glass shape caused a 
set of four squares (positioned as the comers of a larger square) to be perceived as tilted 
into a convex shape. These effects were again robust across changes in size. For faces, 
therefore, some component of shape adaptation could arise through adaptation of these 
mid-level mechanisms. For example, if adapting to a face with widely-opened eyes
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made the normal face appear to have narrow eyes, this could potentially be attributed to 
adapting an aspect ratio mechanism.
Turning to high-level vision, it is also important to rule out adaptation arising 
from non-face object recognition area/s. Functional MRI studies show a face-selective 
“Fusiform Face Area” (FFA) in inferotemporal cortex, which is more responsive to 
faces than to a wide range of other objects (Grill-Spector, Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004; 
Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997), and is 
associated with processing individual face identity (e.g., Grill-Spector et al., 2004; 
Rhodes, Byatt, Michie, & Puce, 2004). However, faces stimuli can also produce some 
response in areas that are primarily responsive to human bodies, isolated face parts, 
houses, and other non-face objects (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001;
Tong, Nakayama, Vaughan, & Kanwisher, 1998), and these areas are also potential 
sources of adaptation.
In the present study, both the symmetric and asymmetric distortions used were 
relational in nature. That is, both distortions altered the spacing between face features 
without (so far as possible) making changes to local feature shape. This type of 
distortion was chosen to increase the chances of targeting the high-level face 
recognition system, at least when the face was upright.
To ensure this aim had been achieved, transfer of adaptation across upright and 
inverted orientations was tested. An extensive literature argues that the processing of 
inverted faces is different from that of upright faces (e.g., Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Yin, 
1969; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). Of particular relevance here is that sensitivity 
to relational information in faces is noticeably weaker for inverted faces than for upright 
faces. If a spacing change is quite small, it can fail to affect subjects' perception of 
inverted faces at all, despite producing a clear effect on perception for upright faces 
(e.g., Gilchrist & McKone, 2003; Leder & Bruce, 1998). If a spacing change is larger 
(e.g., shifting the mouth halfway towards the chin), then it will affect perception of 
inverted faces, but still more weakly so than in upright faces (e.g., Bartlett & Searcy, 
1993; Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2001; McKone et al., submitted). In 
contrast to the large effects of orientation on spacing changes, sensitivity to local feature 
changes (e.g., thickening the eyebrows, or changing the eye shape) is commonly almost 
unaffected by inversion (Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Gilchrist & McKone, 2003; Le 
Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2001; Leder & Bruce, 1998; McKone et al., 
submitted).
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A strong way to show that an adaptation effect for upright faces is truly face- 
specific is to demonstrate that different populations of neurons support the adaptation 
effect for upright faces from those supporting adaptation for inverted faces. This could 
be shown in two ways: demonstrating a lack of transfer of adaptation between upright 
and inverted faces, or demonstrating that upright and inverted faces can simultaneously 
be adapted to different competing distortions.
Rhodes, Jeffery, Watson, Jaquet, Winkler and Clifford (2004) have reported the 
latter result. They simultaneously adapted upright and inverted faces to different global 
distortions (e.g., upright to expanded and inverted to contracted). They also adapted 
upright and inverted faces to different sexes (e.g., upright to female and inverted to 
male). The critical result was that concurrent but opposite aftereffects were elicited in 
the two orientations. This provides good evidence that upright and inverted faces can be 
processed by different populations of cells.4
Transfer of adaptation between upright and inverted faces has given less clear 
results. Two studies (Watson & Clifford, 2003; Webster & MacLin, 1999) have crossed 
the orientation of the adaptor (Upright vs. Inverted) with the orientation of the test 
stimuli (Upright vs. Inverted). Both studies found transfer of adaptation across 
orientations. From upright adaptors to inverted test faces (U-I), adaptation approached 
the strength of upright adaptors to upright test faces (U-U). There was a weaker effect 
for inverted adaptors to upright test faces (I-U), but this was still above zero. Thus, in 
contrast to the concurrent opposite aftereffects (Rhodes, Jeffery et al., 2004), these 
previous results do not clearly dissociate neural populations for upright and inverted 
faces, and thus allow that much of the adaptation observed might have come from mid­
level vision and/or from object processing mechanisms rather than face-specific 
mechanisms.
The type of distortions used in previous studies -  midline expansion or 
contraction (Webster & MacLin, 1999; Watson & Clifford, 2003), radial expansion or 
contraction (Rhodes et al., 2003), and anti-faces (Leopold et al., 2001) -  cannot be 
claimed to specifically target the face system for upright faces. All of these distortions 
change relational properties of the face (e.g., distance between the eyes) but also 
produce substantial changes in local feature shape (e.g., making the eyes rounder or
4 This might appear to conflict with evidence that the FFA shows very little difference in response to 
upright and inverted faces (Kanwisher, Tong, & Nakayama, 1998). However, it is possible that the FFA 
includes distinct populations of neurons which code upright and inverted faces, and this information is 
lost due to insufficient spatial resolution of the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response.
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narrower, or turning down the comers of the mouth). Given the evidence of particularly 
strong sensitivity to relational changes in upright faces, in the present study, I introduce 
relational rather than global (relational-plus-local) distortion types, with the aim of 
demonstrating no transfer of adaptation across orientations. Such a result would argue 
that the adaptation observed for upright faces was genuinely face-specific.
Note that I did not expect to find zero adaptation for inverted faces with inverted 
adaptors (I-I condition). Relational changes can be perceived in inverted faces if they 
are large enough, and adaptation for inverted faces (I-I) has been strong in previous 
adaptation studies (Leopold et al., 2001; Watson & Clifford, 2003; Webster & MacLin,
1999). This adaptation does not necessarily come from the face system, and may arise 
from some other source. To show a face-system origin of upright face adaptation, the 
relevant result to demonstrate would be the lack of transfer between orientations.
6.2.5 Structure of the present experiments and general methodological approach.
In Experiment 10,1 contrasted different dimensions of face-space, using only 
upright faces. The primary question was whether the distortions along the dimension of 
symmetric eye-height (associated with high variability/läge coding range in face-space) 
would produce more adaptation than distortions along the dimension of asymmetric 
eye-height (associated with low variability/small coding range in face-space). In this 
experiment, the adaptor was positioned to be moderately extreme with respect to the 
required coding range for both distortion types. In Experiment 11, again testing only 
upright faces, the position of the adaptor relative to the norm was varied to assess the 
effects of symmetric versus asymmetric distortions at different positions within their 
required coding ranges. In Experiment 12,1 examined transfer of adaptation across 
orientations (i.e., in the I-U and U-I conditions) with the aim of showing that 
aftereffects for upright faces arose from adaptation of face-specific mechanisms.
In each experiment, the task was either to rate each stimulus for “how much 
like” a particular person it appeared, or to adjust the stimulus to appear “most like” a 
particular person. The judgment involved reference to identity, rather than merely 
normality, to encourage processing of the stimuli as individual faces (i.e., a within-class 
discrimination task rather than a between-class discrimination task). To familiarise 
subjects with the target identities, each experiment began with a training phase in which 
subjects learned to recognise four individuals (Bill, Sam, John and Fred; see Figure 6.3) 
in their undistorted form.
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To assess adaptation aftereffects, a three-phase procedure was used for each 
distortion type (symmetric or asymmetric). The pre-adaptation phase presented multiple 
levels of the relevant distortion type for rating, or asked the subject to adjust the face, to 
allow determination of the baseline image perceived as “most like Bill/Sam/John/Fred”. 
The adaptation phase then presented a particular distortion level of the relevant type for 
2 mins. The post-adaptation phase was identical to the pre-adaptation phase, with the 
addition of top-up adaptation stimuli presented for 5 s between each of the test stimuli.
To avoid a contribution of low-level retinotopic aftereffects, the adapting faces 
were presented at a smaller size than the test faces. Similarly, subjects were instructed 
to make eye movements around the adaptor during the adaptation phase, and top-up 
adaptor faces were presented at several locations to require eye movements during the 
post-adaptation test.
Another important point was that, of the four individuals used as test faces (Bill, 
Sam, John, Fred), only two were used as adaptors (Bill and Sam). This allowed, for the 
first time, a full examination of transfer across identity by contrasting the amount of 
adaptation when the adaptor and test identities were the same (i.e., for Bill and Sam) 
with the amount of adaptation when they were different (i.e., for John and Fred).
Rhodes et al. (2003) showed nonzero transfer across identity, but tested only a different- 
identity condition. In the present experiments, strong transfer across identity would 
argue that adaptation aftereffects can be explained as a general shift in the norm of the 
relevant face-space dimension. This idea is illustrated in Figure 6.4. Alternatively, a 
finding of weak or no transfer across identity would suggest that adaptation shifts the 
position of an individual face within face-space, rather than shifting the norm of the 
entire dimension.
172
Original
Norm
Adaptor
position
Mean height 
of both eyes
< -------- <
eyes down *#'^ 4 ( K # *** - >eyes up
Norni
after
adaptation
Figure 6.4. Adaptation conceptualised as a simple shift in the position of the norm 
of a dimension in face-space, illustrated using the height of both eyes together 
dimension.
6.3 Experiment 10: Adapting Different Relational Dimensions in Face-Space
In this experiment the two relational distortions (symmetric and asymmetric) 
were used to test the idea that different dimensions in face-space might be differently 
adaptable. Analysis was based on single-subject data. Each subject rated pictures of 
Bill, Sam, John and Fred at 27 levels of distortion (ranging from -50 to +50 pixels-per- 
eye) for how much the stimulus looked like the original person. This was done for each 
distortion type (for a total of 2.5 hours per subject). Only upright faces were tested and 
only one adaptor position was used.
The adaptor position was set at an intermediate level of distortion (±20 pixels- 
per-eye). All previous studies have used the most extreme test stimulus as the adaptor. 
One advantage of using an intermediate value is that it allows perceptual changes to be 
assessed on both sides of the adaptor (i.e., for more extreme deviation levels as well as 
less extreme deviations). In fact, three regions are of interest: faces more extreme than 
the adaptor on the adaptor side of the original norm (for a +20 adaptor, this is +21 to 
+50 pixels); faces falling between the adaptor and the original norm (0 to +19 pixels); 
and faces falling on the opposite side of the original norm to the adaptor (-50 to -1 
pixels). If an aftereffect arises from a general shift in the norm of a dimension in face- 
space (Figure 6.4), the prediction is that faces on the adaptor side of the original norm,
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regardless of which side of the adaptor they lie on, should be perceived as more like 
“Bill” than previously, while faces on the non-adaptor side of the original norm should 
be perceived as less like “Bill” than previously.
6.3.1 Experiment 10 - Method
6.3.1.1 Subjects.
There were five subjects in total (age range 20-42; two male), four naive as to 
the purposes of the experiment (S1-S4), and the experimenter (RR). All subjects were 
Caucasian, and thus ethnically matched to the face stimuli. All reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Naive subjects were paid $10 per session. For the four naive 
subjects, testing was interleaved with some conditions of Experiment 12.
6.3.1.2 Design.
For a given distortion type (e.g., symmetric), ratings of how much a deviated 
face looked liked the original individual (1 = “looks exactly like” Bill/Sam/John/Fred, 9 
= “looks nothing like”) were determined for 27 deviation levels (0, ±1, ±2, ±3, ±6, ±8, 
±10, ±12, ±15, ±20, ±25, ±30, ±40, and ±50 pixels-per-eye), for all four individuals 
(Bill, Sam, John and Fred). After adaptation to either +20 or -20 adaptors (Bill and 
Sam) of the same distortion type, ratings were taken again for all four individuals. 
“Adapted” individuals were thus Bill and Sam, and “unadapted” individuals were John 
and Fred.
Across different sessions, this procedure was repeated for symmetric distortions 
with a positive adaptor (eyes up), symmetric distortions with a negative adaptor (eyes 
down), asymmetric distortions with a positive adaptor (right up, left down), and 
asymmetric distortions with a negative adaptor (right down, left up). The ±20 adaptor 
stimuli are illustrated in Figure 6.5. Each session lasted 30 -  45 mins. Subjects usually 
completed only one session per day, with a minimum time between sessions of 30 mins. 
Order of conditions was counterbalanced across subjects.
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Figure 6.5. Adaptor deviations used in Experiments 10 & 12 (±20), and 
Experiment 12 (±5 and ±20; the ±50 is shown in Figure 6.1), illustrated using 
Bill.
6.3.1.3 Stimuli.
All stimulus manipulations were carried out with Adobe Photoshop 5.5. Stimuli 
were derived from four undistorted 0 deviation faces taken from McKone et al. 
(submitted; see Figure 6.3), and labelled as Bill, Sam, John and Fred. These had been 
made by cutting the internal regions from photographs of four real people (obtained 
from the Stirling PICS database), and pasting them onto a common background head 
derived from a fifth person. The natural distances between eyes, nose and mouth were 
retained, and the overall set of internal features was placed at an average height within 
the new head. A common background head with stiff upright hair was used to ensure 
that eye/s could be moved relative to a clearly-seen hairline. The resulting faces were all 
natural in appearance.
From each of the four undistorted individuals, 27 deviation levels were made for 
each distortion type (symmetric and asymmetric). The total number of pixels from 
hairline to chin in the images was 263; thus the most extreme deviation of 50 pixels- 
per-eye corresponded to 19.01% of the hairline-chin distance, the adaptor position of 20 
pixels-per-eye to 7.60%, and 1 pixel-per-eye was equal to 0.38% of the hairline-chin 
distance. At the viewing distance of 40 cm, test stimuli (i.e., those shown in the pre­
adaptation and post-adaptation phases) subtended 10° from the chin to hairline by 7.9°
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across the widest point of the cheeks (and thus a 10 pixel-per-eye deviation, for 
example, corresponded to 0.4° of movement if fixating the original eye position). 
Adaptor stimuli were shown smaller than the test stimuli, at 7.9° by 5.7°.
6.3.1.4 Procedure.
Stimuli were presented on an iMac computer with a 36 cm screen set to a 
resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels, using PsyScope software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt,
& Provost, 1993). A chin-rest was used.
Training phase. An identity training phase began with each 0 deviation face 
(Bill, Sam, John and Fred) shown once upright and once inverted5 with its name 
presented beneath. This was followed by 32 trials of training-with-feedback (four trials 
of each 0 deviation face in each orientation). Here, stimuli were presented without 
names, subjects pressed the key matching the face’s initial (B, S, J, or F), and a 
feedback beep was given if the response was incorrect.
At the beginning of their first session, each subject completed four cycles 
through this training phase (i.e. 40 exposures to each individual), taking approximately 
15-20 mins. Identification accuracy was measured during the training-with-feedback 
task, and all subjects passed a criterion of 80% correct in the final cycle. At the 
beginning of each additional session, a single cycle through the training phase was 
given to ensure subjects had reinstated an active representation of each face in its 
undistorted form.
Pre-adaptation test phase. In the pre-adaptation phase of each session, each of 
the four individuals (Bill, Sam, John and Fred) was presented once at each of the 27 
deviation levels, for a total of 108 trials. Face stimuli were presented at the centre of the 
screen with no fixation point (this avoided providing easy cues as to absolute location of 
the eyes on the screen, rather than within the face). On each trial, the stimulus face was 
shown for 1000 ms, followed by a 200 ms blank screen, and then a prompt to enter the 
identity rating. The name of the person was always given in the prompt. For example, 
following a picture of Bill, the question read “How much does this look like Bill? 1 = 
‘exactly’, 9= ‘not at all’”. Trials were presented in random order for each subject.
5 The training phase included inverted faces as well as upright faces because some conditions of 
Experiment 12 were interleaved with those of Experiment 10.
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To encourage appropriate use of the full scale, subjects were shown examples 
from the relevant distortion type (symmetric or asymmetric) before the rating task 
began. Six examples covering both mild and extreme deviation levels in both directions 
were shown, using a nontested individual (Ralph).
Adaptation phase. In the adaptation phase of each session, the relevant adaptor 
deviation (e.g., 20 pixels eyes up, symmetric distortion) was shown for 2 mins. The 
adaptor individual was Bill for 1 min then Sam for 1 min, or vice versa, with the 
individual presented first chosen randomly. Adaptors were presented in the centre of the 
screen. Subjects were instructed not to fixate the adaptor, but instead to scan the whole 
face for the full exposure time.
Post-adaptation test phase. The post-adaptation phase in each session was a 
repeat of the pre-adaptation phase, with the addition of top-up adaptation. Before each 
rating trial began, one of the adaptor individuals (Bill or Sam) was shown for 5000 ms, 
with alternation of adaptor identity on successive trials. The top-up adaptor was shown 
in one of four locations around the test face, to force subjects to make eye movements 
to view the adaptor. The locations were centred 5.7°(vertical) and 5.7° (horizontal) 
away from the test face, to the top-left, top-right, bottom-right or bottom-left comer, 
with locations chosen in clockwise order on successive trials.
6.3.2 Experiment 10-R esults
6.3.2.1 Curve fits.
To allow quantitative summary of the data in any given condition, curve fitting 
was carried out. The primary analysis was based on fits using Fechner's law (threshold- 
plus-log curves). As explained in Figure 6.6, Fechner law fits allow extraction of five 
parameters of interest. (In reading all graphs, note again the direction of the identity 
rating scale: 1= most like “Bill”; 9 = least like “Bill” .) The left threshold value (7/) 
indicates the number of pixels-per-eye by which the stimulus can be deviated in the 
negative direction before ratings of identity start to suddenly increase. The right 
threshold value (77) is the corresponding value for positive deviations. The centre of the 
full subthreshold region (c) provides the best estimate of the stimulus perceived as 
“most like” the individual. The final two parameters are the left slope-at-threshold (A i)
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and the right slope-at-threshold (Ar)\ in each case, higher slopes indicate greater 
sensitivity to changes, this time in the above-threshold region. All fits were done using 
CurveFit (Kevin Raner Software)6.
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k, for Tj > x < Tr
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Figure 6.6. The Fechner law function used to fit the data.
In the pre-adaptation conditions, Fechner law curves provided good fits to every 
subject's data. Figure 6.7a shows an example of a fit for a single subject in a symmetric 
distortion condition. For data in the asymmetric condition, the Fechner curves 
sometimes failed to capture the full degree of “pointedness” close to the zero deviation, 
as illustrated for one subject in Figure 6.7b. For this reason I also tried fitting Pearson 
IV curves. These are 4-parameter modified Gaussians that allow more pointedness 
(kurtosis) than the standard 3-parameter Gaussian. Although the overall quality of the 
fits was still good for Pearson IV, average R2 did not increase compared to the Fechner
6 This program allows the threshold points to be determined from the data, unlike the majority of 
programs which require them to be pre-specified. It does not allow different line patterns for fits.
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fits, and the ability to capture the pointedness did not improve (Figure 6.7c). I chose to 
use Fechner law fits, because they do not force the curve to be symmetrical (thus 
providing better fits in cases like Figure 6.7a), and because there is a well-established 
theoretical rationale behind Fechner's law. Further, Fechner’s law provided good fits in 
McKone et al. (submitted) where there were considerably more subjects. Conclusions 
regarding adaptation were the same from both fitting methods. To demonstrate that the 
good fits with the 7-parameter Fechner law could not be attributed simply to the number 
of parameters, Figure 6.7d shows that fits from a 7th-order polynomial were poor.
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Figure 6.7. Examples of fits, for single subject data in single conditions. Fechner 
law fits are shown in (a) and (b) for two cases. Panels (c) and (d) show the same 
data as (b) to illustrate that neither a Pearson IV curve nor a 7th-order polynomial 
improved the fit.
6.3.2.2 Confirming greater perceived variability for symmetric than asymmetric 
distortions.
Before analysing adaptation effects, it was important to examine the pre­
adaptation data to check that, for the current subjects, the range of faces perceived as 
normal was larger for the symmetric distortion than for the asymmetric distortion, thus 
suggesting a greater coding range in the former case (cf. McKone et al., submitted). To 
give the most reliable results, I averaged over all relevant unadapted scores. This
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included collapsing over direction of future adaptor (+20, -20), identity of the face (Bill, 
Sam, John and Fred were all equivalent here since no adaptation had yet taken place), 
and also adding in extra trials from the pre-adaptation conditions obtained for upright 
faces in Experiment 12. (Note in advance that all calculations comparing pre- and post­
adaptation used data only from Experiment 10).
Symmetric Asymmetric
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S2: 5.33 
S3: 10.45 
S4: 8.56 
RR: 9.29
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S2: 10.24 
S3: 8.39 
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Figure 6.8. Experiment 10: Pre-adaptation identity ratings (averaged over 
subjects, as well as identity of face and direction of future adaptor) and the 
Fechner law fit to the average data. The inset box indicates the total width of the 
sub-threshold region (|T/| + |T,|. in pixels-per-eye) determined for separate fits, for 
each individual subject.
Figure 6.8 shows the resulting ratings and fitted Fechner curves for the 
symmetric distortion (Figure 6.8a) and the asymmetric distortion (Figure 6.8b), for data 
averaged over the five subjects. In the lower right comer of each plot, the width of the 
subthreshold region (|7/| + |7T|) is also listed for each individual subject. The key result 
is that, as in McKone et al. (submitted), subjects were less sensitive to symmetric 
deviations of eye height than to asymmetric deviations. The subthreshold region was 
consistently wider for symmetric than asymmetric distortions; that is, for symmetric 
distortions, subjects tolerated more physical deviation in the face while still considering 
it as much like Bill as the original face. These results confirm that the current subjects' 
face-space includes greater variability associated with the symmetric eye height 
dimension than the asymmetric eye height dimension, corresponding to the greater 
variability within the experienced inputs to face-space in the former case.
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6.3.2.3 Adaptation effects.
The primary theoretical questions were then about adaptation effects. Figure 6.9 
shows data averaged across subjects, for pre- and post- adaptation, broken down by 
direction of adaptor (+20, -20) and identity status (adapted individuals = Bill and Sam; 
unadapted individuals = John and Fred). Three important results are apparent. First, 
adaptation took the form of a simple shift in ratings in the predicted direction. Second, 
adaptation shifts were larger for symmetric than asymmetric distortions. Third, 
adaptation generalised completely over adaptor-test changes in identity.
Form of adaptation. The presence of a norm-based adaptation aftereffect is 
indicated by a shift in the rating curve towards the adaptor direction. To make this 
prediction clear, consider that, after adapting to an eyes-up face (+20), the unaltered 
face (0) should appear to have its eyes moved down; thus, the face which is perceived 
as “most like” the original will be a stimulus with its eyes physically higher than the 
original position. This corresponds to the centre of the subthreshold region shifting in 
the positive direction, for a positive adaptor.
Figure 6.9 shows that such adaptation occurred. For example, after adapting to 
the +20 symmetric face in Figures 6.9 (right panels), stimuli with eyes deviated in the 
positive direction (eyes up) now appeared more like Bill/Sam/John/Fred (i.e., lower 
ratings) than they did prior to adaptation, while stimuli with eyes deviated in the 
negative direction (eyes down) now appeared less like Bill/Sam/John/Fred (i.e., higher 
ratings). This pattern -  that is, ratings decreasing on the adaptor side of the original zero 
point, while increasing on the other -  produces an overall shift in the curve towards the 
direction of the adaptor. It can be seen from Figure 6.9 that adaptation was equally 
strong for both directions, producing a rightward shift for positive adaptors (collapsed 
across identity, symmetric = 6.39 pixels; asymmetric = 1.03), and a similar-sized 
leftward shift for negative adaptors (symmetric = 5.35 pixels; asymmetric = 1.25).
Also note that faces more extreme than the adaptor (e.g. the +30 stimulus) were 
affected in the same way as faces lying in the region between the adaptor and the 
original zero stimulus (0 to +19), in that all faces whose deviations levels were above 
threshold now appeared more like Bill than before adaptation. This pattern of a simple 
overall shift is consistent with a re-centring of the norm of the relevant dimension in 
face-space (Figure 6.4).
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Fieure 6.9. Experiment 10: Identity ratings for the pre-adaptation condition (open 
circles) and post-adapted condition (filled diamonds), plus Fechner law fits, 
averaged over subjects.
Symmetric versus asymmetric distortions. The major result apparent in Figure 
6.9 is that the amount of adaptation was greater for symmetric distortions of eye height 
(top four panels) than it was for asymmetric distortions (bottom four panels). That is, 
with the adaptor positioned at ±20 pixels, the amount of shift in the adaptor direction
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(rightwards shift for positive adaptors, leftwards shift for negative adaptors) was 
consistently greater for the symmetric condition.
To allow concise presentation of individual subject data, I calculated a simple 
measure of shift, as the difference between the centre of the subthreshold region before 
and after adaptation. Shift scores were defined such that a positive shift always 
corresponded to a change in the direction predicted for adaptation (i.e., for positive 
adaptors, shift = c Po s t - c pre\ for negative adaptors, shift = c pre- c Post).
Symmetric distortion Asymmetric distortion
□  Bill/Sam (adapted)
I  John/Fred (unadapted)
SI S2 S3 S4 RR Mean Fit to SI S2 S3 S4 RR Mean Fit to 
of Ss Mean of Ss Mean
data data
Figure 6.10. Experiment 10: Adaptation results for individual subjects (number of
pixels shift in the centre of the sub-threshold region, between pre- and post­
adaptation). Results are collapsed over direction of adaptor (positive or negative) 
as described in the text. Each plot also shows the mean (± 1 SEM) of these
individual subjects' scores (denoted "Mean of Ss" on the figure), as well as a 
score derived by averaging data across subjects first and then fitting (i.e. "Fit to
mean data").
Figure 6.10 shows shift scores for the five individual subjects. To increase 
reliability, individual subject fits were carried out collapsed over direction of adaptor 
(after first flipping the x-axis for negative adaptor conditions). It is apparent that the 
greater adaptation effect for symmetric than asymmetric distortions was consistent 
across subjects. Indeed, the difference between these conditions (collapsed over identity 
as well as direction) was significant even with only five participants, /(4)=3.19, p<.05.
Generalisation over identity. Figure 6.9 (full curves averaged over subjects) and 
Figure 6.10 (shift scores for individual subjects) allow comparison of adaptation for the 
adapted individuals (Bill and Sam) and the unadapted individuals (John and Fred). For
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both symmetric and asymmetric distortions, it can be seen that transfer across identity 
was excellent. Indeed, after adaptation to Bill and Sam, the mean shift across subjects 
for John and Fred (symmetric = 5.37, asymmetric = 1.32) was, if anything, slightly 
larger than for Bill and Sam themselves (symmetric = 4.37, asymmetric = 0.75).
6.3.3 Experiment 10 - Discussion
Experiment 10 has revealed two new adaptation aftereffects for simple face 
shape distortions. Adapting to a face with both eyes up made an undistorted face appear 
to have its eyes shifted down, and vice versa. Adapting to a face with the left eye up and 
the right eye down made an undistorted face appear to have its left eye down and its 
right eye up, and vice versa.
The primary question in the present experiment was then whether some 
dimensions in face-space might be more adaptable than others. I contrasted two 
distortion types associated with different amounts of physical variability in the natural 
population of faces (symmetric = large variability; asymmetric = small variability), and 
confirmed that, in the unadapted state, subjects' perception followed this physical 
difference. That is, subjects tolerated a greater deviation in eye height before changing 
their rating of how much the face looked like the individual for symmetric distortions 
(both eyes up, or both eyes down) than for asymmetric distortions (left up right down, 
or right up left down).
When I then examined adaptation aftereffects, using an adaptor that was placed 
outside the threshold range for both distortion types, I found greater shift in the face 
rated as looking “most like Bill/Sam/John/Fred” for symmetric distortions than for 
asymmetric distortions (again, readers can test a similar result for themselves, using the 
±50 pixel-per-eye stimuli in Figure 6.1 as adaptors). This finding suggests that (a) 
different dimensions of face-space can show different amounts of adaptation, and (b) for 
the moderate adaptor position tested in Experiment 10, dimensions which need to code 
a large range of stimulus values show more adaptation than dimensions which need to 
code a smaller range 1.
7 Note again that the task was rating identity rather than normality. It is possible this lead to increased 
aftereffects for symmetric distortions compared to asymmetric ones as Cooper and Wojan (2000) suggest 
identity judgements are more affected by moving both eyes together whereas normality judgements are
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Experiment 10 produced two other results of interest. First, adaptation took the 
form of a general shift in the curve; that is, the curve relating physical to perceived 
deviation remained the same shape, and shifted towards the adaptor direction. Second, 
adaptation generalised perfectly over individual identity. That is, despite the fact that 
the task deliberately referenced individual identity rather than generic normality, 
adaptation to Bill and Sam shifted the perception of John and Fred by as much as it 
shifted the perception of Bill and Sam.* 8
Both of these results are consistent with the theoretical idea illustrated in Figure 
6.4, namely that adaptation produces a general shift in the norm of face-space along the 
adapted dimension that affects perception of all individuals. It does not support a view 
in which adaptation shifts the location of one individual person with respect to others. 
This general shift in the norm has not previously been demonstrated. With respect to 
adaptor position, previous studies have not tested distortions more extreme than the 
adaptor. With respect to face identity, Rhodes et al. (2003) showed that adaptation 
occurred with a change in identity but, in their study, the adaptor and test faces were 
always different individuals; thus the cross-identity adaptation was not compared to a 
same-identity condition. The Leopold et al. (2001) design also does not allow 
comparison of aftereffects for adapted and unadapted individuals; the trajectory along 
which adaptation takes place (e.g., Tim to anti-Tim) changes many aspects of the face 
simultaneously and thus contains only one individual (weaker and stronger versions of 
Tim). In contrast, by choosing simpler distortion types, multiple individuals can be 
changed in the same way along a given dimension, allowing comparison of the same 
distortion type for adapted and unadapted individuals.
affected by moving one eye. However, McKone et al. showed that when the amount of metric change in
each distortion was matched (as was also the case here) Cooper and Wojan’s link between symmetric
distortion and identity and asymmetric distortions and normality did not hold. Further although there were
slight differences between the identity and normality tasks in McKone et al, as noted below, results for
symmetric and asymmetric were consistent across the two tasks.
8 The generalisation of adaptation over identity should not be taken to suggest that subjects did not 
reference identity in this task. McKone et al. (submitted) used the same identity rating instructions as 
here, and contrasted these to normality ratings. In the unadapted state (adaptation was not tested), both 
tasks produced a Fechner law relationship between physical and perceived deviation. However, 
sensitivity to deviations was noticeably stronger in the identity task (i.e., smaller subthreshold region, and 
steeper slope-at-threshold). The present fit parameters agree well with those of McKone et al.'s identity 
task.
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6.4 Experiment 11: Varying Adaptor Position
Experiment 11 had two aims. The primary aim was to test several adaptor 
positions, specifically ±5, ±20, and ±50 pixels-per-eye. These adaptor positions fall in 
different locations relative to the likely coding range for symmetric and asymmetric 
distortions of eye height.
For symmetric distortions, the coding range required to represent all possible eye 
heights is very large. Considering both the differences arising from individual face 
structure, and the even larger differences arising from three-dimensional up-down head 
rotation, the required range probably covers from the eyes being very close to the tip of 
the nose (looking down) to the eyes being very close to the hairline (looking up). In the 
current stimuli, these eye positions correspond to a range of approximately -60 to +60 
pixels-per-eye. If this presumed range is correct, then, for symmetric distortions, all 
three adaptor positions will fall within the coding range of the relevant dimension in 
face-space. Under these circumstances, we might expect that all adaptor positions 
should produce strong aftereffects. The standard model of adaptation described in the 
General Discussion also predicts that the size of the aftereffect will become larger as the 
adaptor becomes more extreme.
The situation for asymmetric distortions might be very different. The required 
coding range for asymmetric distortions of eye height should be much smaller than for 
symmetric distortions. There is no three-dimensional head rotation that produces 
asymmetric changes in eye height, and the images in Figure 6.5 make it obvious that 
even a ±5 pixel-per-eye deviation would be unusual to observe in the natural population 
of faces. If we presume that the coding range for asymmetric distortions might be at 
most -10 to +10 pixels-per-eye, the ±5 adaptor could be within the coding range, while 
±20 and ±50 adaptors would be outside it. It is therefore possible that an aftereffect with 
the ±5 adaptor might be stronger than the small effect identified for the ±20 adaptor in 
Experiment 10. Given that a ±50 adaptor is very far outside the coding range for 
asymmetric deviations, weak or no adaptation might be expected at this position.
In summary, the coding range hypothesis suggests that, as the adaptor is placed 
further from the pre-adaptation norm, the size of the aftereffect could increase for the 
symmetric distortion, but decrease for the asymmetric distortion. The difference 
between symmetric and asymmetric would then be greatest for ±50 adaptors, and 
smallest for ±5 adaptors. Whether any symmetric-asymmetric difference will remain
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with the ±5 adaptor cannot be predicted: this adaptor is probably within the required 
coding range for both distortion types, but it falls almost within the subthreshold region 
for symmetric (T=±4.89 pixels for N=19 in McKone et ah, submitted) and well outside 
it for asymmetric (T=±\ .79 pixels), and this may or may not affect the amount of 
adaptation.
The second aim of Experiment 11 was to replicate the results of Experiment 10 
with a different measurement technique and more subjects. Instead of rating multiple 
deviation levels for how much each looked like Bill/Sam/John/Fred, an adiust-to-most- 
like procedure was used. Subjects were given an initially extreme distortion, and 
allowed to adjust the deviation level until the stimulus appeared most like the target 
individual. The effect of adaptation was again measured by comparing pre- and post­
adaptation scores, with the specific measure (the shift in the stimulus chosen as most 
like Bill/Sam/John/Fred) being an equivalent of the shift-in-centre score reported in 
Experiment 10. The advantage of the adjust-to-most-like technique is that it is less time 
consuming to test one condition than the procedure used in Experiment 10, thus 
allowing more conditions to be tested. However, because subjects are no longer rating 
27 deviation levels, the estimate of an individual subject's centre point is less reliable 
than in Experiment 10. The present experiment therefore used a multi-subject approach, 
where the intention was to present data only averaged over subjects.
6.4.1 Experiment 11 - Method
6.4.1.1 Subjects.
Twenty-four naive subjects participated (age range 18-39 yrs; 9 male). Subjects 
were Caucasian members of the Australian National University community (mostly 
undergraduates), and were paid $25 for their participation (total 2 hrs). All reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
6.4.1.2 Design.
As in Experiment 10, all faces were upright. Each subject was tested in three 40 
min sessions, with at least 24 hrs between sessions. Each session began with identity
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training on the original undistorted faces. Adaptation effects were then assessed for one 
adaptor position (e.g., -5 pixels-per-eye) for one distortion type (e.g., symmetric) and, 
after a 15 min filled delay, a different adaptor position (e.g., -50 pixels-per-eye) for the 
other distortion type (i.e., asymmetric). Across all sessions, a given subject received 
adaptors of only one direction (all positive or all negative), but was tested on all three 
adaptor levels (e.g., -5, -20, -50) for both distortion types. Order of the resulting six 
conditions was counterbalanced across subjects, within the constraints that each session 
contained one of each distortion type, and with different adaptor levels for each. 
Direction of adaptor (positive or negative) was manipulated between subjects, with the 
intention of collapsing over this variable, given that it had had no influence on 
adaptation effects in Experiment 10.
The final design was thus a 2 x 3 x 2 within-subjects design, crossing distortion 
type (symmetric, asymmetric) with adaptor level (5, 20, 50 pixels-per-eye) and identity 
status (adapted individuals = Bill and Sam; unadapted individuals = John and Fred). The 
subject's task was to adjust each face until it appeared “most like the original 
Bill/Sam/John/Fred”. The physical deviation level the subject chose was recorded.
6.4.1.3 Stimuli.
For the pre- and post-adaptation phases, stimuli were as for Experiment 10, 
except that additional deviation levels were created. To allow adjustments in 1 pixel- 
per-eye increments, stimuli were prepared for every 1 pixel deviation between -40 and 
+40, for each identity and distortion type. These were prepared at the larger “test face” 
size used in Experiment 10. For the adaptation phase, additional stimuli were the ±5 and 
±50 versions of Bill and Sam, prepared at the smaller “adaptor face” size.
6.4.1.4 Procedure.
The procedure was as for Experiment 10, except where noted.
Identity training phase. At the beginning of each session, four cycles of identity 
training were provided. Unlike in Experiment 10, training included only upright faces, 
shortening the training phase to approximately 10 mins. Each cycle first presented 8 
trials of faces with names (2 each of Bill, John, Sam and Fred), followed by 16 trials of 
training-with-feedback without names (4 of each individual). One cycle through this 
identity training preceded testing of the second distortion type in the session.
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At the beginning of Session 1, subjects were required to achieve 80% correct in 
the last of the four training cycles. Three subjects who initially failed to reach this 
criterion were given an extra two cycles before continuing. All subjects remained >80% 
correct in the training phase of Sessions 2 and 3.
Pre-adaptation phase. The pre-adaptation phase for a given condition (e.g., 
symmetric, -5 adaptor) presented two adjust-to-most-like trials for each of the four 
individuals. One of these trials began with an obvious positive distortion (e.g., eyes too 
high), and one with an obvious negative distortion (e.g., eyes too low). The starting 
position was chosen randomly for each trial within the range +20 to +40 pixels-per-eye, 
or -20 to -40 pixels-per-eye, respectively.
To adjust the stimuli, subjects used number keys at the top of the keyboard.
Keys 1 and 4 allowed coarse adjustment, moving the eyes by ±5 pixels with each press 
(one key for each direction). Keys 2 and 3 allowed finer adjustments, moving the eyes 
by ±1 pixel. A beep sounded if subjects tried to move the eyes outside the maximum 
range of ± 40. Subjects were instructed to make adjustments fairly quickly, taking 
approximately 10 key presses, and at most 1 s per press. When the subject considered 
the stimulus to “look like the undistorted person”, they pressed the space bar to accept 
this stimulus, and its deviation level was recorded.
Adaptation phase. This was exactly as for Experiment 10.
Post-adaptation phase. This was as for the pre-adaptation phase with the addition 
of 5 sec top-up adaptors, shown in the same format as in Experiment 10.
Delays within and across sessions. The extensive (24 hour) delay between 
sessions was necessary to avoid carryover of adaptation between successive tests of the 
same distortion type. In initial pilot testing (N=6), I tried including all adaptor levels for 
a given distortion type in a single session. However, there was noticeable carryover 
from one adaptation condition to the next “pre”-adaptation measurement, which 
occurred despite a 3 min intervening task showing 60 novel undistorted individuals, and 
a 2 min cycle of identity training. A second round of pilot testing (N=5) increased the 
first intervening task to 13 mins. This presented 240 trials of greyscale pictures, each for 
3 s. The stimulus for each trial was chosen at random from 81 novel individual faces 
and 51 other objects (at least 120 trials were faces). To ensure attention, subjects were 
told to press the space bar each time one of the pictures appeared for a second or 
successive time. Even with this lengthier filler task, some pilot subjects revealed 
substantial carryover, and the mean effect was 3.08 pixels (SEM = 2.29).
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In the final procedure, the delay between testing two adaptor position conditions 
for the same distortion type (e.g., -5 symmetric, and -50 symmetric) was a minimum of 
24 hrs. Under these conditions, there was no carryover. This is demonstrated in Table 
6.1, which presents pre-adaptation results for the first, second and third session. For a 
given distortion type, any carryover would be revealed as a cumulative change in the 
stimulus chosen as most like the individual, such that stimuli would become more 
negative for subjects who received negative adaptors (N=12), and more positive for 
subjects who received positive adaptors (N=12). This did not happen. Linear trend 
analysis across sessions (1 -  3), conducted for each distortion type and direction 
separately, revealed no significant trends, all ps > .3.
Table 6.1. Assessing carry-over effects across the three sessions in the pre-adaptation 
tests: Mean deviation of the stimulus chosen as most like Bill/Sam/John/Fred (and 
SEM) for each distortion type.
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3
Asvmmetric
Positive 0.17 0.19 0.26
adaptors in all 
sessions
(0.14) (0.15) (0.16)
Negative 0.32 0.22 0.49
adaptors in all 
sessions 
Svmmetric
(0.24) (0.24) (0.14)
Positive -1.48 -1.09 -0.56
adaptors in all 
sessions
(0.88) (1.05) (0.81)
Negative -2.55 -1.36 -1.86
adaptors in all 
sessions
(0.61) (0.63) (1.07)
With respect to testing different distortion types, asymmetric and symmetric 
were included within the same session, with a total of 15 mins filled delay between 
them. This comprised the 13 min filler task described above, plus the 2 mins for one 
cycle of identity training. Note that any adaptation effect left over from one distortion 
type could not affect adjustment performance on the other; for example, adaptation to 
an asymmetric distortion could not be revealed on a task that allowed only symmetric 
adjustments.
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6.4.2 Experiment 11 -  Results
Trials on which subjects made no adjustments before pressing the spacebar were 
treated as errors and discarded. This never occurred for more than one adjustment trial 
for any given subject.
6.4.2.1 Confirming greater perceived variability for symmetric than asymmetric 
distortions.
As for the previous experiment, difference in perceived variability between the 
symmetric and asymmetric distortions was assessed in the unadapted state. For each 
subject, the pre-adaptation deviation level (measured in pixels-per-eye) of the stimulus 
chosen as “most like Bill/Sam/John/Fred” was computed for each distortion type. To 
give the most reliable data, this was done averaging over all four individuals, and all 
three future adaptor levels (e.g., -5, -20, and -50).
The variability of the symmetric and asymmetric conditions across subjects was 
then compared using Levene’s test of equality of variances. This showed that the 
variance of 5.38 for the symmetric distortion (around a mean o f-1.49) was significantly 
higher than the variance of 0.19 for the asymmetric distortion (around a mean of 0.27), 
F( 1,46) = 30.26, p < .001. That is, subjects were less certain about where the eyes 
should be placed in the symmetric condition, corresponding to the finding that there was 
a broader subthreshold region for ratings of the symmetric distortion than the 
asymmetric distortion in Experiment 10. Again, the implication is that the current 
subjects’ perception tracked the fact that the symmetric distortion corresponds to more 
variability in the real world than does the asymmetric distortion.
6.4.2.2 Adaptation effects.
As in Experiment 10, shift scores were defined such that a positive shift always 
corresponded to a change in the direction predicted for adaptation. If an adaptation 
aftereffect is present then, after adapting to an eyes up face (for example), eyes up 
stimuli will be perceived as more like “Bill” than previously, while eyes down stimuli 
will be perceived as less like “Bill”. Thus, after adaptation to positive adaptors, the
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Stimulus chosen as “most like” should be more positive than before adaptation (thus, 
shift = Cpost—Cpre), and after adaptation to negative adaptors, the chosen stimulus should 
become more negative (thus, shift = c Pre -c Posi).
An initial 4-way mixed ANOVA was conducted on the shift scores. This 
included distortion type (symmetric vs. asymmetric), adapted/unadapted identity status 
(Bill and Sam vs. John and Fred), adaptor level (5, 20, 50), and direction of adaptor 
(positive or negative). This showed no main effect of direction or any interactions 
involving this variable (direction by distortion type, F( 1,22) = 3.27, p > .08, all other 
Fs < 1). Thus, I collapsed over direction in later analyses.
Generalisation over identity. The 4-way ANOVA revealed no main effect of 
identity status, F( 1,22) = 2.88, p > . 1. However there was a significant interaction 
between identity status and distortion type, F(l, 22) = 5.97, p < .05. For the asymmetric 
distortion, results agreed with those of Experiment 10. Adaptation generalised perfectly 
over identity: if anything, unadapted individuals showed a slightly larger effect (John 
and Fred, M = 0.78, SEM=0.12) than unadapted individuals (Bill and Sam, M= 0.61, 
SEM=0.15). For the symmetric condition, however, results differed from those of the 
first experiment: adaptation transferred well, but not perfectly, over identity changes. 
The effect for unadapted individuals (John and Fred, M = 2.29, SEM= 0.48) was 
significantly smaller than for adapted individuals (Bill and Sam, M = 3.24, SEM = 
0.68), t(23) = 2.22, p < .05. Note that these results are averaged across level of adaptor, 
because there was no 3-way interaction between identity status, distortion type, and 
adaptor level, F < 1. A check of the three adaptor levels separately confirmed that the 
same trend was present for symmetric distortions at all adaptor levels (for ±5,
J&F=1.25, B&S=1.75; for ±20, J&F=2.97, B&S=3.66; for ±50, J&F=2.65, B&S=4.32).
Effects of distortion type and adaptor level. Given the lack of any 3- or 4-way 
interactions in the initial ANOVA, the questions of primary interest -  how the 
adaptation aftereffect was influenced by distortion type and adaptor position -  were 
examined collapsing over identity and direction. Results are shown in Figure 6.11. A 2- 
way ANOVA revealed a main effect of distortion type, F(l, 23) = 12.64, p < .01, and a 
significant interaction between distortion type and adaptor position, Wilks’ lambda = 
.70 9, F( 1,23) = 4.67, p < .05. As can be seen in Figure 6.11, the interaction takes the 
form that, while shift scores increased with increasing adaptor level for the symmetric
g
Where the sphericity assumption of repeated measures ANOVA was violated, the multivatiate approach 
was used.
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distortion (the trend was 5<20<50), the opposite was true for the asymmetric distortion 
(the trend was 5>20>50).
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Figure 6.11. Experiment 11: Interaction between distortion type (symmetric vs. 
asymmetric) and adaptor position (±5, ±20. ±50). Data are collapsed over identity 
and direction of adaptor. Error bars show ± 1 SEM.
To follow up the interaction statistically, results for the two distortion types were 
analysed separately. Results of the analysis were neatest for the asymmetric distortion, 
so this is presented first. In this condition, trend analysis revealed a significant linear 
trend, F(1, 23) = 5.82, p < .05, with no quadratic component, F < 1. Contrasts 
confirmed that the ±5 pixel adaptor produced a significantly larger aftereffect than the 
±50 pixel adaptor, F{ 1,23) = 6.65, p < .05. The ±20 pixel condition fell in the middle, 
and was not significantly different from either the ±5 condition, F(l, 23) = 1.21, 
p > .05, or the ±50 condition, F{ 1, 23) = 2.18, p > .05.
For the symmetric distortion, there was a trend in the opposite direction (see 
Figure 6.11). The sphericity assumption of repeated measures ANOVA was violated so 
trend analysis was not possible. The multivariate equivalent of a 1-way ANOVA was 
not significant, Wilks’ lambda = .80, F{ 1, 22) = 2.73, p = .087. However, this test does 
not take account of the ordering of the conditions, and thus has substantially less power 
than trend analysis. A priori t-tests showed that the ±5 adaptor produced a significantly
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smaller aftereffect than the ±50 adaptor, f(23) = 2.36, p < .05. The ±20 adaptor again 
fell in the middle, and did not differ significantly from either the ±5 adaptor, /(23) =
1.31, p > .05, or the ±50 adaptor, t < 1. Overall, these results confirm that, for 
symmetric distortions, adaptors with more extreme deviations produced more 
adaptation, and for asymmetric distortions, they produced less adaptation.
I also compared amounts of adaptation for symmetric and asymmetric at each 
adaptor level. For the ±50 adaptors (i.e., within the coding range for symmetric, but 
very far outside it for asymmetric) the greater adaptation for symmetric than 
asymmetric distortions was significant, /(23) = 4.90, p < .001. The difference in the 
same direction for ±20 adaptors was not quite significant, ?(23) = 1.97, p = .06, although 
it can be seen from Figure 6.11 that this was probably attributable to the abnormally 
large variability in the symmetric ±20 condition 10. For ±5 adaptors (i.e., within the 
coding range for both distortions), a quite different result was revealed. Here, 
symmetric showed only marginally more adaptation than asymmetric, and this 
difference was far from significant, t< 1. Overall, these results replicate the symmetric- 
asymmetric difference found in Experiment 10 with moderate and extreme adaptors, but 
also show that the effect is significantly modified by adaptor position (i.e. coding 
range).
Finally, adaptation was compared to zero in each condition in Figure 6.11. For 
symmetric distortions, one-sample t-tests showed significant adaptation for all three 
adaptor levels (all ps < .02). For asymmetric distortions, the generally smaller effects 
were still all significant (ps < .01), including, somewhat surprisingly, the tiny (0.34 
pixels) effect at ±50.
6.4.3 Experiment 11- Discussion
The most interesting finding of Experiment 11 was of the very different 
influence of adaptor position on the aftereffect for the two distortion types. For 
symmetric distortions, the more extreme the adaptor, the larger the adaptation effect.
10 Note that this larger variability may be a real finding. There are likely to be differences between 
subjects in the width of the threshold region (corresponding to slight differences in the shape and/or 
steepness of curves presented in the model in the General Discussion). This would then change the exact 
position of ±20 pixels relative to the threshold for individual subjects.
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For asymmetric distortions, the more extreme the adaptor, the smaller the adaptation 
effect.
The pattem found for symmetric can be interpreted in terms of a standard neural 
model of norm-based aftereffects derived from low- and mid-level vision, in which the 
size of the aftereffect increases as the adaptor shifts further from the norm but remains 
within the coding range of the relevant dimension. As will be discussed in detail in the 
General Discussion, the pattem found for asymmetric is partially, but not entirely, 
consistent with this model. Briefly, the fact that adaptation was largest with the ±5 
adaptor is consistent with the idea that strong adaptation occurs only when the adaptor 
is placed within the narrow coding range for asymmetric distortions. However, the 
finding of weaker adaptation at ±20 and ±50 argues that these adaptor positions must 
have fallen outside the coding range and, if this is the case, the standard model predicts 
no aftereffect, rather than merely a smaller but nonzero effect.
With respect to identity, Experiment 11 showed good generalisation of 
adaptation over adapted/unadapted identity status. This is consistent with Rhodes et al. 
(2003) and the present Experiment 10. It supports the idea that adaptation causes a 
general shift in a face-space norm (Figure 6.4), in that adapting to Bill and Sam not only 
changes perception of these particular individuals, but also changes perception of John 
and Fred. Generalisation results were not exactly as for the first experiment. Previously, 
there was perfect generalisation over identity for both symmetric and asymmetric; 
indeed, in both cases, unadapted individuals showed slightly more adaptation than 
adapted individuals. In the present experiment, there was again perfect generalisation 
for asymmetric distortions, but less than complete generalisation for symmetric 
distortions. From a theoretical perspective, less than complete generalisation is not 
necessarily a surprise, in that the adjust-to-most-like task referenced individual identity. 
However, the rating task of Experiment 10 also referenced individual identity. Thus, the 
reason for the difference in symmetric results across experiments is not clear. My only 
suggestion is that some subjects show greater identity generalisation than others (and it 
can be noted that Experiment 10 tested only 5 participants, while Experiment 11 tested 
24).
A final point is that the overall effect of adaptation in Experiment 11 was 
somewhat smaller than in Experiment 10. Comparing the data for the adaptor level that 
appeared in both experiments (±20), the mean shift in Experiment 11 was 3.07 pixels 
for symmetric and 0.74 pixels for asymmetric, and the mean shift in Experiment 10 was
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4.98 pixels for symmetric and 1.44 pixels for asymmetric. I presume that the smaller 
effects in the “adjust-to-most-like” task than in the rating task can be attributed to the 
time required to make an adjustment (on average, subjects made approximately 8-11 
adjustments taking 7 -  16 s per trial), reflecting some decay of adaptation in the period 
immediately after removal of each top-up adaptor (e.g., see Leopold et al., 2001), or the 
lengthened presentation of the test stimulus (Leopold, Rhodes, Muller, & Jeffery, in 
press).
6.5 Experiment 12: Transfer Of Adaptation Between Orientations
The aim of Experiment 12 was to show that the adaptation found in Experiments 
10 and 11 for upright faces had its origin in the face recognition system, by 
demonstrating zero transfer of adaptation between upright adaptors and inverted test 
faces (and vice versa). Previous research has established that adaptation occurs for 
inverted faces with inverted adaptors (I-I condition); indeed, it is commonly as strong as 
for upright faces with upright adaptors (Leopold et al., 2001; Watson & Clifford, 2003; 
Webster & MacLin. 1999). This does not necessarily mean that adaptation in the U-U 
and I-I conditions is coming from the same source. For example, adaptation for inverted 
faces could arise from generic object recognition processes and/or from shape 
representations in mid-level vision (Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001; Regan & Hamstra, 
1992), rather than from face-specific mechanisms.
To test for different sources, examining transfer across orientations is the 
relevant technique. In previous studies, quite strong transfer has been the usual finding. 
Specifically, an upright adaptor produces a strong perceptual aftereffect on an inverted 
test face and, although the transfer from an inverted adaptor to an upright test face is 
usually weaker, even this is greater than zero (Watson & Clifford, 2003; Webster & 
MacLin, 1999). These findings indicate that, in previous studies, adaptation for upright 
faces and adaptation for inverted faces originated from neural populations that were at 
least partly overlapping, rather than distinct.
Experiment 12 tested the idea that, with the relational-change distortion types 
used in current experiments, adaptation in the orientation mismatch conditions might be 
reduced to zero, thus indicating that adaptation for upright faces could be attributed to
196
face-specific sources. Both symmetric and asymmetric distortions were tested for three 
orientation conditions, namely inverted adaptor-inverted test (I-I), upright 
adaptor-inverted test (U-I) and inverted adaptor-upright test (I-U). The experiment used 
the full-curve rating task of Experiment 10, and the same adaptor position (±20 pixels). 
The rating method was used in preference to the adjustment procedure because it 
produced larger adaptation effects, making any conclusion of no adaptation in the 
orientation mismatch conditions more convincing.
6.5.1 Experiment 12 - Method
6.5.1.1 Subjects.
The experiment used a single-subject approach. Subjects were the four naive 
individuals described in Experiment 10 (S1-S4), paid $10 per session.
6.5.1.2 Design, Stimuli & Procedure.
In addition to the four sessions of Experiment 10 (U-U), each subject 
participated in a further 12 sessions of approximately 40 mins each (8 hrs for 12 
sessions). Each session tested a single adaptor-test orientation condition (e.g., U-I) for 
one distortion type (e.g., symmetric), and one adaptor direction (+20 or -20). For each 
subject, all conditions for I-I and U-U (from Experiment 10) were tested first; these 
were interleaved and, as far as possible, tested in counterbalanced order across subjects. 
After this, all conditions for I-U and U-I were tested; these were again interleaved and 
counterbalanced as far as possible. The minimum delay between sessions was 30 mins 
(and the maximum 18 days); the delay between two sessions testing the same distortion 
type was 1 hr in one case (between U-I -20 symmetric and I-U +20 symmetric, for S4), 
and more than 12 hrs in all other cases, suggesting that carryover should not have been 
a problem.
Experiment 12 used the same task as Experiment 10 (i.e., rating 27 deviation
levels for how much each looked like Bill/Sam/John/Fred). Stimuli and procedure were
as for Experiment 10, with the exception of the changes in stimulus orientation.
Inverted versions of all stimuli were created by rotating the upright versions by 180°.
Note that the identity training at the beginning of each session included both upright and
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inverted orientations. Also note that, for a given condition, orientation for test faces in 
the pre- and post-adaptation phase was always the same. As an example, consider the 
inverted adaptor-upright test condition. Here, the pre-adaptation phase included only 
upright test faces for rating, the adaptor phase showed inverted faces, and the post­
adaptation phase included upright test faces for rating with each trial preceded by an 
inverted top-up adaptor.
6.5.2 Experiment 12 - Results
6.5.2.1 Inverted tests faces and inverted adaptors (I-I).
Before turning to the transfer conditions, I first examined aftereffects when the 
adaptor and test faces were both inverted. In the unadapted state, the open circles in 
Figure 6.12a show identity ratings against deviation level for inverted faces, averaged 
over the four subjects. Data are collapsed across identity and direction of future adaptor. 
The figure shows that Fechner's law still provided good fits to the data for inverted test 
faces.
The pre-adaptation ratings also show that sensitivity to distortion was weaker in 
inverted faces than in upright faces (compare Figure 6.12a to Figure 6.8). The 
subthreshold region was wider in the inverted than in the upright orientation, for both 
symmetric distortions (upright = 11.62, inverted = 14.83) and asymmetric distortions 
(upright = 8.49, inverted = 9.89). These findings are consistent with extensive previous 
evidence that relational changes (altering spacing between features while keeping local 
feature shape constant) affect perception of upright faces more strongly than perception 
of inverted faces (e.g., Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Gilchrist & McKone, 2003; Murray, 
Yong, & Rhodes, 2000).
Finally, with respect to adaptation, Figure 6.12a shows that the aftereffect took 
the form of a simple shift in the rating curve in the direction of the adaptor. This 
allowed shift to be calculated as for upright faces in Experiment 10 (for positive 
adaptors, shift = c Po s t-c pre\ for negative adaptors, shift = c Pr e -c Post). Figure 6.12b then 
shows shift scores for individual subjects. As for upright faces, the aftereffect was 
larger for symmetric than for asymmetric distortions, and this again corresponded to a 
wider threshold in the pre-adaptation ratings. Generalisation over identity for I-I was
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complete, for both symmetric distortions (for adapted identities. Bill and Sam = 5.00; 
for unadapted identities, John and Fred = 5.11), and for asymmetric distortions (Bill and 
Sam = 1.76; John and Fred = 2.51).
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Figure 6.12. Experiment 12: (a) adapted (filled diamonds) and unadapted (open 
circles) data and fits for the inverted adaptor to inverted test face condition (I-I) 
averaged over subjects. To present results efficiently, the data are shown 
collapsed over identity status (adapted vs. unadapted individuals) and also 
direction of adaptor: results for negative adaptor sessions have had the x-axis 
flipped (for both pre-adaptation and post-adaptation) before averaging with 
positive adaptor sessions, so that the adaptor is notionally at "+20" (shown as a 
dotted line). Also shown (b) are the centre-shift scores for individual subjects (as 
described in Figure 6.10, but collapsed over identity of adaptor).
6.5.2.2 Transfer of adaptation across orientation.
Turning to transfer across orientations, the major result of Experiment 12 is 
shown in Figure 6.13 as the shift score for each subject. Essentially no adaptation 
occurred in either of the two orientation mismatch conditions (I-U and U-I). Of the 16 
measurements in the individual-subject data, only one (S3 for U-I symmetric) shows
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any noticeable adaptation. For the fit of the subject-averaged data, the adaptation effect 
was tiny for both symmetric distortions (U-I = -0.08 pixels, I-U = 0.29) and asymmetric 
distortions (U-I = 0.09, I-U = 0.64). The lack of transfer for symmetric distortions is 
particularly compelling given the substantial effects for this distortion type for both U-U 
(Figure 6.10) and I-I (Figure 6.12).
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Figure 6.13. Experiment 12: Effect of mismatching orientation on centre-shift 
score, showing lack of transfer from either upright adaptors to inverted test faces 
(U-I) or from inverted to upright (I-U). Note that the scale is the same as for 
figures showing U-U (Figure 6.10) and I-I (Figure 6.12). Data are collapsed over 
identity and direction of adaptor.
6.5.3 Experiment 12 - Discussion
The finding of strong adaptation when both adaptor and test faces are inverted 
(I-I) replicates several previous findings with other distortion types (Leopold et al.,
2001; Watson & Clifford, 2003; Webster & MacLin, 1999). It is important to note that 
this adaptation does not necessarily come from the same source as that for upright faces.
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Substantial evidence argues that inverted faces are not processed by the same system as 
upright faces (e.g., Rhodes, Jeffery et al., 2004; Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Young et ah, 
1987). Some coding of information about distances between parts must take place 
within non-face object recognition system/s (even if this coding is coarser than takes 
place within the face-specific system), and adaptation may arise within these system/s 
for inverted faces.
The results of the current orientation-mismatch conditions argue that this was 
indeed the case. Experiment 12 obtained essentially no transfer of adaptation across 
orientations (see Figure 6.13). This demonstrates a reliance on distinct, rather than 
overlapping, neural populations for upright and inverted faces. Thus, the aftereffects for 
upright faces in Experiments 10 and 11 must have come from adaptation of cells that 
specifically process upright faces, rather than from other sources of adaptation.
I presume that the use of distortion types that are specifically relational in nature 
was important in achieving this result. (Another relevant factor might have been tasks 
that referenced individual identity, rather than merely face normality.) The global 
expansion/contraction distortions used in previous studies change local feature shape as 
well as the spacing between features (Rhodes et al., 2003; Leopold et ah, 2001; Watson 
& Clifford, 2003; Webster & MacLin, 1999). With local feature distortions, a 
substantial component of adaptation could come from mid-level shape coding 
mechanisms that would show strong transfer across inversion. For example, widened 
eyes could adapt a direction-of-elongation mechanism (Regan & Hamstra, 1992) to 
make the original eyes appear narrowed, and such adaptation would be unaffected by 
180° rotations.
6.6 General Discussion
The major findings of the present study were that (a) for upright faces, 
symmetric distortions of eye height produced more adaptation than asymmetric 
distortions when the adaptor was placed well away from the original norm; (b) 
adaptation for symmetric distortions increased as the distance of the adaptor from the 
norm became more extreme (±5 vs ±20 vs ±50 pixel-per-eye deviation), whereas 
adaptation for asymmetric distortions decreased (although even for ±50, it remained
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significantly above zero); and (c) adaptation disappeared when adapting and test faces 
differed in orientation, indicating that the adaptation for upright faces arose from cells 
tuned specifically to the upright orientation. Other findings were: (d) there was good or 
perfect generalisation of adaptation over identity; and (e) the form of adaptation was a 
simple shift in the curve relating physical to perceived distortion.
I now consider the theoretical implications of these results. I deal first with the 
primary results, namely those for upright faces, in terms of understanding how 
individual faces are coded in face-space, and in terms of developing neural models of 
adaptation for face-space dimensions. Following this, I briefly consider how adaptation 
for inverted faces is to be explained.
6.6.1 Some dimensions in face-space are more adaptable than others.
For upright faces, the representation of individual identity has commonly been 
understood in terms of face-space. The current results regarding the form of adaptation, 
and regarding the generalisation over identity, are consistent with the idea that 
adaptation shifts the face-space norm (Leopold, et al., 2001; Rhodes et al., 2003). This 
shift can be thought of as occurring towards the adaptor, in a trajectory along the 
adapted dimension/s, as illustrated in Figure 6.4.
My major result is then that adaptation differed for symmetric and asymmetric 
eye-height distortions. Previous researchers (Leopold et al., 2001; Rhodes et al., 2004, 
in Rhodes, Robbins, et al., in press) have demonstrated adaptation effects that are 
interpretable within the context of face-space, but have not attempted to contrast 
adaptation for different dimensions. The present study provides the first evidence 
showing that the norm of face-space can be shifted more easily in some directions than 
in others. Specifically, I found that one dimension in face-space (symmetric eye height) 
is more adaptable than another (asymmetric eye height), both in the sense of showing a 
larger aftereffect for certain fixed adaptor positions, and in the sense of showing strong 
adaptation to a wider range of adaptor positions.
In explaining the specific origin of the symmetric-asymmetric difference, I have 
argued that dimensions which need to code a larger range of stimulus values are more 
adaptable than those which need to code a smaller range. Symmetric deviations of eye 
height are associated with large variability in the range of natural face images, partly 
due to large physical variability across individuals (Farkas et al., 1994), and partly due
to up-down head rotation (e.g., nodding) causing further large changes in apparent eyes-
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hairline and eyes-chin distance. Asymmetric differences in eye height are associated 
with much smaller variability: physical measurements indicate little variance in 
asymmetry between the eyes across individuals (Hreczko & Farkas, 1994), and there is 
no three-dimensional head rotation which can alter eye asymmetry with respect to the 
main axis of the face.
6.6.2 What frame of reference does face-space use for coding eve position?
Before turning to possible neural models of the symmetric-asymmetric 
differences, it is worth noting that the results demonstrate something important about 
the reference point/s that face-space uses to code eye height. In particular, they indicate 
that eye height is not coded in terms of individual eye position, nor is it coded with 
respect to only one half of the face (i.e., left half or right half). This conclusion can be 
drawn because the symmetric and asymmetric distortions matched total amount of 
metric deviation from the original. Considering the right eye, for example, this means 
that a symmetric distortion of +20 pixels-per-eye shifted the right eye up by 20 pixels, 
and an asymmetric distortion of +20 pixels-per-eye also shifted the right eye up by 20 
pixels. Thus, if what was happening on the other side of the face was irrelevant, then the 
amount of adaptation for symmetric distortions (right eye up, left eye up) should have 
been the same as the amount of adaptation for asymmetric distortions (right eye up, left 
eye down). The fact that this did not happen indicates that eye height is not coded 
independently for each eye; instead, the position of each eye must be coded in some 
way that takes into account the position of the other.
The present results do not indicate whether the frame of reference for coding eye 
position is with respect to distance from the other features or with respect to the head 
outline (e.g., the hairline and chin). Researchers who have investigated sensitivity to 
relational changes have argued that distance to other features (e.g., eyes-nose distance) 
is important. However, the very large aftereffect obtained with a symmetric ±50 adaptor 
suggests that the height-of-both-eyes-together might also be coded with respect to face 
outline: it is only by allowing for up-down head rotations (which place the eyes near the 
hairline) that there would be any need to code a range of eye heights as extreme as 50 
pixels.
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6.6.3 Neural models of adaptation for face-space dimensions.
At several places in this chapter, I have referred to predictions derived from a 
specific neural model of adaptation, which can be applied to dimensions of face-space. I 
now present this model in detail, and demonstrate how it is able to explain most, but not 
all, of my findings.
Face adaptation aftereffects occur with respect to a single perceptual centre point 
(in the present study, a face with average eye height properties). In low- and mid-level 
vision, aftereffects of this kind have been successfully explained using models (see 
Figure 6.14) based on three simple assumptions. First, the coding of the dimension in 
question relies on two broadly tuned mechanisms that respond maximally to stimuli on 
opposite sides of the norm. For example, Regan and Hamstra (1992) explained coding 
of aspect ratio by presuming that, at some level in the visual pathway, neurons are 
organised functionally into two pools, one of which is preferentially excited by 
vertically elongated stimuli (Pool 1), and the other of which is preferentially excited by 
horizontally elongated stimuli (Pool 2).
Second, any given stimulus produces activation in both pools but, unless the 
stimulus is at the norm, this activation will be stronger in one pool than the other. 
Perception is then determined by considering the output from both pools simultaneously 
(as either the difference or the ratio of the outputs). Thus, for example, a vertically 
elongated stimulus is perceived as “tall and thin” because Pool 1 is firing more than 
Pool 2; a square is perceived as square because Pool 1 and Pool 2 are firing equally; and 
a horizontally elongated stimulus is perceived as “short and fat” because Pool 2 is firing 
more than Pool 1.
The third basic assumption is that adaptation causes each pool to reduce its 
firing rate in proportion to the strength of its initial unadapted response (e.g., Maddess, 
McCourt, Blakeslee, & Cunningham, 1988). After adaptation to a vertically elongated 
stimulus, therefore, the response of Pool 1 will be reduced more than the response of 
Pool 2, shifting the point of equal response levels -  and the physical stimulus now 
perceived as being square -  in the direction of vertical elongation.
204
new cross-over point, 
i.e., face perceived as
most normal after 
adaptation
face perceived as most 
normal prior to adaptation
adaptor position
Pool 2Pool 1
_  i_  _  _r
aspect-ratio
Vertically
elongated
Horizontally
elongated
height of 
both eyes
Below average 
eye height
Above average 
eye height
Figure 6.14. Two-pool neural mechanism for coding an opponent dimension, with 
an explanation of how the adaptation aftereffect occurs. Two pools of cells code 
deviations on each side of the norm. The cross-over point of these then gives the 
stimulus perceived as most normal. Solid lines show the response of pools of 
cells without adaptation. Dashed lines show the response after adaptation, that is, 
the perceived norm shifts towards the adaptor because Pool 2 is reduced by a 
larger amount than Pool 1.
I now consider how well this type of model can explain the current face 
aftereffects. Figure 6.14 indicates how the model can be applied to coding of a height- 
of-both-eyes-together dimension in face-space (corresponding to the symmetric 
distortion), where the two pools are preferentially excited by eyes-up and eyes-down 
stimuli respectively. In the unadapted state, an undistorted face stimulus is perceived as
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most like the target individual because the eyes-up pool and the eyes-down pool are 
firing equally. After adaptation to an eyes-up face, the response of the eyes-up pool will 
be reduced more than that of the eyes-down pool, shifting the stimulus perceived as 
most like the target (i.e., the crossover point of equal response from both pools) towards 
the eyes-up direction, and making the original undistorted stimulus perceived as having 
its eyes down. This idea also implies that perception on both sides of the norm will shift 
in same direction (i.e., both an eyes-down stimulus and an eyes-up stimulus will appear 
to have higher eyes after adaptation than before). This is consistent with the current 
results indicating a simple shift in the overall rating curve.
Turning to the effects of adaptor position, the model predicts that the size of the 
aftereffect will increase as the adaptor becomes more extreme within the range covered 
by the two pools. This is because the relative change in the output of the two pools -  
and thus the amount of shift in the crossover point -  will be greatest when the adaptor is 
located in a region producing very different initial responses from each pool (e.g., very 
strong response from Pool 1, very weak from Pool 2). This is illustrated in Figure 6.15a. 
For symmetric deviations of eye height, this figure assumes a large coding range of -60 
to + 60 pixels-per-eye (see Introduction to Experiment 11 for justification), and marks 
the approximate location of the +5, +20 and +50 adaptors within this range. For a 5 
pixel eyes-up (+5) adaptor, the shift in the norm after adaptation will be relatively small, 
because the eyes-up and eyes-down pools are initially firing at only moderately 
different levels, meaning that the reduction in firing rate for the eyes-up pool will be 
only a small amount more than for the eyes-down pool. For a +20 adaptor, the shift in 
norm will be larger, because the initial difference in firing rate between the two pools is 
larger. For a +50 adaptor, the initial difference is larger again and, indeed, the firing of 
the eyes-down pool would barely be affected at all while the eyes-up pool would be 
strongly affected, leading to the largest possible shift in the norm ".In  the case of the 
symmetric distortion, these predictions of the “large range two-pool model” (Figure 
6.15a) fully match the results, in which the aftereffect increased with increasing adaptor 
distortion.
11 For adaptors beyond ±60, the normal “first-order” configuration of the face (i.e., eyes below hairline 
and above nose) would be broken. I suspect that adaptors outside this range (e.g. an adaptor with the eyes 
above the top of the head) would probably not produce an adaptation aftereffect.
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Figure 6.15. Example two-pool neural models for the (a) symmetric distortion 
and (b) asymmetric distortion. The relative position of the adaptors used to the 
coding range are shown (only positive adaptors are shown, the position of 
negative adaptors would be exactly reversed).
For the asymmetric distortion, it is possible to explain some of the results (but 
not all) in terms of a model that simply covers a smaller range of stimulus values than 
for symmetric. This “small range two-pool model” is illustrated in Figure 6.15b.
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Assuming that the range of asymmetric eye height values coded is approximately -10 to 
+ 10 pixels-per-eye (again, see Experiment 11 for justification), the +5 pixel adaptor will 
be within the coding range of the two pools, while both the +20 and +50 adaptors will 
fall outside it. This model correctly predicts the finding of clear adaptation for 
asymmetric distortions with a ±5 adaptor. It also correctly predicts that the shift in the 
norm will be smaller for ±20 and ±50 adaptors than for ±5. However, it is only able to 
predict this because the 20 or 50 adaptors activate neither pool, and, under this 
circumstance, the model would produce no shift in the norm at all (i.e., no adaptation). 
This prediction is inconsistent with the finding of small but significant aftereffects for 
asymmetric distortions with ±20 and ±50 adaptors.
Is it possible to modify the “small range” model, by assuming that the tuning 
curves for each pool turn around at larger stimulus values? In Figure 6.16a, I have 
assumed that maximum firing in either pool will be reached quite close to the norm, but 
that, rather than the response dropping to zero outside this range, the curves falls off 
sharply at moderate deviation levels but have very extended tails. In the unadapted 
state, this would allow detailed perception of small differences in eye asymmetry for 
small deviation levels, and some degree of sensitivity to extreme asymmetric 
distortions, properties that would seem not unreasonable if neural resources are 
allocated efficiently. In terms of adaptation, the “turnaround” model is able to explain 
the small but nonzero adaptation for ±50 adaptors, because pre-adaptation output from 
the two pools is slightly different. Also, if the tuning curves had the shape indicated in 
the figure, it can successfully predict that adaptation for ±20 should be greater than for 
±50 (because the pre-adaptation difference in pool output is larger) and less than for ±5 
(because the pre-adaptation difference is smaller).
Although the “turnaround” model appears to explain the results very nicely, it 
has one very unfortunate drawback. Regardless of whether a difference readout or a 
ratio readout from the two pools is assumed, this model falsely predicts the existence of 
metamers (Figures 6.16b and c). The term metamer is derived from colour vision, where 
it refers to different physical stimuli which produce the same percept (for example, the 
percept of white can be produced by multiple combinations of three wavelengths). Any 
two-pool model that allows response curves to decrease, rather than consistently 
increasing towards an asymptote, will predict metamers. For example, if we assumed 
that response curves took the specific shape drawn, then the difference readout (Figure 
6.16b) indicates that the -45 stimulus and the -5 stimulus should be perceived as
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identical. These face metamers clearly do not exist; indeed, two very different eye- 
height deviations will never look the same to observers.
(a) Turnaround model
ü
■nco
cL
Ü
<— ,
■Si
face perceived 
as most normal
1 | 
! i
pre-adaptation ~ 1 A  1 
\ \  \
/  1 ! 1
right-up/
left-down
left-up/right /  /
-down pool /  /
K i\
IVi pool
i i
+5 +20 +50
(b) difference readout (c) ratio readout
1 0 - <
-40 -30  -20  -10 0 15 20  25 3045  -40-35  - : 0 -25 - 2 0 - 15-10  -5 0  5
eg metamers
deviation (pixcls-pcr-cyc)
Figure 6.16. (a) The "turnaround" model shown with the positive adaptors. Also 
shown are (b) the difference readout and (c) the ratio readout of the model 
showing that in both cases metamers exist (i.e. two deviations levels which 
produce the same output values).
The resolution of this problem remains unclear. The standard alternative model 
from early vision is a series of narrow-band mechanisms. These have been used to 
explain effects that do not occur with respect to a single perceptual norm, such as the tilt 
aftereffect for line orientation, and the change in the contrast sensitivity function for
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spatial frequency (e.g., Blakemore & Campbell, 1969). This type of model would 
appear to be unsuitable here. It would predict “notch"' adaptation, in which the largest 
change in perception occurs at the adaptor position and the pre- and post-adaptation 
rating curves rejoin fairly close to the adaptor location. In contrast, the current results 
(see Figure 6.9) showed that the greatest change in ratings always occurred partway 
between the original norm and the adaptor, with perception affected for a large range of 
deviation levels.
Given these issues, how is the problematic nonzero adaptation for moderate and 
extreme asymmetric adaptors to be interpreted? If it is certain that this adaptation arose 
from within face-space, my results argue that adaptation for asymmetric eye-height 
deviations cannot be explained within either of the types of standard models derived 
from low-/mid-level vision. This suggests that new models may need to be developed to 
fully explain high-level adaptation effects. However, an alternate idea is that, despite the 
orientation-transfer results of Experiment 12, a very small amount of adaptation for 
upright faces (perhaps covering the 0.34 pixel effect for ±50 adaptors) could be coming 
from mid-level vision mechanisms. For example, if there were a generic “equal height” 
or “symmetry” mechanism that could be adapted (e.g., adapting to two items with the 
left one lower than the right could make equal-height items appear to have the right one 
shifted up), then a small aftereffect for asymmetric eye height outside its coding range 
in face-space could potentially be explained.
Overall, I have presented a two-pool neural model that can neatly explain the 
coding of symmetric deviations of eye height within face-space, and the resulting 
patterns of adaptation. By simply reducing the range of stimulus values coded, the same 
model is also capable of explaining the most important difference in pattern observed 
for the asymmetric distortions, namely the opposite direction of adaptor position effects 
for asymmetric than for symmetric (although the origin of the nonzero effect for 
asymmetric ±20 and ±50 adaptors remains uncertain). The general success of the neural 
modelling approach used here argues that, in the long-term, it will be feasible to 
discover how specific dimensions of face-space are coded at the neural level, using 
adaptation results.
6.6.4 A limitation to using adaptation to explore face-space dimensions.
It is important to note that there is one question about face-space that adaptation 
alone cannot answer. So far, I have referred to different distortion types as
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corresponding to different “dimensions” of face-space, and at first glance, the distortion 
types chosen (e.g., height of both eyes) might seem natural candidates for “core 
dimensions” or “cardinal axes” of this space. However, I am not necessarily claiming 
that this is the case. To explain this, consider colour-space as an example. In the 
standard theory of colour-space, each hue is represented in terms of its position on two 
cardinal axes, a red-green axis and a blue-yellow axis, with white forming the 
perceptual norm at the centre. However, our knowledge that red-green and blue-yellow 
are cardinal, as opposed to purple-lime and turquoise-orange, comes from 
electrophysiology (e.g., De Valois, Smith, Kaitai, & Karoly, 1958), and not from 
adaptation studies. Although adaptation to red causes white to appear green, it is just as 
much the case that adaptation to purple causes white to appear lime. Thus, the mere 
existence of a norm-based aftereffect does not indicate that the dimension tested is 
cardinal, rather than being formed from a composite of the true underlying axes.
6.6.5 What do the present results tell us about the processing of inverted faces?
The theoretical discussion above applies to upright faces. While upright faces 
are the primary focus of this chapter, I will now briefly consider the explanation of 
adaptation for inverted faces (with inverted adaptors).
In the present study, results for upright and inverted faces were different in that, 
in the pre-adaptation ratings, the below-threshold region was wider for inverted than for 
upright faces (replicating McKone et al., submitted). This confirms many studies 
showing that sensitivity to second-order relational changes is relatively poor in inverted 
faces. In terms of adaptation, however, empirical results for inverted faces with inverted 
adaptors were similar in many ways to those for upright faces with upright adaptors (see 
Figure 6.12).
Clearly, adaptation for inverted faces, like that for upright faces, occurs with 
respect to a norm. This is true in the present research (e.g., an inverted eyes-up face 
made an inverted undistorted face appear eyes-down) and also in previous studies that 
have shown adaptation of identity in face-space (adapting to inverted anti-Tim made the 
inverted average face appear like Tim; Leopold et al., 2001) and adaptation of perceived 
sex (adapting to an inverted male face made an inverted sex-neutral face appear female; 
Rhodes, Jeffery et al., 2004). However, it is also apparent that the norm accessed by 
inverted faces must be different from that accessed by upright faces. The lack of transfer 
across orientations (Experiment 12) argues that the source of the aftereffects for
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inverted faces was different from that for upright. Also note that in Rhodes, Jeffery et 
al. (2004), it was shown that opposite aftereffects can simultaneously be induced to 
upright and inverted faces, again indicating different norms.
I suggest that inverted face adaptation might be explained as follows: inverted 
faces are rotated (or otherwise adjusted) to upright and compared to a norm, but within 
an object recognition system rather than the face system. This idea appears quite 
plausible, from a number of perspectives. First, the idea that inverted faces are 
processed within generic object system/s is a common one in the face literature, and is 
consistent with many empirical findings (e.g., Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1995; 
Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997; Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Second, the idea 
that the object system can perform rotation (e.g., Jolicoeur, 1985; Lawson & Jolicoeur, 
1998; McKone & Grenfell, 1999), but the face system cannot, is also consistent with 
evidence that the holistic component of face processing cannot be learned for inverted 
faces even with extensive practice (Chapter 3; McKone, Martini & Nakayama, 2001). 
Third, the claim that the object system can form norms is perfectly reasonable, given 
that the ability to form prototypes is a standard part of all human categorisation 
processes (e.g., Williams, Fryer, & Aiken, 1977). Finally, the current finding that, in the 
unadapted state, sensitivity to eye height deviations was weaker for inverted faces than 
for upright faces is consistent with a common idea that, while the face system codes 
very detailed information about distances between parts, object processing codes only 
coarse relations (e.g., Beiderman, 1987).
6.6.6 Conclusion.
The present study has demonstrated that some dimensions of face-space are 
more adaptable than others and that these effects for upright faces can be attributed to 
processing specifically within the face recognition system. I have also provided a neural 
model of the adaptation effects, including those of adaptor position, that works well for 
symmetric distortions of eye height, if not entirely so for asymmetric distortions. Taken 
together, the empirical results and theoretical ideas I have introduced suggest that future 
adaptation studies will provide much valuable insight into the structure of face-space. A 
particularly valuable approach is to compare adaptation for different types of simple 
distortions, corresponding to displacement along different trajectories in face-space.
In terms of future research, testing both additional relational distortions (e.g.,
nose shifts, mouth shifts) and also local feature distortions (e.g., wide vs. narrow eyes,
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or thin vs. fat lips), are likely to be useful. Testing adaptation to relational-only or 
featural-only changes, in both upright and inverted orientations, would be of particular 
interest, given the literature suggesting that perception of relational changes is more 
affected by inversion than perception of local feature changes. Theoretically, studies of 
this type may begin to bring together the two major, but currently largely independent, 
theoretical approaches in face recognition. The concept of face-space has been used to 
explain the representation of individual identity, and also distinctiveness, attractiveness, 
caricature and cross-race effects (see Chapter 2). Independently, the concept of 
holistic/configural/relational processing has been used to explain differences between 
upright and inverted faces, and between faces and objects. To date, only a few studies 
(e.g., Leder & Bruce, 1998) have made reference to both ideas simultaneously, or 
attempted to theoretically integrate these two important ideas.
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CHAPTER 7: FACES, OBJECTS AND EXPERIENCE: THEORETICAL
CONCLUSIONS AND EMPIRICAL ADVANCES
This chapter forms the General Discussion for the thesis as a whole. The 
empirical work (Chapters 3-6) has been presented as four more-or-less independent 
papers, with substantial theoretical discussion of the results included within each 
chapter. The details of those discussions will not be repeated here. Instead, the role of 
this chapter is to briefly draw together the major findings of the thesis, and put them 
back into the context of the general theoretical questions raised in the Introduction 
(Chapters 1 and 2).
Chapter 7 begins with a summary of the major empirical results and 
methodological advances made in the thesis (Section 7.1). Turning to theoretical 
questions, in Section 7.2,1 then consider the results in relations to the two aims of the 
thesis stated at the beginning of Chapter 1, namely to contribute to the debate on 
whether holistic/configural processing is specific to the domain of faces, and to use the 
effects of experience to explore the representations of faces as individuals within face- 
space. Following this, in Section 7.3,1 link the present results with more general 
previous literature to address the question raised in the title of the thesis, namely “What 
changes with experience for face and object processing?”.
7.1 New empirical findings from this thesis
The major new empirical results of the thesis fall into four groups. These 
correspond to the four experimental chapters.
In Chapter 3 ,1 showed that holistic/configural processing does not develop for 
inverted faces with practice. Despite using stimuli designed to encourage maximum 
reliance on holistic information -  multiple photographs of identical twins in different 
views -  extensive experimental training (8 hrs) with inverted faces produced no 
evidence of holistic processing. There was no composite effect for inverted faces, and 
subjects who had learned to identify the twins inverted did so almost entirely by 
developing very local feature strategies (e.g., a difference in eyebrow grooming) that 
would not provide a viable means of achieving face recognition in real world settings.
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In Chapter 4, in preparation for testing dog experts, I examined the performance 
of dog novices on three tasks, each of which contrasted results for face stimuli with 
results for labrador stimuli. Despite the requirement for within-class discrimination in 
every task, and the fact that dogs provide a stimulus class well-matched to faces (e.g., 
they have genetic variability, fuzzy part boundaries, etc), no evidence of face-like 
processing was found. Results of a recognition memory task replicated the standard 
finding of a much larger inversion effect for faces than for dogs. A contrast reversal test 
replicated previously found substantial effects of contrast reversal for faces, but found 
only a very weak effect for dogs; this experiment provided the first test of contrast 
reversal effects for a natural object class for which shape-from-shading information is 
potentially useful. The composite task replicated the standard composite effect for faces, 
but found no effect for dogs; this provided the first test of the composite task for any 
class of natural object. In addition to the new empirical results, this chapter produced an 
important methodological contribution, namely the evidence that the composite task 
provides a purer measure of the type of holistic/configural processing used for faces 
than other standard tasks: these tasks (inversion, part-whole) produce effects for objects 
that are smaller for objects than for faces but are still greater than zero, while the 
composite task has now been shown to produce no effect for both a natural object class 
(dogs), and, previously, for an artificial object class (greebles).
In Chapter 5, dog experts were tested on the tasks of Chapter 4. Experts had 5- 
37 yrs experience with labradors (mean = 23 yrs), and there was evidence of genuine 
expertise both anecdotally (e.g., experts commented on which dogs were US-bred and 
which Australian-bred), and behaviourally (e.g., the older experts showed poorer 
performance on faces than the younger novices, but better performance on dogs). 
Despite this, findings for experts looking at dog stimuli exactly matched those of 
novices -  that is, a small inversion effect on memory, a weak contrast reversal effect, 
and no composite effect -  rather than the patterns observed in both subject groups with 
face stimuli. Thus, even with substantial real-world expertise, processing of objects 
remained part-based rather than holistic.
In Chapter 6 ,1 examined adaptation aftereffects for upright faces within face- 
space. Results showed that it was easier to temporarily shift the norm of face-space in 
some directions than in others, with more adaptability along a dimension associated 
with large variability, and less adaptability along a dimension associated with small 
variability. For adaptors placed a long way from the original norm, symmetric
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distortions of eye height showed a larger aftereffect than asymmetric distortions of eye 
height, and symmetric distortions also produced strong adaptation for a wider range of 
adaptor positions than did asymmetric distortions. This study is the first to use simple 
relational distortions, and to contrast adaptability for different relational changes.
Results suggest that this approach, as opposed to using more global distortions, provides 
a valuable new method for investigating the structure of face-space.
7.2 Revisiting the aims of the thesis
The theoretical questions addressed by each empirical chapter can be grouped 
into two overall aims. The first of these was to investigate the theory of domain- 
specificity for faces; the second was to investigate the representation of individual faces 
within face-space.
7.2.1 Domain-specificity for faces, versus alternative ideas.
The domain-specificity view states that faces per se are “special” in comparison 
to other objects, and moreover that it is particularly upright faces that are special. This 
is claimed to involve specialised neural processing for faces (i.e., involving the 
Fusiform Face Area), and also a specialised cognitive processing style (i.e., 
holistic/configural processing). Two major alternatives to the domain-specificity idea 
have been put forward in the literature: the within-class discrimination hypothesis, and 
the expertise hypothesis. Both can be assessed by comparing upright faces to inverted 
faces and by comparing faces to non-face objects.
Many results in the present thesis are consistent with the standard position that 
upright faces are special compared to inverted faces. The inversion effect on recognition 
memory was much larger for faces than for dogs (Chapter 4), replicating many studies 
beginning with Yin (1969). The composite effect, indicating holistic processing, was 
present for upright faces but not inverted faces (Chapters 3, 4, 5), replicating Young, 
Hellawell and Hay (1987) and others. Sensitivity to second-order relational changes was 
greater for upright faces than for inverted faces (Chapter 6), also replicating many 
previous findings (e.g., Leder & Bruce, 1998); although no direct comparison to a local 
feature change was included, this result is at least consistent with the idea that spacing
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information forms a key part of the holistic/configural processing for upright faces (e.g., 
Maurer, Le Grand and Mondloch, 2002). In addition to these results indicating special 
processing at a behavioural level, evidence of special processing at the neural level was 
also obtained. In the adaptation study (Chapter 6), there was no transfer of adaptation 
across orientations, arguing that, consistent with the findings of Rhodes, Jeffery et al. 
(2004), upright and inverted faces are processed by independent groups of cells.
The next question was whether faces are special in comparison to other objects, 
when both stimulus classes are shown upright. Results here clearly supported domain- 
specificity.
The idea that task requirements for within-class discrimination (particularly, 
discrimination at the individual level) would be sufficient to produce “special” 
processing for objects had already been largely disproved by previous literature (see all 
of Chapter 1). The results of Chapter 4 confirmed this conclusion: when subjects had no 
particular expertise with the stimulus class, processing style for dogs did not match that 
for faces in three tests requiring reference to individual identity (inversion effects on 
memory, contrast reversal, and composite task).
Most authors accept that the within-class discrimination hypothesis is no longer 
viable (although see Tarr, 2003), but many see the expertise hypothesis as a likely 
alternative to domain-specificity, or even as having been clearly demonstrated to be 
correct (see Discussion of Chapter 5). According to the expertise hypothesis, faces 
appear “special” only due to normal adults' expertise at within-class discrimination for 
faces compared to their lack of expertise at within-class discrimination for other objects. 
The expertise hypothesis predicts that any class of object should also show the 
hallmarks of face-like processing, when all exemplars share a first-order configuration 
and when the subject has sufficient expertise to take advantage of minor second-order 
differences between exemplars (Diamond & Carey, 1986).
The literature review in Chapter 5 made it clear that the evidence previously 
interpreted as favouring the expertise hypothesis is in fact much weaker than commonly 
assumed, and that many studies do not support it at all. My own results also argue 
against it. The lack of learning of holistic processing for inverted faces (Chapter 3) is of 
some relevance, in that the amount of training used (8 hrs) was as much as in the studies 
claiming to have found holistic processing for greebles (e.g., Gauthier & Tarr, 1997, 
2002; Gauthier, Williams, Tarr & Tanaka, 1998). Of course, this study alone does not 
disprove the expertise hypothesis: greater experience might be required, or the previous
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existence of holistic processing in the upright orientation might interfere with its 
acquisition for inverted faces. The lack of holistic processing for dogs in dog experts, 
however, is compelling evidence against the expertise hypothesis. In this case, the 
experts in question had many years' experience at making individual-level 
discriminations of the particular breed of dogs used as stimuli (labradors), and 
substantially more experience than that required to produce holistic processing of faces 
in children (at most 4 years, and possibly much less; see Chapter 2). Despite this, no 
holistic processing emerged, even in the upright orientation, namely the orientation with 
which the experts' lifetime experience had been gained.
Overall, this thesis has argued that neither the within-class discrimination 
hypothesis nor the expertise hypothesis can be supported. Instead, it seems that it is 
faces per se that are “special”.
7.2.2 Possible origins of domain-specificity for faces.
While my empirical results support domain-specificity for faces, my 
experiments have not addressed the origin of this domain-specificity. Given the 
evidence that expertise obtained in late childhood or adulthood with objects does not 
produce the same type of processing as occurs naturally for faces, it would seem that 
there is either an innate component to holistic processing for faces, and/or that 
something important occurs in infancy or early childhood to establish it.
A review of the possible origins was provided in Chapter 2. Briefly, there is 
some evidence that newborn babies have a preference for upright-face-like stimuli (e.g., 
Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991), although not everyone is convinced that it 
is the face-like aspects of the stimuli to which infants are responding in these tests (e.g., 
Cassia, Turati, & Simion, 2004). There is also some evidence suggesting that, while 7 
month infants can discriminate individual faces well (Fagan, 1979), at the same age 
they are poor at discriminating between non-face objects (Bonatti, Frot, Zangl &
Mehler, 2002), although well-controlled studies in this area (e.g., individual face 
discrimination versus individual dog discrimination) do not appear to have been run. 
Studies such as these are consistent with the suggestion by Johnson and colleagues that 
there is an innate representation of basic face structure (they propose this is located 
subcortically), which biases newborns' attention towards faces, and drives rapid 
development of the ability to distinguish between individual people based on their 
faces. It is also clear that any such innate representation requires appropriate visual
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input during a critical period in early infancy (very approximately, before the first 3 
months of life), given the studies showing that patients with congenital bilateral or left- 
eye cataracts fail to develop holistic face processing even after many years of exposure 
to faces after removal of the cataracts (Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2001, 
2003, 2004).
While the idea of some innate component to “special” face recognition is a 
common one, I have also noted (Chapter 2, Chapter 5), that it is not the only possibility. 
It may instead be that the cortical area associated with face recognition in adults has, at 
the beginning of life, the capacity to learn holistic processing for any stimulus class of 
which enough exemplars are seen during the critical period. Given that most parents 
would be unwilling to bring up their newborn infant with close-up exposure to as many 
different dogs (for example) as the infant sees faces, this hypothesis cannot be ethically 
tested in humans. In terms of future research, it would be interesting to know whether 
baby monkeys raised primarily looking at a class of non-face objects, or at inverted 
faces (in an otherwise upright world), would develop evidence of face-like processing 
for these stimuli. (Note that this test would require first demonstrating that monkeys 
show the same hallmarks of holistic processing as do humans for upright faces, such as 
the composite effect.)
Currently, the origins of “special” processing for faces remain unclear. The fact 
that two reasonable mechanisms for domain-specificity in adults can be outlined, 
however, demonstrates the theoretical viability of the view. Also note that, even if 
development during early infancy of face-like processing for other objects were 
discovered to be possible under specialised circumstances (e.g., monkeys raised with 
pictures of dogs rather than with monkey/human faces), these circumstances would be 
extremely unlikely to ever occur for a human baby, given the small chance of seeing 
appropriate stimuli during the critical period. Thus, to all intents and purposes, face- 
recognition in humans would remain domain-specific.
7.2.3 Understanding the representations of individual (upright) faces.
The second aim of this thesis was contribute to our understanding of how faces 
themselves are represented, focussing on norm-based coding and the theory of face- 
space. Addressing this aim formed a smaller part of the thesis than addressing domain- 
specificity. However, some interesting conclusions may be drawn here too. My results 
(Chapter 6) supported previous ideas that faces are coded with respect to a norm, or
average face, and that adaptation can shift perception relative to this norm. Moreover, I
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have shown that, while the norm of face-space is quite changeable in the short term, it is 
changeable only in specific ways that are affected by long-term experience. In 
particular, the amount by which the norm can be shifted (measured both by the range of 
adaptors which produce an aftereffect and the size of the aftereffect at specific adaptor 
positions) is related to the range of values (e.g., eye-heights) previously experienced on 
a particular dimension. This is an important and novel conclusion.
In terms of future research, it would be interesting to test adaptation for various 
objects. Some kind of adaptation for objects seems entirely likely. Even more 
interesting would be to see whether dissociations between populations of neurons 
coding objects and upright faces could be found, similar to the dissociation which has 
been shown between upright and inverted faces (Chapter 6; Rhodes, Jeffery et ah,
2004).
7.3 What changes with experience for face and object processing?
At the most general level, both topics of the present thesis -  domain-specificity 
of face recognition and face-space coding of individuals -  are related via a general 
question about the effects of experience on face and object processing. The timescales 
of this experience are, of course, quite different in each case: domain-specificity is 
addressed by asking whether face-like “special” processing can develop for other 
stimuli with many hours or years of practice, while face-space coding is addressed by 
examining the effects of a few minutes or seconds of adaptation. To draw these two 
parts of the thesis together, in this final section I consider the results in terms of 
summarising what does, and does not, change with experience for upright faces, 
inverted faces, and non-face objects. For each stimulus type, I consider the effects of 
experience on holistic processing, on norm-based coding/face-space, and on other 
important aspects of processing not specifically tested in the present thesis; I also 
consider timescales ranging from minutes to lifetime exposure.
7.3.1 What changes with experience for upright faces?
One of the most important aspects of upright face processing -  holistic 
processing -  seems to change very little with experience, at least after early infancy.
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Holistic processing is present in 4-year old children, the youngest age-group 
comprehensively tested (e.g., McKone & Boyer, submitted; Pellicano & Rhodes, 2003). 
There is also suggestive evidence of its presence in 7-month olds (integration across 
internal and external features, Cohen & Cashon, 2001). However, although it is clear 
that extensive lifetime experience is not needed to develop holistic processing for 
upright faces, there is evidence that experience with faces is needed during the critical 
period in early infancy (Le Grand et al., 2001, 2003, 2004).
Discrimination of individual faces is also good from an early age. For example, 
newborns are able to discriminate their mother from a stranger at 4 hours old (Pascalis, 
de Schonen, Morton, Deruelle, & Fabregrenet, 1995), and by 7 months old infants can 
discriminate two similar unknown faces (Fagan, 1979). Experience can act to de-tune 
the ability to discriminate individuals of another species. Infants do not show a cross­
species deficit (discriminating monkey faces vs. discriminating human faces) at 6 
months old, but they do at 9 months old. This is similar to the finding that newborns can 
discriminate all phonemes but that, with experience, they loose the ability to 
discriminate those phonemes not present in the native language to which they are 
exposed (e.g., Werker & Tees, 1984).
With respect to face-space, it is likely that further tuning of the dimensions used 
to individuate faces occurs throughout life. Cross-race deficits occur when the subject is 
unfamiliar with another race, but seem to be smaller with more experience of that race 
(e.g., Rhodes, 1993) even when that experience is gained as an adult (e.g., Tanaka, 
Kiefer, & Bukach, 2004).
With respect to short-term changes in face-space, representations of norm/s may 
also change in response to short-term experience (e.g., Leopold, O'Toole, Vetter, & 
Blanz, 2001; Rhodes, Jeffery, Watson, Clifford, & Nakayama, 2003; Webster & 
MacLin, 1999). This thesis has shown that they do so in ways based on previous long­
term experience. In particular, the amount of adaptation possible (both in terms of the 
size of the aftereffect and the range of values at which adaptation occurs) is linked to 
the variability or range which a particular dimension needs to be able to code for real 
faces.
7.3.2 What changes with experience for inverted faces?
With respect to holistic processing, subjects do not holistically process inverted
faces, instead using part-based processing, and this style of processing does not change
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after extensive experimental practice (Chapter 3; see also McKone, Martini, & 
Nakayama, 2001). Of course, such experience is gained as an adult; that is, after the end 
of the critical period for developing holistic processing for upright faces. It is possible 
that if an infant were raised seeing only inverted faces during the critical period there 
would be holistic processing for these instead of upright faces.
Norm-based coding seems to occur for inverted faces as well as for upright 
faces, although evidence suggests that different norms are used for each (Chapter 6; 
Rhodes, Jeffery et al., 2004). It seems likely that inverted faces are processed in the 
object system where coding of relational (spacing) information is much more coarse 
than the coding of relational information available for representations of upright faces. 
The development of a norm for inverted faces, like that for upright faces, presumably 
comes from averaging lifetime experience. Moreover, like the norm for upright faces, 
the norm for inverted faces can be temporarily shifted by adaptation (Chapter 6; 
Leopold et al., 2001; Rhodes, Jeffery7 et al., 2004; Webster & MacLin, 1999).
7.3.3 What changes with experience for objects?
There are many interesting questions pertaining to objects and experience, here I 
have been interested in only a sub-set of these. In particular I have looked at the effects 
of experience on object perception in the context of possible developments of face-like 
processing.
With respect to holistic processing, even after many years of experience, objects 
are not processed in the same way as upright faces. Instead processing style remains the 
same as in novices (i.e., part-based), although, as with inverted faces, people become 
better at using this style to differentiate individual exemplars of the stimulus class 
(Chapter 5). When discussing object processing in this context it is important to note the 
particular use of the term “holistic” in the face recognition literature. There is no doubt 
that objects are in some sense processed in terms of the whole, even without extensive 
experience. For example, small part-whole effects are found for a range of objects 
(Davidoff & Donnelly, 1990; Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; 
Tanaka et al., 1996, cited in Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997). Similarly, object superiority 
effects exist for discriminating lines in the context of more complex shapes (e.g., Enns 
& Gilani, 1988). However, I believe it is clear from the studies reviewed and conducted 
in this thesis that such “whole-based” processing is not the same as the
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holistic/configural processing used for upright faces, despite possible confusions caused 
by the terminology.
With respect to norm-based coding, it is clear that prototypes (i.e., norms) can 
form for objects (e.g., Williams, Fryer, & Aiken, 1977). Similarly, objects which are 
more average are seen as more attractive (Halberstadt & Rhodes, 2000, 2003). 
Caricature effects are also found for bird experts looking at very similar birds; that is 
caricatures were recognised more quickly than anti-caricatures (Rhodes & McLean, 
1990). These findings argue that, as for faces, norms for objects can be developed that 
reflect the range of real world experience. Whether short-term adaptation effects occurs 
for objects norms has not been tested.
Finally, experience may, of course, change object processing in other ways. In 
one well-known effect, experience at recognising inverted objects seems to remove 
inversion effects on naming time with little practice (McKone & Grenfell, 1999; Tarr & 
Pinker, 1989; as noted above, inversion effects for faces remain even after extensive 
practice). Experience may also cause a downward shift in the level at which objects are 
first categorised, so that an expert bird-watcher would be more likely to say “robin” 
rather then “bird” when presented with a robin (K. E. Johnson & Mervis, 1997; Tanaka 
& Taylor, 1991). While this is similar to faces (Tanaka, 2001) the present thesis has 
made it clear that objects are not processed like faces in many other ways.
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